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Abstract 
Civil society has been in operation under one-Party rule in Vietnam for a number of years since Doi 
Moi policy was launched in 1986. Conventional scholarship holds that civil society, under an 
authoritarian state, is either heavily repressed or co-opted by the state. The emergence and 
development of a reasonably genuine civil society in the past two decades in an authoritarian state 
like Vietnam thus raises an intriguing puzzle. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the development of Vietnam’s civil society in the one-
party system over the past two decades. At a certain level, civil society has only reluctantly been 
“tolerated” by the party-state but at the same time has played an important role in the nation’s 
governance network and national development. Given the party-state’s continuing suspicion over 
the potential threat of civil society to regime stability and subsequent discouragement of its 
existence, it has never been an easy project for civil society to make its way into Vietnamese 
society.  
The core argument of this thesis is that power is diffused in civil society and generates pressure for 
incremental socio-political changes. Civil society in Vietnam is not only viable, engaging and 
contemporary but also increasingly embraces a more overt, vocal, and contentious character. An 
unprecedented range of actors including state, non-state, quasi-state and hybrid ones engage in 
critical debates on democratic freedoms, transparency, accountability, and meaningful participation. 
I examine these critical issues across four key functional areas of governance: law-making related to 
civil society, poverty reduction, environment, and anti-corruption. Counter-hegemonic manoeuvres 
are present in these four themes, revealing complex aspects of struggles around ideas and values in 
state–civil society relations. These struggles serve as fundamental platforms for the changing 
dynamics of governance in Vietnam.  
  
 
  
ii 
  
ii 
 
Declaration by author 
This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or 
written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly 
stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis. 
I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical 
assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial 
advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis 
is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree 
candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for 
the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have 
clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. 
I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, 
subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the thesis be made available 
for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968 unless a period of embargo has 
been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School.  
I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright 
holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the 
copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis. 
 
iii 
  
iii 
 
Publications during candidature 
Peer-reviewed journal articles: 
Thiem Hai Bui. 2015. ‘In Search of a Post-socialist Mode of Governmentality: The Double 
Movement of Accommodating and Resisting Neo-liberalism in Vietnam.’ Asian Journal of Social 
Science 43 (1): 80-102. 
Thiem Hai Bui. 2014. ‘Pluralism Unleashed: The Politics of Reforming the Vietnamese 
Constitution.’ Journal of Vietnamese Studies 9 (4): 1-32.   
Thiem Hai Bui. 2014. ‘Deconstructing the ‘Socialist’ Rule of Law in Vietnam: The Changing 
Discourse on Human Rights in Vietnam’s Constitutional Reform Process.’ Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36 (1): 77-100. 
Thiem H. Bui. 2013. ‘The Development of Civil Society and Dynamics of Governance in 
Vietnam’s One-Party Rule.’ Global Change, Peace and Security 25 (1): 77-93 
Thiem H. Bui. 2013. ‘Liberal Constitutionalism and the Socialist State in an Era of Globalisation: 
An Inquiry into Vietnam’s Constitutional Discourse and Power Structures.’ The Global Studies 
Journal 5 (2): 43-54. 
Thiem Hai Bui. 2012. Vietnam: rapports entre société civile et parti-État dans le post-Doi moi 
[Vietnam: Relations between Civil Society and the Party-State in post-Doi moi]. Alternatives Sud: 
État des résistances dans le Sud – Asie [Southern Alternatives: The State of Resistance in the South 
- Asia], 19 (4): 73-79. 
 
Conference papers: 
‘Foreign Aid Via Civil Society Support Program in Vietnam: Regulation and Re-configuration 
under the Party-State.’ Paper presented at the 2015 Australasian Aid Conference, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 12-13 February, 2015. 
‘Contestations in Vietnam’s socialist law-based state and constitutionalism: Rule of Law, Party Law 
and Party Governance.’ Paper presented at the 2014 New Zealand Political Studies Association 
(NZPSA) Conference, University of Auckland, 1-3 December 2014. 
iv 
  
iv 
 
‘Integrity System, Civil Society and Anti-Corruption Politics in Vietnam.’ Paper presented at the 
Third International Conference on Human Rights and Peace & Conflict in Southeast Asia 
(SEARHN Conference) hosted by University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 15-16 October 2014. 
‘Elections in a communist party regime: Reform of Electoral Integrity System and Challenges in 
Vietnam.’ Paper presented at the 2014 Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) Conference, 
University of Sydney, 28 September - 1 October 2014. 
‘Elections under Vietnamese One-Party Conditions.’ Paper presented at the International 
Symposium on ‘The New Despotism’ at the Festival of Democracy, the University of Sydney, 27 
September 2014. 
‘Identity Transformation: Discursive Power and Constitutional Politics in Vietnam.’ Paper 
presented at the Vietnam Update Conference 2013, the Australian National University, Canberra, 31 
October - 1 November, 2013. 
‘Postsocialist Mode of Governmentality and the Emergence of Amorphous Postneoliberalism in 
Vietnam.’ Paper presented at the Inter-Asian Connections IV Conference, co-organized by the 
Social Science Research Council, Yale University, the National University of Singapore (NUS), the 
Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (HKIHSS), University of Hong Kong, 
Göttingen University and Koç University, Istanbul, 2-5 October 2013. 
‘Revisiting the Independence of the Constitutional Council in Protecting Human Rights.’ Paper 
presented at the Conference on ‘Transplanting UN Conventions on Human Rights into the 
Constitution and Domestic Laws: Experiences from Norway and Vietnam’, Institute of State and 
Law, Vietnam Academy of Social Science, Ha Noi, 9-10 September 2013. 
‘Human Rights Discourse during Vietnam’s Constitutional Reform Process.’ Paper presented at the 
7
th
 EuroSEAS Conference (European Association of Southeast Asian Studies), Lisbon, 2-5 July 
2013.   
‘Civil Society and Constitutional Politics in Vietnam today.’ Paper presented at the Conference 
‘Human Rights in the Constitutions in Norway and Vietnam’, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, 
University of Oslo, 29-30 May 2013. 
‘Civil Society Development and Governance in Vietnam’s One-Party System.’ Paper presented at 
the Fifth Biennial Oceanic Conference on International Studies (OCIS), the University of Sydney, 
18-20 July 2012. 
v 
  
v 
 
‘Liberal Constitutionalism, Globalization, and the Socialist State: The Case of Vietnam.’ Paper 
presented at the the Fifth International Conference on Global Studies, Lomonosov State University, 
Moscow, 20-22 June 2012. 
‘Civil Society and Environmental Policy: A New Source of Governance?’. Paper presented at 
Vietnam Update Conference, the Australian National University, Canberra, 17-18 November 2011.  
 
 
 
  
Publications included in this thesis 
No publications included. 
 
Contributions by others to the thesis  
No contributions by others. 
 
Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree 
None. 
 
 
vi 
  
vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have been possible without the assistance, encouragement and support from a 
number of institutions and individuals to all of whom I owe my deepest debt of gratitude and 
appreciation. 
First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Melissa Curley (UQ) for her outstanding supervision over the last 
four years. I am deeply grateful to her intellectual guidance, patience, support and mentoring over the 
course of my thesis writing and research career preparation. I want to thank Prof. Roland Bleiker (UQ) 
for his excellent associate supervision, which has been essential to this project. His great advice and 
constant mentoring have been of critical importance to the completion of my thesis and beyond.   
I am also grateful to Prof. Benedict Kerkvliet (ANU), Dr. Philip Taylor (ANU) and Prof. Tuong Vu 
(University of Oregon) for their constant encouragement and support. Their constructive comments on 
my various pieces of writing have encouraged my production of work of a higher level of sophistication 
and quality.  
I would also like to acknowledge the support from the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the former Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 
by the Australian Leadership Award for my PhD study. I want to thank the UQ School of Political 
Science and International Studies for awarding me the Research Committee Funding for my fieldwork 
and providing me with a stimulating scholarly environment. I am grateful to the administrative support 
by a number of people at the School, particularly Dr. Barbara Sullivan, Dr. Rae Wear and Ms. 
Muriwai Salam (Vanessa). My thanks also go to the staff at the UQ International Office for their 
continued assistance throughout my candidature. I want to take this opportunity to thank the 
Institute for Legislative Studies in Ha Noi and its President, Dr. Dinh Xuan Thao, for the great 
support for my PhD study.  
I want to thanks many friends of mine who have provided me with support, encouragement and joy over 
the course of my PhD candidature, particularly Morgan Gibson, Angela Sutterland (as a reader of my 
Statement of Intent paper), Kazi Rahman (as a reader of my Work-in-Progress paper), Rebecca Shaw, 
Ngo Chi Nguyen, Nguyen Huu Nhuan, Nguyen Thanh Thao, Nila, Febri, and Jaime. 
My deep gratitude and appreciation go to my family (my parents and my brother Bui Hai Thi) and 
my family-in-law. Their continued love, support, and encouragement gave me a great deal of 
strength and determination during my writing of this dissertation.  
Finally, most importantly, I owe my greatest debt to my wife Nga (Nguyen Hong Nga). She is the 
love of my life, my best friend and a constant source of precious support and inspiration. My thesis 
is dedicated to her and our two adorable daughters, Bebe (Bui Phuong Khanh) and Cece (Bui 
Khanh Lam), who have given me a happy and meaningful life. 
vii 
  
vii 
 
 
Keywords 
Civil society, Vietnam, communist party, party-state, governance, contestation. 
 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC) 
ANZSRC code: 160606, Government and Politics of Asia and the Pacific, 60% 
ANZSRC code: 160603, Comparative Government and Politics, 20% 
ANZSRC code: 160510, Public Policy, 20% 
 
Fields of Research (FoR) Classification 
FoR code: 1606, Political Science, 80% 
FoR code: 1605, Policy and Administration, 20% 
  
viii 
  
viii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................... viii 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................................... x 
List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... xi 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 13 
Research background ................................................................................................................................... 14 
Research question ........................................................................................................................................ 22 
Research methodology ................................................................................................................................ 24 
Thesis organization ...................................................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 1 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................... 32 
1.1 Existing Approaches .............................................................................................................................. 32 
1.1.1 The liberal democratic view ........................................................................................................... 33 
1.1.2 Critical approach: a Gramscian perspective ................................................................................... 37 
1.2 Analytical perspectives .......................................................................................................................... 42 
1.2.1 Public sphere and discourse ............................................................................................................ 42 
1.2.2 Process-based approach and embedded social activism ................................................................. 44 
1.2.3 Associative governance approach: Moving beyond corporatism ................................................... 46 
1.2.4 Network theory ............................................................................................................................... 48 
1.3 Re-conceptualizing civil society and governance in a party-state ......................................................... 50 
Chapter 2 Factors influencing civil society development in Vietnam ....................................................... 54 
2.1 Institutional environment and governance system in Vietnam .............................................................. 54 
2.2 Economic growth, the middle class and the intellectuals ...................................................................... 61 
2.3 The thriving associational life and non-state actors .............................................................................. 64 
2.4 Engagement with the international community and global civil society ............................................... 69 
2.5 The Internet and the virtual networks .................................................................................................... 74 
Chapter 3 The evolving legal framework for civil society development ................................................... 83 
3.1 Constitutional basis for public participation in governance and associational life ................................ 84 
3.2 Legal regulation of civil society space .................................................................................................. 86 
3.3 Contestation and challenges for a more enabling environment for civil society ................................... 93 
Chapter 4 Civil society and environmental policy in Vietnam: An emergent source of governance ... 105 
4.1 Environmental Activism and Governance in Vietnam ........................................................................ 106 
ix 
  
ix 
 
4.2 The engagement of civil society with environmental governance ...................................................... 110 
4.3 Vedan case study: civil society struggle for farmers’ interests ........................................................... 112 
4.4 Case study: Environmental Protection Tax Law ................................................................................. 117 
Chapter 5 Civil society and poverty reduction governance: Potentials and limits in influencing rules 
and norms ..................................................................................................................................................... 122 
5.1 Background to Vietnam’s poverty reduction ....................................................................................... 123 
5.2 Actors and discourses in poverty reduction governance ..................................................................... 125 
5.3 Contestations in poverty reduction governance ................................................................................... 129 
5.4 Case study: Grassroots organizations and poverty question in Quang Tri province ........................... 132 
Chapter 6 Civil society and integrity reforms: Transforming norms and practices in combating 
corruption in Vietnam ................................................................................................................................. 142 
6.1 Background to anti-corruption politics in Vietnam ............................................................................. 143 
6.2 Perception of Corruption in Vietnam .................................................................................................. 147 
6.3 Integrity-based reforms to combat corruption ..................................................................................... 149 
6.4 Civil Society and Anti-Corruption Politics ......................................................................................... 152 
6.5 Case study: Do Son land grab corruption scandal ............................................................................... 157 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 164 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 169 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................... 190 
Appendix A: Fieldwork interviews in Vietnam ........................................................................................ 190 
Appendix B: Vietnam’s Key Dates for Elite Politics, 1986-2014 ............................................................. 192 
 
  
x 
  
x 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Vietnam’s formal governance structure 
Figure 2.3 Continuum of possible civil society roles 
Figure 2.4 Number of INGOs having relations with Vietnam between 1991 and 2011 
Figure 2.5 Vietnamese blogosphere landmarks 
Figure 4.3 The location of Thi Vai river 
Figure 6.1 Vietnam’s corruption perception score in the Transparency International’s CPI over the 
period of 15 years (1997-2011). 
  
xi 
  
xi 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
CBO Community-Based Organization 
CC Central Committee 
CEMA Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs 
CEPEW Centre for Education Promotion and Empowerment for Women  
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CIFPEN Civil Society Inclusion in Food Security and Poverty Elimination Network 
CORENAM Consultative and Research Centre on Natural Resources Management 
CPC Communist Party of China 
CPI Corruption Perception Index 
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam  
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency  
DFID UK Department for International Development 
DPO Disabled People’s Organization 
GENCOMNET Gender and Community Development Network 
GONGO Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization 
IDS Institute for Development Studies 
ISEE Institute for Study of Economy and Environment 
ISS Institute for Social Studies 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization 
MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
MCD Centre for Marine-life Conservation and Community Development 
MCNV Medical Committee Netherlands-Vietnam 
MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment 
MO Mass Organization 
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOLISA Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
MSD Research Centre for Management and Sustainable Development 
NA National Assembly  
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NIS National Integrity System  
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
ODA Official Development Assistance/Aid 
PACCOM People’s Aid Coordinating Committee 
PA Public Participation and Accountability Facilitation Fund 
PPP Power Purchasing Parity 
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SPC Supreme People’s Court  
SPP Supreme People’s Procuracy 
SRD Centre for Sustainable Rural Development 
TI Transparency International 
UNDF United Nations Democracy Fund 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
xii 
  
xii 
 
VACNE  Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature and Environment 
VCCI Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
VDPF Vietnam Development Partnership Forum  
VESDI Vietnam Environment & Sustainable Development Institute 
VFF Vietnam Fatherland Front 
VGCL Vietnam General Confederation of Labour 
VNGO Vietnamese Non-Governmental Organization 
VPA Vietnam People’s Army 
VUFO Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations  
VULAA Vietnam Union of Literature and Arts Associations  
VUSTA Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations 
WB World Bank 
  
Introduction 
Civil society has become a significant and indispensable part of Vietnam’s politics over the 
past ten years. The development of civil society and its increasing interaction with and influence 
over formal governance structure in Vietnam’s one party state is a puzzle that this thesis seeks to 
unravel.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate how civil society interacts with formal 
governance structures in Vietnam. The thesis aims to understand the power which permeates civil 
society and reconfigures civil society interaction with the party-state to influence changes. I 
examine various expressions of civil society in both consensual and contestatory character. By 
doing so I demonstrate how civil society in Vietnam is viable, engaging and contemporary. 
I argue that over the past decade civil society in Vietnam has become more overt in 
appearance, vocal in voices, and contentious in nature. As a result, I suggest power is diffused in 
civil society in a way that has generated competing articulations of interests to the party-state and 
has brought about about incremental changes to the political order.  
Although the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has been highly reserved in regards to 
political reforms, the party has implimented numerous economic reforms, often associated with 
dramatic social and political changes. Central among these economic reforms has been the relaxed 
control of the party-state over society and the restoration of civil society (Lu Phuong 1994). The 
symbiosis of a traditional Leninist governance structure and a market economy has created space 
for elements of civil society to come into being. Vietnam’s authoritarian state has gradually 
accepted aspects of civil society (Marr 1994; Kerkvliet 2003; Pham Chi Dung 2013). Civil society 
has been “tolerated”, “endorsed”, or “recognised” by the party-state and fills a gap in order to play a 
role in the governance network and the national development. In practice, while still viewing civil 
society with suspicion, the CPV increasingly accepts civil society as part of the governance 
landscape as it steers the market economy to pursue development goals. Various forms of “civil 
society” exist in Vietnam, which the CPV finds useful for societal control along with other types of 
organization, particularly mass organizations.  
In this introductory chapter, I will first discuss the research background to the thesis, 
providing a critical appraisal of the burgeoning literature on civil society in Vietnam and identifying 
the research problem to be addressed in this work. I advance my core research question as: How 
does civil society interact with governance structures and procesess in Vietnam? I will then present 
the research method used in this thesis in order to answer the research question. In the last sub-
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section of the introductory chapter, I present the thesis outline and key arguments developed in each 
chapter to substantiate the core argument.  
Research background  
Since launching Doi Moi (renewal) or market-based reforms in 1986, various changes have 
taken place in economic and social fields in Vietnam. Among these changes are the rise of 
neoliberalism, the inevitable integration of Vietnam’s economy into the global political economy 
(GPE), the development of civil society and the emergence of various governance questions facing 
Vietnamese elites and bureaucrats alike.  
Civil society is a theoretical concept that emerged in Vietnam’s political discourse in the early 
1990s. While the appearance of the concept is recent, Indigenous forms of civil society took root in 
the pre-colonial time and developed in the colonial period. Under the rule of the CPV, civil society 
had limited expressions in the 1950s before it was crushed. In the official discourse nowadays, civil 
society is still an anathema concept to the party-state and is rarely used by the media. Despite its 
limited use in public discourse, civil society is indeed a social force that exists and one that has 
gradually expanded its presence since the ruling CPV launched Doi Moi in late 1986. Since then, 
the emergence of civil society in Vietnam has been noted as a new phenomenon characterizing 
state-society relations in an authoritarian state dominated by the CPV. As commented by Hannah 
(2007: 8), ‘the Vietnamese state has been working to incorporate the idea of civil society into their 
state ideology and to make it relevant to the rapidly changing social, economic and political 
conditions of Vietnam under a comprehensive and wide ranging set of reforms.’ 
According to Hannah (2007), the most likely avenue through which the term entered 
Vietnamese language was the entry of the donor community in early 1990s. The translated versions 
‘xa hoi dan su’ or ‘xa hoi cong dan’, both with contested denotations and diverse connotations, 
were transplanted into Vietnamese political discourse since then (Hannah 2007). Despite limited 
public discussion around the concept and lack of an enabling legal framework due to the party-
state’s inherent anathema to the concept, civil society activity has transcended the development 
discourse and quietly established its presence in the political discourse.  
Since the late 1980s, civil society organizations and associations in Vietnam have proliferated 
and market forces have worked to increasingly loosen the grip of the party-state over the public 
sphere. Economic reforms have indeed ‘opened up much more freedom in the social, personal and 
private spheres’ (Kerkvliet et al. 1999: 12). New developments in the associational life of 
Vietnam’s society have given rise to a nascent civil society with the prospect of political 
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democratisation in Vietnam as a concomitant of the renovation process and a degree of relaxation in 
‘mono-organizational socialism’ (Thayer 1992: 187). The growth of some activities out of the free 
social and cultural space, independent of the command structures of the party-state, has been 
identified as central to the process of restoring civil society (Lu Phuong 1994).  
The growth of civil society has been supported by various factors ranging from economic 
liberalization, the easing of some restraints in the regulatory environment, and the rise of the 
Internet and the blogosphere. The erosion of the party-state’s control over information flows has 
enabled the opening of space for some aspects of civil society to thrive. The emergence of various 
societal actors, especially civil society organizations and better-informed citizens, has increased 
demand for more effective governance and popular participation in policy-making. At the same 
time, the public have been increasingly vocal in demanding democratic rights, freedom of 
association, assembly, and participation in the public realm, which as added to the complexities of 
the state-society relations.  
Using three interpretations from the scholarly literature, that is, the ‘state-dominating’ 
approach, ‘mobilisational corporatism’, and ‘dialogical’ approach, Kerkvliet (2001) analyzed state-
society relations in Vietnam by examining four specific political arenas: governing institutions and 
processes, mass media, agricultural collectives, and corruption. He found that, separately, each 
approach was incomplete for understanding the political system and state-society relationship in 
Vietnam, thus falling short of appropriate explanations about the development of civil society. 
Recognising meagre research on the topic, Kerkvliet (2003) studied the explosion of different 
organizations and subsequent implications for civil society more broadly in Vietnam. He identified 
three important changes indicating development in civil society: improved legal infrastructure for 
recognising and protecting non-government orgnaizations (NGOs), the expansion of press and 
media communications, and the growth in number and diversity of civil society organizations. In 
commenting that ‘civil society exists in degrees’ and ‘it is not something that is either present or 
absent’ Kerkvliet (2003: 15) reframed the question from: ‘is civil society in Vietnam or not?’ to 
‘how is it?’. Accordingly, Kerkvliet (2003) found that civil society in Vietnam is ‘significantly 
constrained’. Analysis of empirical data across the region by Alaggapa (2004) and Weiss (2010) 
confirms that, along with Burma, the Vietnamese state is characterised by a repressed civil society.1 
Zink (2013: 7) continues to confirm the impression of a repressive civil society through his 
                                                          
1
 The empirically-derived taxonomy of civil society in Southeast Asia is made by Alaggapa (2004: vi) followed by 
(Weiss 2010: 297): “legitimate civil society” in the post-1986 Philippines, post-1998 Indonesia, and Thailand; 
“controlled and communalized civil society” in Malaysia and Singapore; and “repressed civil society” in Burma and 
Vietnam.    
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observation that the Vietnamese government is generally intolerant to domestic civil society 
organizations not affiliated to any established political hierarchies.     
Inclusive of the above-mentioned studies on Vietnam’s civil society, there has been a 
burgeoning academic interest around the topic since the second half of the last decade. Hannah 
(2007) studied the spectrum of civil society’s roles in Vietnam, ranging from public resistance to 
the regime, opposition, acting as a watchdog, lobbying, advocacy, and implementing state policy. In 
separate research, Norlund (2007) assessed four essential dimensions of civil society in Vietnam – 
structure, socio-economic environment, values and impact – and made recommendations in a 
number of areas ‘to support stronger development of associational life’ (2007: 3). Kerkvliet et al. 
(2008) focused on the forms of engagement between state agencies and civil society organizations 
in Vietnam, identifying four areas of interaction between CSOs and the party-state: service delivery, 
policy and law-making, monitoring and holding officials accountable, and channelling citizens’ 
concerns. Their study report made recommendations ‘to help the state authorities and CSOs better 
understand the nature of their relationship and identify ways to enhance their interactions and help 
international actors support engagement more effectively’ (Kerkvliet et al, 2008: 7).  
From the perspective of law in relation to society, Sidel (2008) offered insights into the legal 
infrastructure for the development of civil society. He drew attention to a compromise in Vietnam’s 
legal framework that ‘allows for both a level of control that satisfied the Party and state, and a level 
of autonomy that temporarily satisfies powerful associational actors while allowing for some 
flexible expansion in the future.’ Meanwhile, more recently, Thayer (2009a, 2009b) was interested 
in the confrontational aspect of civil society and investigated the challenges mounted by civil 
society against the party-state. He argues the study of pro-democracy groups has been marginalised 
in civil society literature while political change in Vietnam is significantly shaped by the way the 
party-state manages their challenges. He analyses how political legitimacy of the party-state is 
challenged on the basis of performance, nationalism, and rational-legal grounds. Exploring a new 
source of civil society, Wells-Dang (2010, 2011) examined civil society networks that engage in 
path-breaking advocacy with authorities and elites to bring about political and social changes. He 
demonstrates how civil society networks create new political space and effect policy change by 
‘expanding their web of ties, linking previously unconnected nodes, and leveraging other actors and 
resources’ (Wells-Dang, 2011: 313). Wischermann (2010, 2011) investigated civil society’s actions 
in relation to governance in legitimate rule, security and welfare. His two important findings were 
that ‘civil society action from within the state apparatus effects changes in governance’ and ‘those 
processes of change were initiated more or less simultaneously from above and below’ 
(Wischermann 2011: 383).  
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Changing dynamics in the Vietnamese economy and political sphere in recent years have 
further highlighted the need for civil society development. Vietnam is now considered a middle-
income country, resulting in international donors withdrawing aid from a number of development 
areas, and a decrease in official development assistance grants. As such, the country has entered the 
longest period of economic slowdown since Doi Moi. Economic mismanagement, rampant 
corruption, the rise of a rent-seeking state, and the poor quality of various basic welfare services 
provided by the state have further stimulated social dissatisfaction and criticisms over the 
effectiveness of the state’s governance.  
Amid the various governance problems, the level of tolerance exercised by the party-state 
towards civil society processes has been remarkable. In a way, the party-state has been able to 
accommodate popular pressures in its policy-making processes. “Petition 72” initiated during the 
process of amending the Soviet-style 1992 Constitution in 2013 by a “loyal opposition” group, 
gained wide support, and represents a liberal response to the efforts to adopt conservative 
constitutional amendments by the party-state. Petition 72, and subsequent criticisms from various 
groups over the draft constitutional amendments on the grounds of its limitations over civil and 
political right were new expressions of civil society. The preparation and submission of a ‘shadow 
report’ in June 2013 by more than 60 local NGOs under the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal 
Periodic Review, as a mechanism to assess the Vietnamese state’s implementation of obligations on 
human rights, is the first of its kind in Vietnam’s history. And in August 2013, the appeal court in 
Long An province halved the sentences of two high-profile political activists that had been 
convicted of ‘conducting propaganda against the state’, resulting in one being released on probation 
and the other having their sentence reduced to four years’ imprisonment. This is the first case in 
which sentences have been reduced so significantly for such political acts, and many observers were 
surprised by the decision. Earlier in 2013, fish farmers who had resorted to violence against the 
state’s law enforcement squad during an illegal land eviction in Tien Lang, Hai Phong city, also 
received more lenient sentences from the appeal court. 
Some fundamental preconditions for a new phase of civil society development have been in 
place since late 2000s, and can now take on more substantive qualities. The expansion of the middle 
class after some decades of capitalist development, and the rising power of social media and 
individual blogging, have given those with liberal ideals new confidence in civil society. 
Furthermore, Vietnam’s “China policy” has become a critical question for Vietnamese politics. 
Since the normalization of relationship between Vietnam and China at Chengdu secret summit 
meeting in 1990, the Vietnamese top leadership has persistently pursued a strategic alliance with 
China. This line of policy results in Vietnam’s international behaviour seemingly being submissive 
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to China particularly in the context of China’s growing assertiveness and projecting of power over 
the South China Sea and the islands over which Vietnam claims sovereignty. Both the elites and 
public are becoming increasingly divided over Vietnam’s China’s policy. A series of anti-China 
demonstrations during the summers of 2011 and 2012 signaled a new era of protest politics in a 
country where rules and norms are now being subject to serious contestations. Finally, the issues of 
human rights and rights-based approaches have gained more importance on the state’s agenda, and 
the practices of many local NGOs in this area have moved beyond their typically donor-driven 
scope.  
In sum, as a theoretical concept, civil society has only recently been adopted into Vietnam’s 
political discourse. Since Doi Moi or market-based reforms launched in 1986, the symbiosis of a 
traditional Leninist governance structure and a market economy has created space for elements of 
civil society to come back into being. The emergence of civil society in Vietnam has been noted as 
a new phenomenon characterizing state-society relations in an authoritarian state dominated by the 
CPV. Although the CPV has been highly reserved on political reforms, economic reforms have 
been associated with many dramatic social and political changes. Among these changes, which 
resulted from the relaxed control of the party-state over society, is the restoration and development 
of civil society.  
Vietnam’s authoritarian state, which once attempted to annul civil society in its efforts to 
dominate every aspect of society, has now accepted aspects of civil society. The party-state’s 
tolerance and implicit recognition of civil society in some particular roles within the governance 
network and national development agenda has given rise to many forms of “civil society.” They can 
perform roles which the CPV finds useful for societal control alongside other types of organization, 
particularly mass organizations.2
 
However, these forms of civil society have the potential to run 
beyond the party-state’s control and governance capabilities. Thus, the attitude of the party-state 
and its behaviour towards civil society processes remain ambivalent. 
 
Vietnam’s governance amid the rise of civil society  
The development of civil society has raised important governance questions for the party-
state. On the one hand, civil society might pose a challenge to the CPV’s control of governance and 
its political legitimacy. Due to the arrival of the powerful forces of the market and globalisation, 
                                                          
2
 In a socialist system, mass organizations are Leninist institutions which ‘serve as mobilizational instruments of the 
authorities by transmitting official policies and laws to society’ (Stromseth 2003: 63).  
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Vietnam’s party-state institutions have become ‘increasingly less effective tools for building 
popular legitimacy or managing society’ (McCormick 1999: 162), and thus are more vulnerable to 
the challenge of civil society. On the other hand, if appropriately harnessed, aspects of civil society 
can serve to ameliorate the party-state’s lack of capabilities and resources in various functional 
areas of governance. The responses of the party-state to the dilemma over handling civil society 
have become an important part of Vietnamese politics in the post-Doi Moi era. Faced with 
sweeping economic and social changes, the Leninist governance structures have remained largely 
the same as they were before the 1990s. However, it would be misleading to jump to the conclusion 
that no political change has happened since that time and the mismatch between that governance 
structure and market reforms results in a disjuncture in the process. Rather, the dynamics of the 
governance process are characterized by the multi-dimensional interactions between civil society 
and the party-state.  
In terms of governance structure, little has changed since Doi Moi was launched because the 
Leninist structure of party dominance still persists in Vietnam (Kerkvliet et al. 1999). This pattern 
of governance structure has been complicated by the two concurrent trends of centralisation and 
decentralisation, which have been occuring in Vietnam since the 1990s. In an era of globalisation, 
the mono-organizational governance structure of the party-state has never before been so 
challenged. The party-state has faced a number of internal and external constraints. For example,   
market-based reforms have led to market mechanisms replacing a centralized planning system, 
which has eroded the party-state’s tight control over the local economy. At the same time, shrinking 
resources and limited management skills have reduced the party-state’s control over the general 
economy and a number of functional areas of governance like poverty reduction, healthcare, 
education, welfare services, and the environment. Inside the government structure, the party-state 
advocates a policy of decentralisation and, as a result, cities, provinces, and regions have acquired 
more effective autonomy at the expense of state power. Gainsborough (2003) notes that in Vietnam, 
reform is commonly seen as embodying decentralisation and a consequent increase in local 
government. Indicative of increased local power vis-à-vis the centre are increased responsibilities 
for economic and investment decision-making at the local level, comprehensive representation from 
provinces and major cities on the Party Central Committee, and reduced dependence of local 
governments on the centre in terms of financial support. However, tension remains between 
centralisation and decentralisation approaches as seen in the concerted efforts by the party-state for 
re-centralisation, which has been described as ‘an ongoing tug of war between centre and periphery’ 
(Gainsborough 2003: 3). While factors such as the role of local government, public participation, 
and the importance of horizontal networks, have grown in importance in recent years, the party-
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state still views them as inferior to the hierarchical relations between institutions and actors. Despite 
this, the diffusion of central party-state power has significant implications for the development of 
civil society and its interactions with both governance structures and processes. Decentralization 
helps create room for civil society actors to manipulate the system to their advantage in some 
functional areas of governance through their formation and implementation of different projects in 
those fields.  
While the party-state continues to maintain firm control over political power and many 
aspects of general society, even expanding its control in new forms, the party-state has relinquished 
power over provision of a number of public services. Most visibly this retreat has been through the 
policy of “socialisation” (xa hoi hoa), which has seen the state delegate responsibility for service 
provision to domestic and international private and non-state sectors. This policy has been highly 
controversial because of its affinity to privatisation and alienation of the orthodox socialist 
ideology. The policy has inevitably facilitated the increasing horizontalization of institutions, 
organizations, and networks. As a result, on the one hand the party-state has become increasingly 
dependent on other societal actors. Ironically, a number of societal actors are increasingly reluctant 
to conform to the state’s interests and objectives. On other hand, by employing this kind of 
strategies and programs, the party-state is able to sustain and legitimize its existing power relations. 
The social actors, despite their quiet resistance, are ultimately thwarted by state power via decision-
making and final approval. The phenomenon has further vindicated the dynamics of changing 
governance processes in Vietnam.  
The resilience of the old-style Leninist political system and governance in Vietnam, along 
with resistance to political reforms, has been a bone of contention among different commentators, 
observers, and activists. Against this context, different conditions and potentials have been explored 
by Vietnam commentators to make sense of the political developments in Vietnam (London 2014). 
For the past few years, resilience of the political system has been called into question due to the 
increasingly grave situation in many areas of governance and significant debates have emerged 
about substantive changes and transformation needed to overcome another imminent crisis of 
governance. For example, Nguyen Trung (2013) raised a series of critical concerns about the 
economic mismanagement evidenced by the collapse of large state-owned conglomerates like 
Vinashin and Vinalines and the death of hundred thousands of businesses and massive government 
debt, which have resulted in the economic slowdown of the country.3 Other endemic problems, such 
                                                          
3
 According to the World Bank statistics on Vietnam’s GDP, the economic growth rate has been fallen to 6.4% in 2010, 
6.0% in 2011, 5.2% in 2012, and 5.3% estimated for 2013. The rate is much lower than that of the previous years and 
falls short of the target between 6.5-7% set out in the five-year socio-economic plan of 2011-15. According to the 2013 
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as the structure of the economy (which is biased towards highly extractive development), 
environment degradation, rampant corruption, limited access to justice, worsening quality and 
services in education and healthcare have all contributed to a rising frustration in society. Long-
standing political institutions have been inffective in responding to public demands for meaningful 
political and economic change and such institutions have responded with increased defensiveness. 
The official rules and norms embedded in orthodox narratives have been seriously challenged by 
different social forces, which have sought to break political passivity and stimulate change. While 
regaining and maintaining high economic growth with macroeconomic stability is a formidable 
challenge for Vietnam, accommodating expanding social demands and meeting growing calls for 
participation are equally significant problems. 
Amid serious problems in governance and institutional weaknesses, proposals for amending 
the Constitution were discussed in the years leading up to the National Congress of the CPV in 
2011. A major decision was reached at the Party Congress, allowing the amendments of the 
Constitution to be on the table for discussion beyond the limited official circles and with wide 
participation from the public. The process of reforming the Vietnamese Constitution had opened up 
a Pandora’s box of resistance and contestations over the orthodox rules and norms. It had 
crystalized the emergence and assertion of plural identities and interests with the contemplated 
amendments to the 1992 Constitution representing a focal point in the exercise of discursive power 
and struggles for change.  
 
Comparative studies of civil society 
Within the broad Asian context, a small number of countries with significant economic, 
political and strategical influences, notably China and Vietnam, continue to mount considerable 
challenges to conventional understanding of their mode of governance. While debate continues 
about neoliberalism’s influence on these socialist states since they opened their economies to global 
capitalism, new and challenging questions have arisen in regard to changing forms of governance 
within these countries (Saich 2010; Case 2009; Chang and Welsh 2013). Due to both countries’ 
extensive engagement with neoliberal policies and practices, neoliberalism has mangaged to carve 
out certain constituencies due to convergence of elite interests, while never becoming fully 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
annual report by Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as of April 2013, only 312,600 out of 694,000 
enterprises registered since the Enterprise Law came into effect in July 2006 are still active and a record number of 
58,128 enterprises went bankrupt in 2012. 
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embedded in either country’s political processes. China and Vietnam both continue to rhetorically 
assert their allegiance to the socialist mode of governance.      
Market-based reforms in both China and Vietnam indicate a search for a new type of socialist 
developmental state. However, except for the persisting monopoly of political power by the 
communist parties in China and Vietnam, it is still unclear what this kind of governance entails and 
excludes. At first, as a survival strategy in their acute crises, these socialist states embarked on 
market-based reforms and embraced neoliberalism as both a complementary and competing form of 
governmentality as these socialist states emphasized diversification. As a result of diversification 
strategy, the socialist states have deployed a number of programs associated with neoliberal logics, 
specifically for diversifying the economy, education, healthcare and welfare to allow private 
participation.  
In Vietnam, the East Asian model of state-led developmentalism had great appeal to the party-
state when it embarked on market-based reforms. The activist and interventionist role of the state in 
directing the course of development corresponds with the desire of the party-state to maintain 
control as the commander-in-chief. However, the Vietnamese party-state embraced this model when 
neoliberalism had already taken a strong hold. Amid the advent of neoliberalism, a number of 
services traditionally monopolized by the socialist state were transferred partly to private control 
and ownership; deregulation and decentralization took some ground. In this phase, governance 
techniques blended and juxtaposed both neoliberal and socialist forms of governmentality, which 
was once deemed unthinkable by the party-state. Upon embracing the market economy and 
neoliberalism, the party-state’s mode of governance was transformed and adapted in such a radical 
way that understanding governance in terms of institutions and ideologies might be insufficient. 
Thus far, Vietnam has started to enter post-developmentalism in which the declining capacity and 
willingness of the party-state to intervene in the way it used to have become more evident. In this 
period, the interplay of various complex factors beyond developmentalist and materialist ones have 
contributed to reshaping and reconfiguring the role and practices of the party-state. The broadening 
of the political space, both invited and newly created, has been instrumental in bringing about civil 
society processes in the post-Doi Moi Vietnam.  
 
Research question 
Decades of market-based transition have brought about various economic, social and political 
changes in Vietnam and the rise of civil society is noteworthy among these changes. Of course 
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market reforms do not account in full for the development of civil society in such an authoritarian 
state, an argument that would be one-sided and one-dimensional. Though economic reforms have 
given rise to more individual freedom, premising Vietnam’s civil society development on that 
single ground appears reductionist. A more in-depth analysis of why elements of civil society have 
developed in Vietnam is lacking in the current academic literature. In this respect, there remains a 
need for analysis of civil society and state-society relations to come to a more comprehensive 
understanding of these dynamics. Based on the underlying assumption that market reform gave rise 
to civil society in Vietnam, a number of authors have analysed different aspects of civil society and 
governance including Vietnamese NGOs (Hannah 2007), society networks (Wells-Dang 2011), and 
legitimate rule, security and welfare (Wischermann 2010; 2011). Together, these studies have laid a 
firm ground for understanding civil society in Vietnam. However, they are yet to examine the 
dynamics of governance in light of civil society development. Although this research is suggestive 
of new trends and formulations, it should be considered a point of departure for further study of 
civil society through a critical perspective and the lens of governance.  
The argument outlined thus far in the introduction above presents a multi-dimensional and 
dynamic account of Vietnam’s politics and governance, which requires further exploration via the 
empirical case studies outline in this thesis.  
A clearer articulation of the answer to the puzzle over the development of civil society in 
relation to governance prompts my core research question: How does civil society interact with 
governance structures and processes in Vietnam? The answer to this question involves an analysis 
of the very factors accounting for the development of civil society under Vietnam’s 
authoritarianism. Central to the research project is the interactions between civil society and 
governance and the extent to which civil society has become a source of governance. An 
investigation of these aspects aims to generate knowledge on the workings of civil society and its 
role in setting trends for state-society relations. The intellectual responses to the research question 
address a gap in understanding of civil society development and related state policies. In providing 
an answer to this question, I address the dilemma of the party-state in dealing with civil society and 
explore both the problems that the emergence of civil society brings to the one-party system and the 
benefits it creates for existing governance structures and mechanisms. Such analysis helps explain 
the attitude and policies of the party-state towards the development of civil society. 
To answer this question, I focus on specific case studies to show how civil society actors have 
manoeuvred the existing governance structures and processes to their advantage. Their efforts have 
been successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others. Most importantly, the research aims to 
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explain the difficult struggle of civil society to rise out of the “controlled space” and assert itself as 
an actor in the sphere of governance. Civil society’s interactions with governance structures and 
processes have been met with ambivalent responses from the party-state. The reconfiguration of 
civil society action to shape and reshape the responses from the party-state is indicative of political 
developments in Vietnam in the years to come. Understanding these aspects of contestation and 
consensus will significantly challenge some existing assumptions and improve the knowledge of 
specific experiences of civil society in a one-party dominant system and Vietnamese politics in 
general.  
   
Research methodology  
This research grows out of my own personal interest and involvement with civil society actors 
in Vietnam. In my experience, the emergence and development of civil society, to the point where 
civil society is now a central phenomenon in the political life of Vietnam, was puzzling. I worked in 
an organization under the CPV and in an organization under the National Assembly of Vietnam, 
where I had many chances to work on matters related to associations and NGOs. I was in a position 
to observe the official discourse and behaviours by different actors regarding civil society as well as 
their increasing influence over the decision-making on a number of governance issues. 
For this research I have adopted a qualitative methodology. Several aspects indicate the 
relevance of qualitative methods in dealing with the question under investigation in this research. 
As argued by Creswell (2008: 53), qualitative research ‘is best suited for research problems in 
which you do not know the variables and need to explore.’ In my study, the development of civil 
society in Vietnam’s one-party rule is problematized and little is known about the factors that 
account for this phenomenon. The simplistic view of a repressed civil society under an authoritarian 
state is unable to explain the changing dynamics of governance with civil society as a social force. 
Qualitative research can redress this imbalance by offering a dynamic and context-specific approach 
(Weiss 2008: 165). Furthermore, it facilitates a “thick descriptions” of the phenomenon and 
experiences of actors involved (Geertz 1973).  
 
Research design  
This research has two layers. The first layer relates to secondary data where I critically review 
the literature on major approaches and themes related to civil society applicable to a system 
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dominated by one party rule. I also examine the literature on civil society and civil society actors in 
Vietnam in combination with a governance analysis to justify the importance my research problem. 
In this aspect, I build on existing work on civil society in Vietnam to develop my theoretical 
framework and complement them by extending the research to some understudied areas and 
examining these more thoroughly.  
The second layer of my research is primary data based on multiple case studies. As civil 
society and governance are broad topics, I narrow down the research to focus on four functional 
areas of governance as case studies, these are: the legal framework for civil society actors, 
environmental policy making and implementation, poverty reduction governance, and integrity 
system and anti-corruption politics. These areas are selected for two major reasons. First, they are 
the areas that are central to the party-state’s governance capabilities and its claim to legitimacy to 
rule. A number of problems have arisen to pose challenges to the party-state in these functional 
areas of governance. Second, these are the areas in which the party-state consents to civil society 
activity and where the actions and processes of civil society are most visible. As a result of activity 
in these areas, civil society either reinforces or weakens the party-state’s governance capabilities in 
these areas and thus the governance interactions between the party-state and civil society are more 
readily traceable.  
The case studies are theoretically informed choices. The governance-based theoretical 
framework of civil society lays this foundation. In using a case study method, I seek to make “thick 
descriptions” of interactions between civil society and governance in a particular case in order to 
‘make a lot out of a little’ (Silverman 2010: 137). Therefore, my research aims at identifying the 
remarkable from the mundane to present a dynamic account of civil society and governance in 
Vietnam. The first case study examines the legal framework that allows civil society actors to 
register and operate in Vietnam. The legal foundation for the party-state to recognise civil society 
actors is a constitutional right of association stipulated in Article 69 of the 1992 Constitution of 
Vietnam. However, the translation and performance of this right into practice is far from an 
enabling regulatory framework by the party-state. Civil society’s engagement with this aspect of 
governance has been an ongoing struggle with the party-state. The site for fieldwork research for 
this case study is Hanoi, the capital city of Vietnam. The second case study focuses on 
environmental policy making and implementation where civil society activism has contributed to 
the dynamics of governance. The green public sphere has prominently emerged in Vietnam over the 
past decade due to an increasing influence of civil society under the tacit recognition of the party-
state. In this area of governance, there have been ample discussions about the role of civil society 
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and different actors in influencing the practice of the party-state. The third case study examines the 
processes of civil society in poverty reduction programs. The party-state often takes pride in 
Vietnam’s performance over poverty reduction and indeed the international donors praises Vietnam 
as a success story in poverty reduction. It is important to trace the impact of “socialization” policy 
and role of non-state actors in this area. Examining the local sociocultural dynamics as well as 
different narratives behind the general picture of poverty reduction can be more telling about the 
interaction between civil society and the party-state. The fourth case study deals with the building 
of a national integrity system and the anti-corruption efforts of the party-state. Anti-corruption has 
become critical to the political legitimacy and stability of the regime. The party-state has recognized 
the level and scope of the problem that it cannot solve alone and calls for broad social participation 
in this functional area of governance. It is in this area that I see the increasingly overt and 
contestatory characters of civil society that re-shapes the dynamics of governance and influences 
anti-corruption politics of the country.  
In sum, the findings from analysis and interpretation of data in these case studies are assessed 
in light of the theoretical framework. This involves developing and relating themes of information 
and composing a theoretical model that portrays the general explanations of the interactions 
between civil society and governance structures and processes. 
 
Data collection 
In the process of qualitative data collection, the first important task is to identify the 
participants and the sites for fieldwork research.  The criterion for selection is that they ‘can best 
help you understand the central phenomenon’ (Creswell 2008: 213). Participants in my research can 
be categorized into four groups of informants. The first group includes those officials working in 
relevant central agencies (Ministries and Government institutions, National Assembly 
organizations, Party institutions, central organs of some mass organizations), all based in Hanoi. It 
also encompasses officials from two major state-sponsored political-social organizations closely 
related to international and domestic NGOs: the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations 
(VUFO) and Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA). The second group 
consists of local officials working in the institutions of the party-state and mass organizations in 
provinces or cities. The third group comprises members of non-state actors including NGOs, 
professional associations, issue-oriented organizations, and other society actors. The fourth group 
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includes members of some international donor agencies operating in relevant fields of governance 
in Vietnam. 
 
Site selection 
The in-depth case studies have a comprehensive geographical coverage across the North, the 
Centre, and the South, from the central level to the local level, to present a comprehensive and 
thorough picture of civil society’s engagement with governance. The selection of case studies 
avoids urban bias as they are spread throughout both cities (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh city, and Vung 
Tau city) and the countryside (Quang Tri, Quang Ngai and Thua Thien - Hue province). For the 
first and the fourth case studies, the site for fieldwork research is Hanoi, the capital city of Vietnam. 
In this political centre, all laws and major policy decisions are made. Thus, it is the only place that 
can offer access to primary resources for the study of governance of the legal framework related to 
civil society and the national integrity system. For the second case study, the sites selected are Ho 
Chi Minh city and Vung Tau city and its adjacent province, Dong Nai. This is an area where 
environment policy is contested due to various environmental problems exposed in practice. Three  
central provinces of Vietnam, Quang Tri, Quang Ngai and Thua Thien-Hue are the sites for 
fieldwork research on the third case study. These are poor provinces with high rates of poverty 
where many poverty reduction programs and development projects have been implemented by the 
party-state, at both the central and local levels, and international donors in conjunction with local 
NGOs.  
In Quang Tri province, besides collecting secondary data including legal documents, charters 
or rules of organizations and periodical reports on performance, my study focuses on two associations 
at the grassroots level: the Disable Peoples’ Organization (DPO) of Cam An commune (Cam Lo 
district) and the DPO of Vinh Tu commune (Vinh Linh district). I employ the method of focus group 
in the form of facilitation-guide-discussion meetings to interview participants. In these meetings, I 
prepared a set of questions and asked the participants to think about them, discuss among each other 
and provide answers. Throughout the meetings, I facilitated and guided the discussion and sought to 
focus the group on the set topics of inquiry. There are two separate meetings for each of the DPOs. 
Ten members of each organizations participated in the first meeting. They were leaders of the 
organization, members of the executive committee or group leaders in the association. In the second 
meeting where no member of the related association is present, representatives from the People’s 
Committee, the Medical Station, the Women’s Association, the Farmers’ Association, and the Youth 
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Union in the designated locality are interviewed. The purpose of the second meeting is to cross-check 
the information provided in the first focus group and to seek more inputs from the authorities and 
mass organizations related to the association in question.    
 
Access to materials and informants 
Due to my knowledge of the language and culture as well as my extensive network of 
relations with government and party officials, experts, local NGOs practitioners and international 
donors, I was able to gain “insider” access to many organizations and people in the course of this 
research. This allowed me to gain “thick descriptions” of the multiple cases. Some foreign 
researchers have conducted fieldwork on the topic of civil society in Vietnam and recognise 
substantial difficulties of being a foreigner. They are viewed with suspicion because civil society is 
still considered a sensitive topic in Vietnam. I was able to overcome this challenge by framing the 
issue in simple language and in an informal and flexible way so that respondents were willing to 
share and reflect. By so doing, I expect to offer a context-specific approach by an “insider” to 
studying civil society, which aims to enrich knowledge in the field.   
 
Type of data 
In order to understand the complexity of the central phenomenon set out in my research 
question, I collected multiple types of information combining three major forms of data: documents 
and audio-visual materials, observations, and interviews. These data are interconnected to and 
supportive of each other. First, I gathered and analyzed information from public documents 
including articles, periodicals, archive materials, books, reports, minutes of meetings, and internal 
and private documents such as correspondences, organizational profiles, plans, program and project 
documents, vision and mission statements, progress reports, and evaluation papers. Pictures, 
sounds, and videotapes were also collected for analysis. Second, observational data was collected as 
part of this research. As noted by Creswell (2008: 221), ‘observation is the process of gathering 
open-ended, firsthand information by observing people and places at a research site.’ I recorded 
multiple observations over time by field-notes in Ho Chi Minh city, Vung Tau city, Quang Ngai, 
Quang Tri, Hue city and Ha Noi. Third, and most importantly, I conducted in-depth interviews. In 
each case study, I conducted ten to twelve one-on-one, semi-structured interviews. In total I 
interviewed 45 informants during the fieldwork (Appendix A). Participants were asked general and 
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broad questions about the rules and regulations in the field, how they are formulated and 
implemented them; how they are changed when problems arose; who effected changes; and what 
were the impacts and consequences of change. The interview style was conversational and 
interviews lasted from 30 minutes to one hour. The consent of interviewees was sought before the 
interview was conducted. The fieldwork protocol received ethical approval from the University of 
Queensland.   
 
Thesis organization 
This thesis engages with the development of civil society in Vietnam as an ongoing process. It 
seeks to unravel the complex and diverse interactions between civil society and governance. The 
thesis is organized around four sections: introduction, theoretical framework, key themes of inquiry 
and conclusion.  
In the next chapter, which outlines the theoretical framework, I present an overview of 
influential lines of thoughts that inform the practice and formation of civil society in a single party 
rule context. I review the literature on major existing approaches to the concept as well as those 
distinct scholarly works on civil society in Southeast Asia and China. By drawing on these distinct 
bodies of literature, especially the writings on civil society across the region, I develop a theoretical 
framework to operationalize the concept of civil society within the Vietnamese context.In the 
Vietnamese context, civil society is broadly understood as a sphere of associative actions that 
articulate common interests and demands of citizens, protect citizens’ rights, and meet citizens’ 
needs vis-à-vis the state by seeking to engage with governance to negotiate ideas, norms, values, 
and practices of the state. 
In Chapter Two, I explore the interplay between different factors that shape the development 
of civil society in Vietnam and its dynamic interaction and negotiation with governance networks. I 
provide an analysis of the institutional framework and the hegemonic political system, economic 
liberalization and the rise of the middle class as well as the role of intellectuals, the thriving 
associational life and emergence of non-state and hybrid actors. This chapter also explores the 
engagement of Vietnamese civil society with the international community and global civil society, 
and the role and influence of the Internet and virtual networks in shaping civil society in Vietnam. 
Both the conducive conditions and constraints for the development of civil society are highlighted 
in the complex and fluid interaction among these factors. 
30 
  
30 
 
In Chapter Three, I examine the regulatory framework for the development of civil society, 
focusing on the challenges and potentials for the operation of civil society. It explores how civil 
society is constitutive of both Vietnam’s politics and laws and illustrates the need for a more 
expansive way of understanding civil society in Vietnam. 
Chapter Four is an in-depth analysis of the relationship between civil society and 
environmental governance in Vietnam. It presents a detailed account of the environmental activism, 
as a civil society process, that influences the rules and norms of environmental governance. The 
case studies of the Vedan scandal and the environmental protection tax law demonstrate both the 
constraining and enabling effects embedded in civil society.  
The interaction between civil society and poverty reduction governance is the theme of 
inquiry for Chapter Five. The chapter provides a background to the issue of poverty reduction in 
Vietnam and discusses the actors, as well as their discourses, in this area of governance. It provides 
an analysis of the contestations permeating civil society over the role of marketization and 
government policies in poverty reduction. It highlights the local sociocultural dynamics in 
understanding different formations of civil society processes in response to the poverty question. 
The case study of the Disabled Peoples’ Organization at the grassroots level in Quang Tri province 
highlights the limits and potentials of civil society organizations in effecting social change over the 
endemic question of poverty. 
Chapter Six engages with the highly political dimension of interaction between civil society 
and the party-state over anti-corruption governance. It presents a background to the issue and 
discusses the perception of corruption in Vietnam, which is closely linked to the perceived 
legitimacy of the regime. It provides a detailed account of the role of civil society in anti-corruption 
politics and the integrity system. The case study of the Do Son land grab corruption scandal 
illustrates the contestation between civil socity and the party-state and highlights the civil society 
processes that effected change to the injustices caused by corrupt practices of local officials.  
 
The last chapter is the conclusion of the thesis. In the concluding remarks, I recap the core 
arguments and key points that have been made throughout the thesis. I highlight the key theoretical 
and empirical contributions of the thesis to the study of civil society under one party rule. I re-
emphasize the analytical utility of perspectives on civil society in understanding the current state-
society relations in Vietnam and its changing dynamics. I recognize the many expressions of civil 
society in Vietnam’s governance are constitutive of governance processes. Civil society should be 
studied as ongoing processes so that the intellectual ideas with normative visions about civil society 
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can be translated into a contextually-grounded and historically conditioned and socioculturally 
influenced basis.   
 
  
32 
  
32 
 
Chapter 1 
Theoretical framework 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework as a conceptual basis for 
understanding, analysing and investigating the development of civil society in Vietnam. In this 
chapter I review major traditions of thought on civil society and key concepts that are relevant and 
applicable to the research problem identified. In doing so I situate my main argument in the broader 
areas of knowledge and debates being considered. My main argument in this chapter is that the 
concept of civil society should be re-calibrated and reconfigured to offer a useful and clear lens to 
the research problem. A contextualized re-calibration of civil society is set to guide and inform my 
research.  
At the core of my research is the concept of civil society. The literature on theories of civil 
society is voluminous, however, it is overshadowed by confusion and ambiguity. I argue civil 
society is a contested concept and it is necessary to reformulate the concept in the context of Asian 
countries in general, and Vietnam in particular. There has been ample literature on the genealogy 
and definitions of civil society, which are informed by different theoretical approaches. With 
regards to the history and debates of the concept of civil society, many scholars have conducted 
thorough and comprehensive examinations by tracing it back to the ancient Greek and the Scottish 
Enlightenment and discussing the ideas of de Tocqueville, Hegel, and Marx (Cohen and Arato 
1992; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001; Guan 2004; Hannah 2007). Instead of repeating their exhaustive 
efforts, I will selectively outline influential schools of thoughts that inform the practice of civil 
society in a single party rule context, including those on civil society itself and relevant analytical 
prisms of looking into civil society.   
 
1.1 Existing Approaches  
In this section, I review the literature on the core existing approaches used in the study ofcivil 
society as well as those distinct scholarly works on civil society in Southeast Asia and China. By 
drawing on those bodies of literature, especially the writings on civil society across the region, I 
develop the theoretical framework within which a concept of civil society can be operationalized in 
the Vietnamese context. 
Amid the complex theoretical terrains of civil society, two broad traditions of thought stand 
out. Neither are coherent or unified, and both contain ‘multiple discourses and nuances within each 
one’ (Howell and Pearce 2001: 17). The first is regarded as the mainstream perspective which has 
roots in a liberal democratic tradition represented by the ideas of Ferguson, Smith, and de 
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Tocqueville. The second is an alternative approach taken from Hegel, Gramsci and critical theorists. 
While the first is generally ‘associated with the market and the private sphere’, the second is with 
‘politics and the public sphere’ (Lipschutz 2006: xiv). To put it in a different way, Colás (2002: 47) 
contends that ‘civil society has historically found expression in two predominant forms – one linked 
to the private sphere of the capitalist market, the other to the struggles against the all-encroaching 
power of the state.’ It is important to understand these two traditions and recognize their own merits 
in making sense of civil society in a specific context of Vietnam. However, as I will point out later, 
there are some inherent limitations in the first approach that make it difficult to grasp the nuances of 
civil society’s development in Vietnam while the second demonstrates more potential. This is 
primarily because the second presents a better account of the complex dynamics of civil society but 
not necessarily limited to democratization, as in the first approach. The theoretical framework 
developed in this chapter is based mainly on the second tradition.  
1.1.1 The liberal democratic view 
The liberal democratic perspective has dominated thinking about civil society since the 1980s 
when neoliberalism began to carve profound imprints in the global political economy. The 
mainstream approach has four important assumptions that need to be highlighted as they are 
relevant to the debates on civil society in Vietnam.  
First, it emphasizes the dichotomy between the state and civil society or the structural 
autonomy of civil society from the state (Landau 2008: 244). Civil society is associated with an 
arena of social action separate from the state and market (Cohen and Arato 1992: x). It is 
accompanied by liberal ideas about asserting civil liberties of individuals, universal right to political 
participation, checks on state power, and the rule of law. A vibrant civil society functions 
independently from the state and contributes significantly to the fulfilment of the state’s roles. Civil 
society and its organizations are supposed to play the role of legitimate partners of state and market 
institutions in making and implementing public policies to address collective problems and promote 
the public good (Naidoo and Tandon 1999: 7). With NGOs as its significant bolsterers, civil society 
‘underpins an effective and streamlined state, ensuring legitimacy, accountability and transparency: 
effectively, strengthening the state’s capacity for good governance’ (Mercer 2002: 7). 
Second, it characterizes state-civil society relations as complementary, cooperative, and in 
partnership. This consensual approach is reinforced by the ‘discovery’ of social capital generated by 
civil society in the 1990s. The American political scientist Robert Putnam arguably identified the 
link between social capital and democracy, contributing to the effectiveness and stability of 
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democratic government. He defines social capital as ‘features of social life, networks, norms and 
trusts that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam 
1995: 169). Social capital is more firmly rooted in democratic society. However, in undemocractic 
regimes like a party-state, as commented by Inoguchi (2006: 215), ‘social capital and trust exhibited 
in society tends to be narrowly defined along the line of strong clientelism.’ Furthermore, the liberal 
democratic view tends to assume a conflation of NGOs with civil society as the embodiment of 
‘good things.’ In state-society relations, NGOs play an important role in ‘channelling and 
processing the demands and concerns of disparate interest groups to the state’ as they represent the 
interests of the poor and the marginalized (Mercer 2002: 7). 
  Third, civil society is associated with political democratization towards a liberal democracy 
(Howell and Pearce 2001: 39; Jones 1998: 147-148). Civil society contributes significantly to 
democratic transition and consolidation and civil society organisations (CSOs) act as a bulwark 
against the state by checking its power, pressing for change and advocating alternative perspectives 
and policies (Mercer 2002: 9). The value of civil society as a major democratizing force for political 
change is well captured in Hall’s (1995: 26-27) comment: ‘we value democracy in large part 
because we expect it to be married to civil society.’ It is in this sense that civil society represents a 
challenge to the party-state in a post-communist era because civil soceity manages to canvass public 
support mainly from economic success buttressed by nationalism (Marsh 2006: 1). In fact, the 
modern use of this concept was ‘revived first and foremost in the struggles of democratic 
oppositions in Eastern Europe against authoritarian socialist party-states’ (Cohen and Arato 1992: 
15). In a liberal democratic vision, after a period of economic success and market opening for 
capitalist development, the middle class will grow to such a large degree that the authoritarian state 
can no longer accommodate their needs when it comes to economic slowdown. Other important 
factors such as serious inequality and rampant corruption will add to the dissatisfaction of the 
middle class, resulting in sufficient pressure for democratic transition and political. Democratization 
is predicted to come in the form of revolutions of East European character or Arab Spring style. 
Fourth, a market economy engenders civil society and civil society is an inevitable and natural 
product of capitalist development (Howell and Pearce 2001: 72). Market economy creates 
conditions conducive to the development of civil society. Outside a market economy, civil society 
can hardly thrive. Thus, civil society is believed to be conducive to economic development.  
As can be seen, the four assumptions point to the normative ideals of civil society that 
Western governments and international donors have been seeking to promote in developing 
countries. The first and second assumptions lay the groundwork for various answers to an 
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essentialist question ‘what is civil society?’ These characteristics are well captured in a definition 
offered by Diamond (1994: 228):  
…the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of share rules. It is distinct from 
“society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere… Civil society is 
an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state... Civil society not only 
restricts state power but legitimates state authority when that authority is based on the rule of law.  
 
While some scholars have found Diamond’s definition useful, they acknowledge how difficult 
it is to apply to an authoritarian context like Vietnam (Marr 1994, Weiss 2008). This vision of civil 
society is unacceptable to Vietnamese Marxist-Leninists and accordingly no such thing as civil 
society exists in Vietnam. A recent research finding reveals that civil society actors have had a 
legitimizing effects on the authoritarian rule in the absence of the rule of law in Vietnam 
(Wischermann 2013). This clearly contradicts Diamond’s image about civil society.   
Employing a collectivist perspective, Oxhorn (1995: 251-2) provides a definition of civil 
society with an emphasis on a different normative dimension:  
Civil society is a rich social fabric formed by a multiplicity of territorially and functionally based 
units. The strength of civil society is measured by the peaceful coexistence of these units and by their 
collective capacity to simultaneously resist subordination to the state and demand inclusion into 
national political structures. 
 
This definition recognizes the importance of collective struggles and a lack of consensus for 
the development of civil society. As it moves away from a categorization of the units belonging to 
civil society, it offers a more flexible way and a more useful avenue to understand civil society 
within authoritarian governance. However, it is practically difficult to find evidence of those units 
that can qualify for simultaneous collective actions to resist subordination and demand inclusion 
successfully. Thus, strictly adhering to this kind of definition is likely to result in a misleading 
impression about a dysfunctional civil society. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, CIVICUS, 
an interntional NGO advocating for the cause of civil society, offers an even broader definition of 
civil society, which it defines as: ‘the arena outside of the family, the state and the market where 
people associate to advance common interests’ (Nørlund 2007: 72). With an emphasis on functions 
rather than normative description of organizations, this working definition seeks to reconcile the 
fuzzy boundaries of different spheres: civil society, state, market, and family. It has enabled 
empirical research by CIVICUS into some different normative dimensions of civil society in 
Vietnam. However, given the serious problems of gathering data on the values domain, their study 
of civil society does not go far enough to grasp the dynamics of interaction between civil society 
and the party-state in Vietnam. 
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As discussed above, the liberal democratic view presumes a necessary link between a vibrant 
civil society and democratization in developing countries. However, this assumption has been 
debunked by the debate about authoritarian durability with rich empirical evidence from Southeast 
Asia. Given the relative successful economic development and the growth of civil society in the 
region since decolonisation, the undemocratic and illiberal rule consistently prevailing in the region 
is puzzling (Jones 1998; Emerson 2008; Case 2009). None of the countries in Southeast Asia 
belongs to the regime type of liberal democracy according to the typologies by Diamond (2008) and 
Emmerson (2008). Across the spectrum of regime type, the cases best described as electoral 
democracy are Indonesia and the Philippines while Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei are categorized as 
“politically closed authoritarianism.” 
The role of civil society in democratization process in Southeast Asia remains inchoate and 
inconspicuous. Less is known about civil society in closed authoritarian systems like Vietnam. 
There is a need to go beyond the liberal democratic framework to understand the complex dynamics 
of interaction between the party-state and civil society. On the one hand, the party-state has been 
able to sustain successful, soft authoritarian guidance through civil society by both co-optation and 
coercion. On the other hand, civil society embraces different forms of resistance, negotiation and 
struggle. This paradox indicates the flexible yet controlling aspects of “smart authoritarianism” or 
“responsive authoritarianism” that not only endures but prospers in Southeast Asia and China 
(Reilly 2012).            
In sum, the influence of the liberal democratic view on the studies of civil society in China 
and Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, has been limited despite its utility in understanding Western 
donors’ agenda and programs in development and NGO section across this region. In fact, the 
liberal democratic view has been substantially challenged by most empirical studies of civil society 
in Asia (Howell and Pearce 2001; Alaggapa 2004; Guan 2004; Weiss 2008). This approach 
emerged from liberal democracies while the majority of Asian countries have diverse and different 
regime types and political cultures. The major problem for this approach in Asian countries in 
general and Vietnam in particular lies in the assumption of autonomy or the rigid and distinct 
separation between the state and civil society. This causes difficulty in studies of civil society as an 
empirical reality in Asia. It is important to note a fact pointed out by Weiss (2008: 145) that in Asia 
‘the boundaries of the public and private sphere are more often porous than impermeable, and the 
state tends to exert more ideological and programmatic control than in democracies with a sturdier 
tradition of individualism.’ This point is also made by Kerkvliet (1995: 40-41) in his research of 
state-society relations in Vietnam, where herecognized that ‘state and society are often 
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intermingled.’ Thus, there remains confusion and lack of convincing evidence about these liberal-
democratic assumptions.  
The problems with the mainstream approach suggest that it is more useful to explore 
alternative lines of thought and examine the reinvention of the concept. This is not to say that this 
line of thought is irrelevant. Rather, it has certain influences over civil society-strengthening 
programs by international organizations and aid agencies, the operations of many international 
NGOs working in Vietnam, and local NGOs. These groups are in fact elements of civil society that 
advocate broad liberal agendas at different levels in their work. Thus, the utility of the liberal 
democratic view in studying civil society in such a context should not be completely discounted. 
Instead I argue it needs to incorporate alternative lines of thought in order to provide a more 
thorough and nuanced account of civil society in Vietnam. Particularly, as will be seen in Chapter 
Two, since the 2000s, Vietnam has witnessed new developments in civil society and governance 
that are difficult to fully understand within a stand-alone liberal democratic view. Against that 
background, I argue the need to bring a neo-Gramscian notion of civil society to the fore due to its 
increasing relevance to Vietnam. In the following section, the Gramscian concept of civil society is 
first discussed and then employed to shed light on recent dynamics of civil society and governance 
in Vietnam. 
1.1.2 Critical approach: a Gramscian perspective 
Recognising that ‘the democratic potential of civil society in the region is more limited than it 
is widely assumed’ (Quadir and Lele 2004: 8), many scholars writing on civil society in Asian 
countries have drawn on a Gramscian perspective. As argued by Landau (2008: 254), ‘Gramsci’s 
theory of civil society provides an important counterweight to normatively charged liberal theories 
in which a strong civil society is regarded as the panacea for many of the political, economic and 
social ills facing Asian states today.’ 
Gramsci’s line of argument was developed in an effort to explain why the communist 
revolution in Italy failed and why the fascists manage to stay in power during the 1930s. He 
observed that the dominant ideology of fascism still permeated civil society, arguing that the 
emergence of a counter-hegemony in civil society was needed before a revolution could succeed. 
Political parties were considered part of civil society and a strategy for conquering the realm of 
culture and ideology was necessary for strengthening the political position of the communist parties 
in class struggles. In discussing the Gramscian perspective, I will first sketch out the key idea of 
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hegemony in Gramsci’s political theory before linking it to the conception of civil society and 
underlying assumptions of the Gramscian approach. 
 
Hegemony, civil society and the party-state 
Conceptualization of hegemony is a central theoretical legacy of Gramsci. The concept of 
hegemony is often reduced to a simplistic identification with the ideological predominance of a 
particular group of class (Femia 1981: 23-26). For example, in Vietnam, it is common to see 
hegemony as the ideological predominance of the orthodox Marxism and Leninism with ubiquitous 
penetration through all aspects of society and culture besides state institutions. Conversely, 
hegemony is theorized by Gramsci with more rigour and sophistication. Hegemony is the kind of 
intellectual, ideological and moral leadership to maintain societal control through consent (Gramsci 
in Simon 1982: 21). Hegemony in itself is ‘the consensual aspect of political control’ (Femia 1981: 
25). This is to distinguish it from the domination exercised by the coercive machinery of the state 
which comprises the armed forces, police, law courts, prisons, and all administrative departments 
(bureaucracy) including taxation, finance, customs, industry, trade, social security, health and 
education. Thus, it is important to note that achieving hegemony involves a more widespread and 
deeper-rooted process than commanding and controlling structural powers of the state. 
Externally, hegemony is attained through the wide-ranging capacities of the dominant group, 
for example, the party-state, in using incentives, material interests, punishments, and political 
influence to achieve desirable behaviours and choices from societal actors. In so doing, the 
dominant group can transform the raw attributes of power into favourable outcomes. In this sense, 
hegemony has a regulative meaning for societal actors in both legal terms and practice, allowing 
them to act more predictably in accordance with what is permitted, avoid what is prohibited, and 
consider what is ambiguously regulated. Internally, hegemony is obtained by ‘moulding personal 
convictions into a replica of prevailing norms’ (Femia 1981: 24). In this sense, hegemony has a 
constitutive meaning because it constructs rules and norms codified in a single narrative and a 
single conception of reality at the expense of all alternative narratives. These rules and norms 
become the kind of identity embedded in societal actors. They seek to naturalize their adherence 
and compliance and destroy resistance and challenges.  
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony strikes a congruent note with Weber’s original usage of 
legitimacy as the inner justification for the rule of the dominant group (Bocock 1986: 85-6). 
According to Weber (1947: 328), there are three analytical types of legitimation: traditional, 
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charismatic, and rational-legal. They are the basis on which the political legitimacy of a system of 
authority rests. At the core of legitimacy is also the consent of the governed due to some moral 
authority. While the idea of legitimacy is widely used as an analytical category to study political 
regimes across the world, including the party-state in Vietnam (Vasavakul 1995, Holmes 2007, 
Thayer 2009), the concept of hegemony has not received such attention for application in Vietnam.  
Hegemonic leadership is a difficult task for any ruling group even though they command the 
coercive apparatus of the state partly because there are always counter-hegemonic struggles. A 
party-state might be in a position to obtain such hegemonic leadership but the latter is unlikely to be 
stable and constant. The political project of construction and maintenance of identities and norms 
requires unceasing efforts for negotiations, readjustments and concessions inter alia to manufacture 
consent. This point is forcefully made by Bocock (1986: 37): 
Hegemonic leadership involves developing intellectual, moral and philosophical consent from all 
major groups in a nation. It involves an emotional dimension too, in that those political leaders who 
seek hegemonic leadership must address the sentiments of the nation-people and must not appear as 
strange or alien beings who are cut off from the masses. 
 
In the case of the party-state, both an objective and a means, hegemony is needed to permeate 
civil society. The term ‘proletarian dictatorship’ which used to be a catchphrase in all communist 
party-states denotes the hegemony armored with coercion. No longer in vogue, hegemony is now 
couched in the term ‘party’s leadership.’ It is no doubt that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
struggles take place across most areas of governance.  
 
Conception of civil society and underlying assumptions 
Gramsci understood civil society as the ideological infrastructure which is the ensemble of 
educational, religious, voluntary and associational institutions (Gramsci 1971: 12; Femia 1981: 24). 
Even though his theorization of civil society was inspired by Hegel and Marx, Gramsci’s 
conception departs clearly from their usages, which are rooted in material substructure and 
economic relations (Simon 1982: 70). There are three important arguments advanced by Gramsci 
that find relevant applications in many countries across Southeast Asia.  
First, turning the focus away from the economic base in the classical Marxist tradition, this 
conflictual approach highlights civil society as a crucial superstructure that the state seeks to control 
in order to achieve hegemony or assert its political legitimacy. This approach refers to ‘a condition 
in which the dominant classes utilize the state to both coerce and at the same time achieve consent 
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to their dominance within civil society’ (Katz 2006: 336). In practice, the state uses more nuanced 
and insidious forms of cognitive and political persuasion rather than coercion to exercise 
ideological hegemony. This process takes place so powerfully and naturally in civil society 
institutions such as schools, churches, universities, the media, and unions, it is if it is not happening 
at all. The forces and/or classes who rule the state seek to dominate civil society to produce 
necessary consent to social, political and legal ideas and institutions for political domination. They 
do that by naturalizing and infusing ideas of ‘political passivity and nationalism, rather than 
cultivating critical reflection’ (George 2012: 30). The consent is manufactured indirectly through a 
range of compromises and concessions made by the state to the populace. Thus political and social 
change can only come through “counter-hegemonic” projects to expose these ideas and undermine 
the processes of the ruling class who gain consent and legitimacy from the governed. 
Second, the Gramscian perspective questions the mechanical distinction between the state and 
civil society (Gramsci 1971: 235-238; Simon 1982: 71). Gramsci had a full appreciation of the 
interpenetration between the two spheres as ‘the distinction is essentially analytical, a convenient 
device designed to aid understanding’ (Femia 1981: 27). The Gramscian view contends that civil 
society is an arena of challenge and contestation over idea, thoughts, ideologies, and political 
principles (Ramasamy 2004: 206). This contestation happens between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces which reciprocally shape one another as ‘simultaneous double movements’ (Katz 
2006: 336). Due to that contestation, the borderline between state and civil society becomes more 
blurred and porous. Bocock (1986: 34) clearly points out this Gramscian view: ‘The borderline 
between state and civil society is a constantly shifting one and one which has to be negotiated, 
maintained and continually re-adjusted over time.’ 
The hegemonic forces are represented by the coercive rule of the state by the dominant classes 
and some elements of civil society co-opted by the state with mechanisms of cultural and 
ideological consent. The party-state engages actively and strategically with some sub-sectors and 
elements of civil society to promote its values and practices and allows some space for ‘limited (and 
to an extent, false) freedom of expression for the dominated groups, thereby maintaining the 
continued consent to the current relations of force’ (Katz 2006: 335). The counter-hegemonic forces 
include those elements of civil society, especially subaltern groups supported by intellectuals, who 
challenge the dominance of the state in culture and ideology and effect social change. Hence, there 
is competition and contestation between different forces as ‘whoever controls civil society succeeds 
in manufacturing consent from the masses, thus commanding the political power’ (Ramasamy 
2004: 202-203). This perspective gives insight into why authoritarian states try to severely constrain 
civil society from growing autonomous and out of their control. In articular, it helps explain why 
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those communist parties with a monopoly on power like the CPV (Communist Party of Vietnam) 
and the CPC (Communist Party of China) attach critical importance to maintaining a tight grip over 
ideology and culture.
4
  
Third, civil society is not only a sphere of class struggle, but a realm of popular democratic 
struggles (Simon 1982: 26). The Gramscian perspective challenges the assumption that civil society 
is characterized by democratic and egalitarian relations (Quadir and Lele 2004: 10). Civil society is 
described as a sphere of power relations where inequalities and exploitation exist. Therefore, it 
offers a terrain for a radical reform and an emancipatory project ‘through which dominant ideas and 
structures of power could be contested’ (Howell and Pearce 2001: 34-70). Despite the asymmetric 
relationship between civil society and the state, democratic struggles take place because, as Gramsci 
suggests of power, it is ‘…diffused throughout civil society as well as being embodied in the 
coercive apparatuses of the state’ (Simon 1982: 27). The Gramscian notion recognizes that civil 
society is ‘a medium though which the state can impose its own versions of what is good for society 
as a whole’ (Ramasamy 2004: 206). However, as the state gradually degenerates, it promotes and 
preserves only the interests of the ruling party elites, not the universal interests of the general 
public. As such, there need to be a space to freely associate and to speak critically and to form 
organizations independent of the state. This situation was particularly applicable to communist 
states in East Europe throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the demands for freedom of 
association constituted ‘a revolt against the communist state’s hegemonic claim to be the vanguard 
of universal interests’ (Guan 2004: 4). From this perspective, civil society which embraces 
‘educational and formative processes’ (Devetak et al. 2012: 73) is considered to generate important 
factors for genuine democratization and emancipation. 
In sum, the Gramscian perspective of civil society offers a useful insight into how non-state 
actors interact with governance dominated by the state, calling into question the distinction between 
the state and civil society. Civil society is regarded as an arena of challenge and contestation 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces.  
In this thesis, I will draw on the broad Gramscian themes to illustrate how the ‘ruling class’ or 
their vanguards – party and state institutions as well as party-sanctioned mass organizations – acts 
to naturalize certain ideas and attitudes in a system that has deviated into one that enhances the 
                                                          
4
 In the CPV and CPC, it is a long-standing tradition that its department in charge of ideology and culture is extremely 
powerful and has authority that overrides that of the government ministry responsible for the field. The person who 
heads the party’s department in charge of ideology and culture is usually a senior member of the PolitburoSee further 
details at section 2.1 in Chapter Two.   
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power and prosperity of a small minority at the expense of the populace at large. In Vietnam, there 
are signals that a counter-hegemonic discourse has emerged in some functional areas of governance 
as potential sites of counter-hegemonic struggle to challenge the orthodox narratives and the 
political legitimacy of the one-party rule. Thus far, the party-state has managed to maintain control 
by means of imposing structural ties and implementing ideological leadership on civil society 
organizations so that the former are subordinate to the latter’s interests. However, some elements of 
civil society have successfully circumvented this type of co-optation by manipulating the system to 
their advantage to claim and assert their autonomous space.  
While there are undeniable merits in the Gramscian perspective in studying civil society and 
governance in Vietnam, there exist limitations to this theory itself, just like the liberal democratic 
view. Landau (2008) and Wells-Dang (2011) both find it difficult to travel far with theories of civil 
society, including the Gramscian one. The most frequent difficulty that researchers face is that not 
all cases fit with the underlying assumptions and, therefore, cases might need to be chosen 
selectively for analysis within the theory. In my thesis, I argue that the Gramscian theory of civil 
society has great potential that can only be realized by being brought into fuller play by theoretical 
recombination with other analytical prisms that are relatively close to the concept of civil society. 
Employing insights from these prisms, relevant elements of the Gramscian perspective can be 
drawn out and appropriated for the study of civil society in Vietnam. These elements will be 
utilized in constructing my theoretical framework and the arguments addressed throughout the 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Analytical perspectives  
1.2.1 Public sphere and discourse  
All accounts of civil society deal explicitly or implicitly with the concept of public sphere as 
they are closely linked. This key theme was discussed thoroughly by Habermas. Habermas defined 
the public sphere as ‘a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed... Although state authority is so to speak the executor of the political public sphere, it is 
not part of it’ (Habermas 1974: 49). The concepts of civil society and public sphere are both similar 
and different. While actors in civil society are mostly organizations and associations, ‘participants 
in a public sphere are individual citizens’ (Wells-Dang 2011: 29). However, both are highlighted as 
a sphere of voluntarism and autonomy. Madsen (1993: 190) argues that ‘a public sphere arises out 
of civil society as people come together to form a public.’ Furthermore, it is important to note the 
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existence of multiple public spheres at different levels along with multiple civil societies (Edward 
2004: 57). In practice, the public is fragmented into competing interests groups, which means that 
many publics exist in a society, thus it is difficult to completely produce consensus about the 
common good (Wells-Dang 2011: 29). This argument is interestingly resonant with the Gramscian 
idea of different sub-sectors and elements in contestation within civil society.  
Habermasian theory of the public sphere is concerned with ‘how the communicative 
processes of civil society influence the legislative and policy processes of the state’ (Dryzek 2000: 
25). Writing on the political functions of the public sphere, Habermas (1989: 74) describes: 
The public sphere as a functional element in the political realm was given the normative status of an 
organ for the self-articulation of civil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs. 
 
The reason Habermas emphasizes civil society and public space is because ‘they form the 
locus for the formation of truly public opinion via communicative action’ (Dryzek 2000: 24). In 
turn, public opinion can influence policy formulation and practice of the state through ‘the 
translation of the “communicative power” generated in the public sphere into the “administrative 
power” of the state’ (Dryzek 2000: 25). It is in the public sphere that discourses are employed as 
useful avenues for social actors to influence policy- and law-making.  
Engagement with discourses is a powerful and effective way to understand civil society and 
governance in a party-state. Discourses are important because they are shared ways of apprehending 
the world and the vehicles through which we give meaning to the world  that we shape, produce and 
reproduce (Gee and Handford 2012: 5). In this respect, Joan Scott (1988: 35) provides a useful 
definition of discourse as ‘a historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of statements, 
terms, categories and beliefs.’ Discourses construct meanings and power relations that help to 
define both common sense and knowledge. Remarkably, each discourse rests on assumptions, 
judgments and contentions that provide ‘basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and 
disagreements’ (Dryzek 2006: 1). The discursive power originates from the ability of discourses to 
structure and coordinate the actions of individuals and entities wholly or in part. It is through 
examining discourses that we can gain a more in-depth understanding of power relations, the 
hegemonic order and the potentials and conditions for a transition to a new order.  
Discourses shape social processes where ‘deliberators are amenable to changing their 
judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve 
persuasion rather than coercion, manipulation, or deception’ (Dryzek 2000: 1). Writing specifically 
about Vietnam, Gillespie (2008: 677) notes that such deliberation that ‘takes place outside 
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constitutionally defined mechanisms and pathways’ has a strong influence on policy and law-
making. For deliberation to be effective, Gillespie stipulates three conditions: (1) the willingness 
and capability of social actors to engage in reasoned and reflective debate with law-makers; (2) 
shared understanding (or preference convergence) about the nature of regulatory problems and the 
appropriate legislative response; and (3) the existence of political space for social actors to organize 
and deliberate state policy and law. These are the crucial conditions for the “authenticity” of 
deliberation and for broad social consensus to be realized. It is in this sense that cracks and forms of 
resistance emerge to challenge the powerful forms of domination within discourses, thus revealing 
the hidden transformative potential in both societal consciousness and institutional structures 
(Bleiker 2003: 43-44). 
The theory of public sphere and discourse analysis has been found to be useful by many 
scholars studying aspects of civil society across Asia (Weiss 2008: 148; Howell and Pearce 2001: 
145). In relation to Vietnam, Thomas’ (2001: 306) analysis of crowd formations and state reactions 
reveals a semantic shift in the crowd ‘that has allowed public space to become a site where 
transgressive ideologies and desires may have an outlet.’ He convincingly argues that ‘changes in 
the use of public space map the sets of relations between the public and the state, making these 
transforming relationships visible, although fraught with contradictions and anomalies.’ Wells-
Dang (2010) develops the theoretical framework of political space to study civil society in Vietnam 
from the ‘rice-roots’. He explores the new changing dynamics of political space where citizens 
influence authorities over decisions on a public park and land seizure for development purposes in 
Hanoi, equating the political space with ‘moves towards democracy, a public sphere and civil 
society’ (Wells-Dang 2010: 95). In another study on public participation in lawmaking in Vietnam, 
Gillespie (2008: 675) uses the deliberative model to explore ‘how public discussion provides a 
forum for different social groups to debate issues that influence lawmaking’ and how the state 
control creates an asymmetric discourse that benefits elite interests at the expense of small-scale 
actors. The above authors’ nuanced uses of public sphere and the deliberative model will be drawn 
out for the purpose of answering my research question on the interaction between civil society and 
governance. 
1.2.2 Process-based approach and embedded social activism 
Most definitions of civil society influenced either by the mainstream perspective or alternative 
one, have used such spatial metaphors as “realm,” “sphere,” “space,” “arena,” or “domain.” This 
commonality is described by Hannah (2007: 70) as ‘indicating that it is an essential (and elemental) 
piece of overall social structure.’ As such, most studies tend to focus on actors in structural terms 
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and inevitably result in a typology of social organizations to identify which one belongs to civil 
society. When studying civil society in a non-Western context, especially authoritarian states, 
academics usually have to deal with a problem of recognizing the form of civil society in existence 
and identifying the actors. Sticking to an autonomy issue, this way of identifying civil society 
organizations is difficult because almost all organizations must have structural ties to the party-state 
in one way or another. 
To circumvent this slippage, sociology and governance studies have lent some scholars a 
process-based approach to focus on interactions between structures or the actions of civil society 
organizations. Moving from the question of ‘what it is’ to ‘what it does’ (Uphoff and Krishna 2004: 
357), they tend to take an action-oriented approach to analyze the development of civil society in 
such countries dominated by communist parties like China and Vietnam. It is important to note that 
this approach is not at all a departure from theoretical foundations on civil society set by the 
domain-based approach.
5
 They are by all means complementary.  
Drawing on the work by Uphoff and Krishna (2004) theorizing civil society actions, 
Wischermann (2005, 2010, 2011) and Hannah (2005, 2007) have made extensive use of this 
approach in their writings on civil society in Vietnam. As argued by those scholars, the advantages 
of studying civil society by process rather than by structure are to provide more inclusiveness, 
richness and nuance. First, it helps to overcome the problem with autonomy of actors from the 
party-state. The exclusion of certain organizations or associations from civil society merely due to 
its structural ties to the state is avoidable (Hannah 2007: 94). Second, it provides a broader 
perspective on state-society relations by studying civil society as relationships embodied in 
activities. It explores actions that accomplish objectives of civil society. The actors who undertake 
civil society activities can be among ‘a variety of institutions and organizations, not all of which are 
or need to be detached from the government’ (Uphoff and Krishna 2004: 357). This approach to the 
study of civil society in Vietnam proved useful to Wells-Dang in his later writings. He theorized 
civil society as ‘a process of collective action that occurs and develops when organizations and 
individuals join together to influence and promote positive, non-violent social change’ (Wells-Dang 
2011: 24).  
The process-based approach to civil society is particularly useful in light of Polanyi’s notion 
of “embeddedness.” This process was applied by Evans (1995) to develop the notion of embedded 
autonomy to explain the connections between state bureaucracy and society through a network of 
                                                          
5
 The domain-based approach tends to focus more on structures or actors in civil society. 
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social ties and institutional channels for the success of developmental states in East Asia. Given the 
limited political space allowed by the party-state in Vietnam and China, “embeddedness” is used as 
‘a measure of autonomy of civic organizations from the state’ (Ho 2007: 334). The strength of this 
concept lies in its capacity to embrace critical features such as contextualization and networks of 
human action seen in the flow of processes. It refers to social action between the (semi-
)authoritarian state and society as ongoing interactions and negotiation or a situation of negotiated 
symbiosis, which are effected through networks or ties. It explains the power of informal, 
interpersonal connections conducive to social penetration into the state.  
The notion of embeddedness is appropriate to denote the engagement of civil society process 
in a (semi-)authoritarian context like Vietnam as it is in China. Its great analytical utility is brought 
into play for the seemingly paradoxical situation of social activism in various functional areas of 
governance. It is a matter of fact that the (semi-)authoritarian state limits or discourages social 
activism and that there is little maneuvering political space for formal associations operating 
autonomously from the state. However, at the same time, it seems the (semi-)authoritarian 
environment is still enabling the embeddeding of social activism, due to civil society actors’ 
enmeshment into thick and diffuse webs of informal relations, unwritten rules and norms, and their 
constructing processes, and at times shared missions with the state.  
1.2.3 Associative governance approach: Moving beyond corporatism 
Although the process-based approach has not been commonly used in civil society studies, it 
has been an important perspective in governance studies. As pointed out by Pierre and Peters (2000: 
22), ‘the governance approach is often argued to focus more on process and outcomes than on 
formal institutional arrangements.’ This approach has been widely applied by political scientists to 
investigate state-society relations. Although there are various modes of governance, the most 
relevant to my research is associative governance which offers a highly useful lens especially for 
scholars studying state-society relations in countries under one-party authoritarianism like China 
and Vietnam. One of the influential concepts developed under the mode of associative governance 
is corporatism. Before touching on this specific model, I will briefly discuss the general concept of 
governance and associative governance.  
Governance is a key concept in contemporary politics. At its core is the formulation and 
implementation of policies to articulate and pursue collective interests. Kerkvliet (2004) offers an 
operational definition of governance as, ‘a process in which government officials and institutions 
make and implement policies, rules, and regulations while at the same time being accountable to the 
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public.’ Notably, governance is ‘a dynamic outcome of social and political actors’ (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000: 22) as it is ‘the distributive aspect of who get what, when, and how in a society’ 
(Weatherbee, 2003). This understanding of the term has affirmed the role of civil society in 
governance as a sphere of actions and interactions among different actors for the articulation and 
pursuit of common interests.  
This line of thought rejects the notion that governance is a task performed exclusively by the 
government, even in a one-party dominated state. Rather, it requires the inclusion and active 
participation of different actors, including civil society, in various modes of governance. It is 
important to note the continued centrality of the state in this process. In this sense, good governance 
means the state ‘performs its tasks and meets challenges effectively, efficiently, and in a manner 
that contributes to the legitimacy of authority (the general approval of the people)’ (Weatherbee 
2003). The involvement of non-state actors in such governance is the goal of the state. It points to 
associative governance as a mode where ‘governments or state agencies form governing 
partnerships with societal organizations or NGOs’ (Bell and Hindmoor 2008: 162).  
Associative governance has a particular form identified as “corporatism6.” In a “soft 
authoritarian” or “semi-authoritarian” context like that of China and Vietnam, it is tempting to 
frame the state-society relationship into a corporatist mode of governance (Ding, 1998; Heurlin, 
2009). This approach is suitable for explaining the status quo established by the dominant party-
state. In a corporatist model, the powerful interest groups greatly influence the making and 
implementation of public policy. This governance model has been invariably highlighted in studies 
on state-society relations in socialist countries with market economies: China and Vietnam (White 
et al. 1996; Ding 1998; Kerkvliet 2001; Stromseth 2003). In these countries, corporatism 
convincingly accounts for the rise and influence of interest groups and rent-seekers in the decision-
making of the state. Thus, it was even arguably regarded as more applicable to China and Vietnam 
than the concept of civil society. To explain the emergence of a nascent civil society in these two 
countries, a nuanced version of corporatism  – societal corporatism – was developed. This refined 
model of corporatism indicates a conceptual overlap with civil society and emphasizes the 
institutional arrangement linking interests of civil society with decision-making structures of the 
                                                          
6
 It may be useful to refer to a widely used definition offered by Schmitter (1974: 93-94): corporatism as ‘a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection 
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.’ 
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state (Ding 1998: 45). Basically, the model lays a theoretical ground for a repressed civil society 
where the party-state co-opts elements of civil society.  
Despite its merits in providing insights into state-society relations in authoritarian contexts, 
the corporatist model of governance has limitations. As Saich (2000: 125) argued, societal 
corporatism increasingly finds it difficult to explain the dynamics of change in governance when a 
number of civil society actors manage to negotiate the party-state for expanding their political 
space. The theory of social corporatism fails to take into account social activism from a burgeoning 
civil society and its potential for political and social change. Thus, it is important to note how 
associative governance is engaged by civil society. In this approach, civil society can be identified 
with the sphere of associative actions to articulate common interests and demands of citizens. Its 
core mission is to protect their rights, and to meet their needs vis-à-vis the state by seeking to 
engage with governance to negotiate ideas, norms, values, and practices of the state.  
1.2.4 Network theory 
While studying civil society in China and Vietnam, Wells-Dang (2011: 28) recognized the 
strength of sociological theories of collective action for trying to “establish links among concepts 
that often stand in parallel isolation” in order to develop a network-based theory of civil society that 
is ‘more robust and better able to travel to the contexts of China and Vietnam.’  He demonstrates 
how theorists of social movements and social capital have been embracing network analysis (Wells-
Dang 2011: 42). Indeed, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 3) contend that transnational solidarity networks 
engaged in ‘production, exchange, and strategic use of information’ are formed of non-state forces 
without necessarily using confrontational means.  
A modern society like that of Vietnam is characterized by increasingly diverse and complex 
webs of information, cultures and institutions. Such a network society is creating new patterns and 
dynamics for the development of civil society. As a result, the emerging strand of theory on 
network society is likely to provide a useful prism for study civil society in that context. Castells 
(2004: 3), a leading theorist on network society, defines it as a society whose social structure is 
made of networks powered by microelectronics-based information and communication technology.  
By social structure, he means the organizational arrangements of humans in relations of production, 
consumption, reproduction, experience and power expressed in meaningful communication coded 
by culture. The network society comprises virtual nodes and codes that constitute fundamental 
patterns of social life. The significance of “networks” for civil society lies in its flexibility, 
adaptability, and self-reconfiguring capacity that can enable ‘new actors and new contents in the 
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process of social organization, with relative independence of the power centres, increased over time 
with technological change, and more precisely, with the evolution of communication technologies’ 
(Castells 2004: 5).  
The Internet and revolutionary changes in information and communication technologies have 
brought the network society to a new level and scale. Their wide-ranging effects and ubiquitous use, 
particularly among the youth and middle-class, tend to produce a misleading impression about its 
omnipotent power of transforming the institutional structure when used by civil society actors. 
Castells (2004: 5) argues that ‘the availability of proper technology is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for the transformation of the social structure.’ Binary logics like 
cooperation/competition and inclusion/exclusion in a network society endure. Writing on China, 
Linchuan Qiu (2004: 118) concurs that ‘the Internet is not a superimposed agent of change’ but only 
a conduit through which the existing propensities of society are set free.   
The network society theory offers a cogent way to understand power relations. Social 
struggles take place around the making and assertion of key values, which in turn are the 
expressions of power (Castells 2004: 25). The dynamics of domination and resistance to domination 
characterize the network society with an emphasis on organizational transformation. The concept of 
network society cogently correlates with the Gramscian view of hegemony and Habermasian vision 
of public sphere. It denotes the contestation of values such as individual freedom and personal 
autonomy vis-à-vis the institutions of both state and society and the power of business corporations, 
cultural diversity and rights of the minorities or the vulnerable ultimately expressed in human rights 
against all forms of oppression and violence. Obviously, network theory is able to encapsulate the 
modern functions of communication that were not present during Gramsci’s writing.    
The network concept is particularly important for making sense of the interactions between 
individuals and organizations who share ideas and/or values with an aim to influence policy agenda, 
procedures, outcomes, discursive positions and behavior of the state, to transform the terms and 
nature of the debate, or to challenge the establishment. As argued by Keck and Sikkink (1998: 3), 
‘networks are communicative structures’ and they ‘must be understood as political spaces, in which 
different situated actors negotiate – formally or informally – the social, cultural, and political 
meanings of their joint enterprise.’ It is in these political spaces or networks that ideas and norms 
are introduced and contested. Consequently, perceptions of the state and societal actors about their 
identities, interests and preferences are shaped and reshaped. Thus civil society actors can achieve 
their aims of influencing institutional structures; to what extent they do achieve them is dependent 
on state power.        
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While it is a useful prism, the network theory itself also has a number of limitations and has 
been critiqued. The most recognizable cleavage is its resultant stress on a structural and actor-
centered approach at the expense of adequate attention to processes and actions. Thus its application 
to the political and social context in Vietnam is likely of less analytical utility. At this point, I agree 
with Wells-Dang’s (2011: 45) argument that the network theory should not stand on its own, but is 
more rigorous when linking to ‘the broader process of civil society in specific contexts.’ In a similar 
vein, Zink (2013) employs the “actor-network” theory in combination with “slippery space” 
concept to make sense of the complex interdependence and individual agency in policy-making on 
science and environment in Vietnam.   
 
1.3 Re-conceptualizing civil society and governance in a party-state  
Scholars of civil society in Southeast Asia and China have been interested in re-
conceptualizing civil society ‘to make it more relevant to and reflective of non-Western experience’ 
(Weiss 2008: 153). This re-conceptualisation of civil society aims to shed clearer light on the 
dynamics of governance given its indeterminate and contested nature in both political philosophy 
and development discourse (Howell 2001; Guan 2004). The recalibration of the civil society 
concept offers a clearer lens and brings the concept more in line with Southeast Asian reality, thus 
rendering it useful in a specific context. This section seeks to develop an analytical framework to 
map the processes through which civil society actors influence governance. The framework will 
investigate both the regulative and constitutive interactions between civil society actors and party-
state institutions. There are three means used in processes of interactions that will be subject to 
critical analysis: critical discourse of hegemonic leadership, norm construction, and networking 
praxis for associative action. 
In this framework, civil society is neither homogenous nor static but understood in dynamic 
terms. It is normatively based on a Gramscian assumption that the party-state engages actively and 
strategically with some sub-sectors and elements of civil society to promote its values and practices. 
It also indicates the limited political space that the party-state consents to civil society. 
Who are the emerging civil society actors and what are their processes/actions?  
Two important features relevant to the Vietnamese context and experience shall be brought to 
the fore. First, civil society is neither homogenous nor static but has a dynamic character. The range 
of actors varies flexibly from NGOs to government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) or even party-
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sponsored mass organizations who are of the state and by the state, but not necessary always for the 
state’s interests. They include both non-state actors and hybrid actors. Both types of actors can take 
various forms. As the Vietnamese context is frequently imbued with ambiguity around hybrid 
actors, it is helpful to include a definition. Hybrid actors are those that ‘can resemble state agencies 
but pursue private (non-state objectives) or look like non-state agencies but aim to realize state 
policies’ (Gillespie 2009: 28). Second, the autonomy of non-state actors is compromised and 
negotiated, which is termed “negotiated symbiosis” (Ho 2007: 334). Although NGOs must be 
structurally tied to the party-state through the latter’s agents, particularly the mass organizations, 
institutional parasitism phenomenon does not mean that the party-state today can arbitrarily impose 
its dictates on society. Albeit façade institutions, the non-state actors operate on a basis of highly 
complex and diffuse webs of interests and are inclined towards the thin line between tolerance and 
repression by the party-state. As Saich (2000: 125) argues, the dynamics of change in governance 
happen when a number of civil society actors manage to negotiate with the party-state for 
expanding their political space.  
Such features of civil society highlight the dilemma of co-optation strategy by the party-state 
of Vietnam. The ruling CPV has been able to control society in such a way that ‘it can penetrate 
into every possible sector and level of society’ (Heng, 2004: 41), blurring the delineation between 
the state agencies and civil society actors as well as the public and private spheres. The CPV seeks 
to dominate ideology and culture in civil society with party cells infiltrating many elements of civil 
society. Thus far, the party-state has managed to maintain control of society by means of imposing 
structural ties from civil society organizations to the party-state so that the former are subordinate to 
the latter’s interests. However, some elements of civil society have successfully circumvented 
and/or navigated this type of co-optation by manipulating the system to their advantage to claim and 
assert their autonomous space. This duality pattern of civil society in Vietnam is strikingly similar 
to that of China. Writing specifically on China, Cooper (2006: 115) notes that the various 
incarnations of civil society, such as the diffuse and informal networks of relations, a wide variety 
of informal activities and associations in combination with formal ones to accommodate both 
compliance and resistance are both a necessity and an asset. Clearly, there is evidence that signals a 
counter-hegemonic discourse in some functional areas of governance to challenge the political 
legitimacy of the one-party rule (Wischermann, 2010 & 2011; Hannah, 2007; and Wells-Dang, 
2011).  
The conceptual affinity of embedded social activism to particular patterns of associative 
governance makes them complementary and pertinent to the analysis of governance areas in 
Vietnam’s soft authoritarian context. Furthermore, through this strategy, embedded social activism 
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has gained certain political and social influence, specifically, increased legitimacy in the view of the 
party-state, a firm place in the society, and links with international NGOs (Ho & Edmonds, 2007: 
336). In this aspect, rising social activism has made substantive contributions to strengthening civil 
society.   
The struggle between those forces in a context like that of Vietnam does not manifest so 
apparently in a confrontational manner or in social resistance and popular protest as it does in the 
European context. Rather, civil society actors in Vietnam tend ‘to work from within the nexus of 
power in order to make a difference’ and achieve their political objectives by ‘increasingly courting 
government approval and influence in policy-making’ (Ho 2001: 917). Given the limited political 
space, civil society actors have to work in this way to gain legitimacy and recognition from the 
party-state otherwise they would be outlawed and repressed. Thus, the associative action is 
understood in terms of active process by both formal associations and informal networks to 
influence the policy agenda, discursive positions, and outcomes, as well as state behaviors and 
practices.   
Critical discourses and norm construction 
In each functional areas of governance, there exist a number of critical discourses that shape 
and coordinate the discursive positions and practices of the involved actors. The party-state has 
always tried to assert its hegemonic leadership over these discourses by constructing and 
inculcating master narratives in particular areas of governance. This process is in no way 
unidirectional with the party-state dictating its narratives to the societal forces. It is a process with 
unceasing efforts from the side of the party-state for norm construction, re-negotiation, re-
adjustment, and concession to manufacture the consent about its rule on the side of the society. On 
the side of subaltern groups, counter-hegemonic efforts are constantly made in many forms with 
discourses to circumvent co-optation from the party-state and carve out greater political space. 
Hence, civil society is an active site of deliberation, contestation and challenge of ideas and norms. 
It accounts for the dynamic interaction and intersubjectivity that produces the rules and norms with 
both regulative and constitutive meanings.     
The systems of meanings and knowledge embedded in policy processes and state behaviors 
are organized and negotiated among many actors and institutions so that ‘political claims are 
legitimated, making particular actions seem normal or inevitable’ (Savigny and Marsden 2011: 37). 
Understanding of how competing systems of meanings and interpretations are constructed and clash 
is key to make sense of power relations. By immersing oneself in the discourses where particular 
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language games are being played or used and particular systems of meaning are constructed or 
contested, we can better understand the mechanism to include and exclude certain options, ideas 
and possibilities. A similar point is made by Gillespie about the useful framework of discourse that 
“social actors can deploy language in strategic ways to realize particular sets of interests” (Gillespie 
2008: 678). The caveat at this point is that the tacit recognition by the Vietnamese party-state of the 
existence of competing narratives and counter-hegemonic discourses from different societal groups 
should not be interpreted as an emergent pluralist political system. Rather, the recognition might 
represent certain possibilities and potential conditions to challenge the hegemonic discourse and the 
dominant order as for effecting transformation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed key issues and debates in the two major schools of thought on civil 
society within the liberal democratic theory and critical theory, particularly the Gramscian 
perspective. In recognizing both the usefulness and the limits of these concepts in making sense of 
civil society development in Vietnam’s one-party system, I draw inter-connections to a number of 
key concepts: the public sphere, the process-based approach, embedded social activism, associative 
governance, and network theory. Based on the re-combination and reconfiguration of these 
concepts, I reconstruct a theoretical framework that guide and inform my research. The framework 
holds a basis for investigation of both the regulative and constitutive interactions between civil 
society actors and party-state institutions. Processes of interactions subject to critical analysis 
include critical discourse of hegemonic leadership, norm construction, and networking praxis for 
associative action. 
 The theoretical framework developed in this chapter takes civil society as a process of 
collective action taking place in the public sphere and network society. Equipped with this 
theoretical framework, the rest of the thesis investigates interactions between civil society and 
governance in Vietnam’s one-party rule. The perspective on civil society discussed above features 
prominently across various important functional areas of governance like the environment, poverty 
reduction, integrity building, and the rule of law. 
  
54 
  
54 
 
Chapter 2 
Factors influencing civil society development in Vietnam 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of key structures that condition and 
constrains the development of Vietnam’s civil society over the past few decades. In this chapter, I 
will explore the main factors that influence civil society in various ways. Exploring these factors 
will shed light on the context for case studies in functional areas of governance that follows in the 
next chapters. My key argument is that the interplay of these various factors form the structural 
forces that set the operational parameters for civil society and at the same time locate the potential 
area for transformation by the agency of civil society.  
The previous chapter discusses different bodies of literature on civil society and related 
concepts and constructs a theoretical framework for the thesis. This chapter draws upon it to shed 
light on the interplay of those key factors. They have close relations to the development of civil 
society. The chapter first discusses the institutional environment and governance system which 
situates the dominant role of the party-state. It follows by an examination of economic 
development, the middle class, and the intellectuals and their links to civil society. The thriving 
associational life and the rise of non-state actors, quasi-state actors and hybrid actors with more 
diverse roles in governance is also a critical factor that deserves discussion. Finally, the chapter 
engages with the important aspect of modern communication and communicative action, that is the 
internet and the blogosphere which provides a new site and political space for civil society.    
  
2.1 Institutional environment and governance system in Vietnam 
Vietnam basically maintains a Leninist system of governance and a unitary political system. 
Despite sweeping economic and social changes, the Leninist governance structure has remained 
largely the same as they were before 1990s. The entire political system is characterized by the 
persistence of party dominance (Kerkvliet et al. 1999: 2). The party-state has traditionally 
conceived itself as the epitome of the great collective interest of the society and believed to wield 
wide-ranging capacity to pursue and fulfil such collective interests. Rather, the dynamics of the 
governance process are characterized by the multi-dimensional interactions between civil society 
and the party-state. In this section, I will make a brief introduction to Vietnam’s governance 
structure and discuss the problems it faces as well as the shifting patterns of governance process 
amid the development of civil society. There have been different accounts of the formal governance 
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structure. For example, Zink (2013: 6-7) attends to ‘four formally organized hierarchies of political 
powers’, that is, the CPV, the National Assembly, the Government and the Fatherland Front while 
London (2014: 3-13) highlights the role of the CPV, the state administrative apparatus, formal 
representative institutions, mass organizations and the armed forces including the army, police, and 
a multitude of security agencies. In this section, I will discuss some major governance institutions 
and their significance.   
In Vietnam’ one-party system, the first and foremost feature is the overwhelming domination 
of the CPV over the entire governance structure. The resilience of the one-party system in Vietnam 
owes, to a great extent, to the CPV’s powerful and cohesive organization (Levitsky and Way 2013: 
8). The paramount principle of party leadership over the entire state and society is asserted and re-
asserted in Article 4 of the Constitution after many revisions since Doi Moi.
7
 In legal terms, this 
principle is understood as the core of “socialist legality” (Gillespie 2004: 150-1). The party-state 
has harshly resisted any attempt that challenges the constitutional rule of party leadership. 
Furthermore, the post-revolutionary CPV has been rationalizing its leadership by an inevitable slide 
into ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian behaviour’ (Womack 1987: 501). As a result, it has become a 
conventional wisdom to describe the political system as reactive, stagnant and self-sustaining 
(Abuza 2011: 4-5) since the party-state is clearly more interested in stability or status quo rather 
than any radical change.    
The party maintains a monopoly of power through its membership,
8
 policy directives, 
nominations and appointments of personnel to government positions, careful vetting of candidates 
at elections, and partisan penetration by implanting cells inside every state institution at every level, 
most importantly the coercive apparatuses which include the army, security, and police. Thus, the 
organizations of the Party are central to the governance structure. The CPV holds a National 
Congress every five year to elect a Central Committee, which in turn elects the Politburo and 
Secretariat. In theory, the top authority of the CPV is the National Congress, which is seconded by 
the Central Committee. However, given that these two institutions have infrequent meetings and 
their agendas are set by the Politburo and the Secretariat, the latter are in fact at the commanding 
height of authority in the whole governance system of Vietnam. They have prerogative powers to 
substitute policy in the form of directives and resolutions for law. Decisions made by the Politburo 
                                                          
7
 The principle of party domination was first included in Article 4 of the 1980 Constitution and has been re-affirmed 
throughout major Constitutional revisions in 1992, 2001, and 2013 although the wording has been altered. 
8
 By 2010, the CPV has more than 3.6 million members, according to statistics from the CPV CC Commission for 
Organization (http://www.xaydungdang.org.vn/Home/Dang-vien/2010/3160/Toan-Dang-co-3636158-dang-vien.aspx), 
accounting for about 4.1% of the country’s population.   
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on important matters of governance are usually ultimate and shall be strictly implemented.9 In many 
ways, the methods that party organizations control governance have not deviated away from what 
Leon Trotsky (cited in cited Deutscher 1970: 90) described about the Soviet system:  
In inner-party politics, these methods lead, as we shall see, to this: the party organization substitutes 
itself for the party, the central committee substitutes its self for the organization, and finally a 
‘dictator’ substitutes himself for the central committee.  
The Politburo exercises its decision-making power over the National Assembly (National 
Legislature) by means of party committees at the National Assembly (NA), the Government 
(Cabinet), Ministries, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), Supreme People’s Procuracy (SPP), 63 
local governments and all other state institutions. As can be seen from Figure 3.1 below, based on 
the socialist theory of concentration of powers, the National Assembly is designed in the 
Constitution as the highest organ of the state power which delegates the executive power to the 
Government,
10
 and judiciary power to the SPC and the SPP. Elections of deputies to the NA and 
local people’s councils are tightly controlled by the CPV and its agents, especially the VFF. 
Candidates are always carefully vetted through three rounds of consultations so that an absolute 
majority of elected deputies must be part-members. For example, 458 out of 500 NA deputies 
(91.6%) elected in May 2011 are party members and among them, 81 deputies are concurrently 
members of the CPV Central Committee. All members of the CPV Politburo and the Secretariat 
hold seats at the NA. 
The parallel structures of Party, legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions are organised 
in the local governments of 63 provinces and centrally-administered cities. All of them have 
interlocking directorates of party committees down to the lowest level of government. Besides, the 
party wields direct and comprehensive leadership over the entire armed forces at every 
organizational unit, most importantly the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA). The CPV CC General 
Secretary chairs the Central Military Committee which is the top command of the VPA. As such, 
the VPA is ‘highly partisan and thoroughly committed to the regime,’ making the one-party system 
less vulnerable to military coups and breakdown (Levitsky and Way 2013: 10-11). Partisan 
penetration ensures the absolute loyalty of the armed forces and security apparatus to the CPV.  
                                                          
9
 Little is known about deliberations and decision-making process at the CPV Politburo. 
10
 The Government here refers to the Cabinet which includes the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and all 
Ministers and Ministerial-level officials approved by the National Assembly. This is to note the distinction from ‘the 
government’ which means the authority governing a country. In this sense, the government is used interchangeably for 
the state or party-state.  
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The party dominance is not only seen in the state apparatus but it continues to penetrate and 
control the society. The Leninist “transmission belts” (Stromseth 2003; Landau 2008) act as 
important pillars for governance in this structure. They comprise mass organizations such as the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and its members like the Vietnam General Confederation of 
Labour (VGCL), the Vietnam Women’s Association, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League, 
the Vietnam Farmers Association, and the Vietnam War Veterans Association.
11 
The VFF is a 
special mass organization which had 44 member organizations including the CPV and the VPA.
12 
All mass and umbrella organizations and major professional associations are also members of the 
VFF.
13 
 
The mass organizations serve the dual functions. First, they are ‘mobilizational instruments of 
the authorities by transmitting Party policies and State laws to society’ (Stromseth, 2003: 63). 
Second, they are providers of assessments of the concerns and attitudes of their members and 
society to the party-state, sometimes referred to as social criticism or feedback. More often, the first 
function of mobilizational instruments is practiced and the party-state invokes a language of 
“mobilization” to implement the policies and laws. The VFF plays an important role in vetting 
candidates for elections of deputies for the NA and people’s councils at all levels. These nationwide 
membership organizations are sometimes categorized as GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-
Governmental Organizations) which act as agents of the party-state conduit in civil society. Their 
roles are to transmit party-state policies and mobilize support for such policies from the people. As 
commented by Sabharwal and Than (2005), ‘mass organizations have been the largest and most 
dominant of social groupings. They occupied the space that civil society organizations tend to 
occupy across other countries or political contexts.’   
  
                                                          
11
 For a general analysis of “mass organizations” in the socialist system, see Kornai (1992: 40) or similar discussion on 
‘transmission belts’ in China, see Howell and Pearce (2001: 129). These organizations are mentioned in Article 9 of the 
2013 Constitution in which the VFF is listed as a political organization and the rest are listed as political-social 
organizations. 
12
 See the introduction about VFF at its official website http://www.mattran.org.vn/Home/GioithieuMT/gtc4.htm 
(accessed 27 December 2013). 
13
 For more details about the umbrella organizations and professional associations, see Norlund (2007: 11-12). 
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Figure 3.1: Vietnam’s formal governance structure 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on the Constitution and the Constitution of the CPV. 
The workings of the governance system are based on the Leninist principle of ‘democratic 
centralism’, which requires dual accountability of state institutions. Democratic centralism 
emphasizes a hierarchical order in which the lower level institution is subject to the direction of the 
higher level institution.
14
 Furthermore, dual accountability means a state institution is held 
‘accountable to a constituency on the same level as well as to agencies at a higher level’ (Kerkvliet 
2004: 7). All of these principles are to ensure the unity of power and unity of the party-state as a 
whole. Traditionally, inner-party promotion and advancement are based on the Soviet-style 
nomenklatura selection process which places emphasis on loyalty and subservience to the party and 
its edicts (Abuza 2001: 4) plus family background credentials. The tradition is reiterated by the 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, also a CPV Politburo member, at a parliamentary question time 
                                                          
14
 For further details on the principle of democratic centralism in a socialist system, see Kornai (1992: 35). 
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on 14 November 2012 in a response to a non-party member of the National Assembly suggesting 
the former’s resignation due to mismanagement of the economy. The Prime Minister claimed the 
confidence from the party by pointing to his loyalty and subservience, thus rejecting the suggestion 
of resignation.  
However, it would be misleading to understand the formal governance structure in Vietnam 
as monolithic. There exists a wide spectrum of political views even within the CPV (Thayer 2010: 
199), different factions and institutional hierarchies with competing interests (Vuving 2010: 367-
91). The rise of interest groups, patronage and clientelism in a post-Doi moi Vietnam has added up 
more complicate factors. As Marr argued, although Politburo’s directives are not to be disputed by 
anyone in the system, ‘leadership behaviour was defined equally by career path, group identity, and 
patron–client ties’ (Marr 2013: 154). In fact, the system allows a certain level of toleration for 
interest-group politics (Kerkvliet et al. 1999: 2).   
Under the influence of neo-liberalism, this pattern of governance structure has been 
complicated by the trend of decentralisation in Vietnam since 1990s. The market-based reforms 
have led to the replacement of a planning system by a market mechanism, thus eroding the tight 
control of the centre over local economies (Gainsborough 2003: 1-12). As a result of the state-
driven decentralisation, cities, provinces, and regions have acquired more effective autonomy at the 
expense of central state power. Decentralisation has been evidenced by the increased 
responsibilities of economic and investment decision-making, the comprehensive representation 
from provinces and major cities on the Party Central Committee, the reduced dependence of local 
governments on the centre in terms of financial support. Fiscal decentralization has been a major 
force empowering local governments as major cities and many provinces have their own revenue 
streams which are large enough to be independent from the central budget and responsible for local 
public expenditure on education, health, social security and welfare. Thus, provincial leaders have 
more become powerful players in the political system.  
The relationship between the central and local governments has become more dynamic and 
complicate in that context. Provinces and major cities, particularly in Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh city 
and Hanoi, have considerable leeway in adopting policies to increase economic growth and 
undertaking approved policy experiments. Local governments have the right to pass their own laws 
and regulations, which may extend national laws and regulations, but not conflict with them. 
Central government ministries have bureaus in the provinces and major cities, but these bureaus or 
departments have dual accountability of reporting both to their respective ministry in Hanoi and to 
the provincial leadership. When priorities are in conflict, the leaders of such bureaus, with the 
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exception of defense and security departments, tend to put the provincial leadership’s interests first, 
not least because the provincial leadership controls personnel assignments. Hence, the central 
government in Hanoi sometimes seems to struggle to impose its will on the provinces and major 
cities. However, ultimately in important cases, Hanoi has the upper hand. Local governments do not 
have the kind of autonomy as in a federal system. They do not have the power to appoint their own 
leaders. The CPV Organization Commission in Hanoi manages the appointments, promotions, 
rotations of all provincial Party Secretaries and Chairmen, and routinely moves those provincial 
leaders in and out of posts in Hanoi, to ensure that they do not build up regional powerbases. For 
the same reason, the Party also ensures that military region boundaries do not overlap with 
provincial boundaries. The central government’s leverage over the provinces and major cities 
includes its ability to dispatch missions to oversee the local governments’ performance. Most 
significant tools are those from the Party’s Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee and the 
Government Inspectorate sent into provinces and major cities to investigate corruption and 
wrongdoings allegations, and the General Auditor’s Office to check their books.  
Furthermore, due to shrinking resources and limited capabilities, the party-state has reduced 
control over the economy and a number of functional areas of governance like poverty reduction, 
healthcare, education, welfare services, and environment. It advocates a policy of “socialisation” 
(xa hoi hoa)
15
 which delegates responsibility for such services to both domestic and international 
private and non-state sectors. As a result of the state’s retreat as a monopoly provider a number of 
social services, the policy of “socialisation” has facilitated the increasing horizontalization of 
institutions, organizations, and networks. The institutional environment seems to be ‘shifting from a 
total state domination of development activity to an acceptance of the contribution of other 
development actors’ (Sabharwal and Than 2005).  
In sum, the situation of economic liberalization and political decentralization has significant 
implications for the development of civil society and its interactions with both governance structure 
and process. It results in “the rise of more politically active citizenry” (Marston 2012: 177). It also 
helps create room for civil society actors to swing and manipulate the system to their advantage in 
some functional areas of governance through their formation and implementation of different 
projects in those fields. In a context of increasingly diverse interests and different knowledge 
                                                          
15
 The translation of the Vietnamese term “xa hoi hoa” into “socialisation” is controversial. London (2004: 132) points 
out that “xa hoi hoa” in Vietnam means a policy of shifting the cost from the state onto society, which is closer to 
privatization while “socialisation” carries the precisely opposite meaning in Europe and North America. Salemink 
(2006: 121) concurs that “socialization” (xa hoi hoa) is ‘close to what non-Vietnamese would probably call 
“privatization,” Vietnamese-style “socialization” calls for beneficiary contributions to the services that they want.’  
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systems on development issues, many societal actors are more reluctant to conform to the party-
state’s interests and objectives. The phenomenon has further vindicated the dynamics of changing 
governance processes in Vietnam. Those changes signal the growth of civil society and the erosion 
of authoritarianism. 
 
2.2 Economic growth, the middle class and the intellectuals 
The Doi moi in late 1980s which aimed at embracing a development model predicated on the 
economy’s integration with global markets and the international institutions that underpin them has 
led to a vibrant economy for Vietnam in the decades that follow. Market-based reforms and 
economic liberalization have transformed the economy by discarding the centrally planned and 
command model to make impressive achievements in many respects. Vietnam had been one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world until 2008 at an average annual rate of 7.5%. Despite an 
economic slowdown since 2008, Vietnamese economy has become the 42th largest in the world 
according to the World Bank’s rankings in 2013 based on power purchasing parity (PPP). With a 
nominal GDP of over US$170 billion and a population of 90 million, the GDP per capita reached 
US$1890 in 2013. Compared to the GPD per capita of US$114 in 1990 (Luong 2003: 1), the 
average income of Vietnamese people has been markedly increased. Starting from a very low 
development base in late 1980s, Vietnam has become a middle-income country by the end of the 
first decade of the twenty first century.  
Generally, there has been a great improvement in the living standard of most Vietnamese 
people. Remarkable progress has been made in poverty reduction, agricultural production, and 
universal primary education. Until 1980s, most of Vietnamese people still lived under the poverty 
line. However, the poverty rate of 60% in early 1990s was reduced to 20.7% by 2010, according to 
the World Bank statistics.
16
 As an importer of food in 1980s due to serious shortage, Vietnam has 
now become a leading exporter of various agricultural products including rice and coffee. It has also 
done well on achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set in 2000. 
Thus Vietnam has been praised by the international community as a success story in economic 
development.  
The good economic performance has resulted in a number of important implications. First, it 
has strengthened the legitimacy claim by the party-state (Vasavakul 1995; Holmes 2006; Thayer 
                                                          
16
 See http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam 
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2009). It has helped restore the party’s confidence in its leadership and augment the popular support 
for the regime (Dalton and Ong 2005; Chu, Welsh and Chang 2012). Second, the priority given to 
economic development has raised the importance of business people and business associations 
become more powerful interest groups. The business associations wield large financial resources 
and close political connections to directly influence regulatory decision-making (Gillespie and Bui 
2009: 175-78). Business people and their connected party-state officials have amassed immense 
wealth in Vietnam (Gainsborough 2003). The sources of their wealth and their extravagant 
consumption have been questioned by the public in media-covered corruption cases. Finally, a 
vibrant economy has served as a firm base for the growing middle class in Vietnam. Identified by 
the criteria of assets ownership, income, education, lifestyle and/or profession, middle class people 
mostly live in urban areas and play in increasingly important part in (re-)shaping the state-society 
relations. While it is difficult to measure the size of the middle class in Vietnam, a point of 
reference can the standard of income for the global middle class which is between US$6000 and 
US$30,000 per year (Fukuyama 2013). This income range is much higher than the average GDP per 
capita of Vietnam, thus the middle class is still likely to be of a modest size.  
The middle class in post-Doi Moi Vietnam has some distinct identities. Focusing on lifestyles, 
Belanger, Drummond and Nguyen-Marshall (2012: 9) conceptualize middle class people as those 
who make adjustments ‘to build new valued forms of symbolic capital and establish their position 
in urban society’ and their adherence to a certain set of lifestyles is encouraged by both the market 
and the state. Gainsborough (2002) explores the link between the Vietnamese middle class with the 
potential of civil society for democratization. He pays attention to professional state employees with 
positions in the bureaucracy and state-own enterprises, the salaried professionals in industries and 
services, emphasizing their continued close relations to the state and their benefits from the status 
quo system. Truitt (2012) makes a similar point when she analyses the middle-class identity 
formation in the retail-banking sector, pointing out the role of the state in promoting rapid 
transformation of retail banking and shaping middle-class identities.  
While it has some distinct features, the Vietnamese middle class also share universal 
characters, particularly a majority of them are new to being middle class since Doi Moi. According 
to Fukuyama (2013), they are more likely to be spurred to action by ‘the failure of the government 
to meet their rapidly rising expectations for economic and social advancement.’ The newly arrived 
members of the middle class have displayed growing exasperation with official corruption and poor 
governance by the party-state since the economic slowdown for the last few years. There have been 
clear signals that the middle class, let alone the poor and the working class, have come under more 
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stress in recent years. The global economic crisis in 2008-09 marked the downward spiral of 
economic growth and various governance problems. Economic mismanagement resulting in high 
inflation, massive bad debts, widespread bankcruptcy, and enterprise closedown has undermined the 
confidence of the middle class in the performance-based legitimacy. According to the World Bank, 
economic growth rate of Vietnam between 2008 and 2012 averaged 5.7%, much lower than the 7% 
target set by the party-state. Coupled with rampant corruption and social problems, economic 
slowdown will be likely to increase the discontent of the population in general and the middle class 
in particular.  
Defined by education, the growth of the middle class is in part due to the expansion of higher 
education in Vietnam. As entrance to existing universities was expanded for more students and 
more universities, including both public and private ones, had been established, there have been 
more opportunities for people to get access to higher education. It is a strong belief of both political 
leaders and people that education is the key to successful development and integration into the 
world. Thus, along with increasing investment in education at home, the state and people use 
extensive resources for better education abroad. Each year, thousands of Vietnamese students with 
scholarships from various sources or self-funding go abroad to seek higher quality education. 
Among them, many are public officials or party cadres who expect to have necessary qualifications 
for higher leadership positions. In 2011, over 100,000 Vietnamese were being students in 49 
countries and 90% of them were self-funded.17 It is a ten-fold increase in the number of 
Vietnamese going abroad to study within a decade. Australia is the top destination for Vietnamese 
students with 25,000 and the US is the second most favourite destination with 15,000.   
A major section of the middle class is the intellectuals. They have privileged background and 
connections to the party-state in many ways. Influenced by the Confucian values, the intellectual 
tradition in Vietnam is to support the state rather than criticize it. The intellectuals do not have 
autonomy from the state but are subjugated to close leadership by the party. As in any modern 
society, intellectuals are ‘professional second-hand dealers in ideas’ who play a crucial role in 
shaping public opinion and wield a power ‘to make their peculiar opinions of the moment influence 
decisions’ (Hayek 1960: 371). Thus, they are too important to be let loose by the party-state. They 
become the elites nurtured the party and serve the party-state in return. Instead of ‘putting ethical 
and critical issues at the heart of their scholarly and professional activities’ (Jahanbegloo 2011), the 
intellectual elites in Vietnam have surrendered their critical independence to the dogmas of Marxist-
Leninist ideology to become handmaidens of power. Most of the intellectuals have been the party-
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 Statistics from the Vietnam International Education Agency (VIED) under the Ministry of Education and Training. 
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state’s instrument of ideological and political control over the society. As a result, they have, to a 
great degree, merely reinterpreted local political and social realities in line with these purposes.  
A section of the intellectuals have tried to resist the temptation of a safe side with the power 
by engaging critically with moral, ideological and governance issues to remain agents of 
enlightenment and change. A number of them have publicly broken up with the mainstream 
intellectuals and become dissidents. While the tradition of intellectual dissidence against the party 
control can be traced back to mid-1950s of Nhan Van-Giai Pham (Ninh 2002: 121-63), the post-Doi 
Moi Vietnam has opened up new space for intellectual dissent. As commented by Abuza (2000: 7), 
‘the mid-1980s saw an unprecedented degree of intellectual freedom, and Vietnamese arts and 
literature flourished with fewer constraints.’ It had emboldened many intellectuals to press demands 
for freedom of expression and democratization. They include Ha Si Phu, Tieu Dao Bao Cu, Nguyen 
Kien Giang, Nguyen Khac Vien, Phan Dinh Dieu, Tran Do and most notably, Tran Xuan Bach, a 
Party Politburo member, to name a few.  
Despite heavy clampdowns on intellectual dissidents in the pre-Doi Moi period, there have 
been an increasing number arrived from the middle class and the fissure of the party-state for the 
past few decades. The party-state’s claims to legitimacy have been seriously challenged on rational-
legal basis (including economic performance, corruption, poor governance, authoritarianism, 
ideology), leadership basis (incompetent and short-sighted leaders) and on traditional basis 
(including nationalism in dealing with China over the South China Sea dispute and historical 
legacies). The newly embolden intellectuals such as lawyers, retired officials, writers, professors, 
journalists are taking advantage of the new technologies and cyberspace to vent their ideas and 
demands for democratic governance and human rights. Their organized networking and activity has 
far-reaching implications for the development of civil society in Vietnam. These issues are taken up 
in the next chapter on contestations during the constitutional reform.  
 
2.3 The thriving associational life and non-state actors 
An important phenomenon that characterizes the (re-)emergence of a nascent civil society in 
Vietnam since the early 1990s is the proliferating number of organizations and associations which 
have been trying to seek increasing space from the party-state. The impact of market reforms on the 
revitalisation of groups and associations was noted by Thayer (1995: 52):  
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With the exception of groups which have attempted to engage in overtly political activity, state 
authority has generally tolerated – if not encouraged – the activities of revitalized organizations and 
newly formed associations.     
The loosening grip of the party-state over the society has provided opportunities for more 
active citizenry to organize themselves in groupings labelled by the party-state as ‘popular 
associations.’ While these popular associations remain close structural ties to the party-state, ‘they 
assumed an increasingly important role as advocates and pioneers of policy options on behalf of 
certain interests’ (Vasavakul 2003: 26). Part of the reasons for a loosening control over the 
associational life is that these organizations can ‘compensate for the inability of the state to keep 
pace with social needs in the reform period’ (Sidel 2010). The sheer increase in number of party-
state-sponsored popular associations indicates a more complex picture of governance. By 1990, 
there were 124 national-level mass societies, including 41 friendship associations, and more than 
300 provincial and municipal level associations (Thayer 1995: 45). By June 2005, there had been 
320 associations operating at national level and 2150 associations at provincial and equivalent 
municipal level. At sub-province and sub-city level, associations are even more populous. The 
mushrooming of popular associations has made the party-state struggle to control and manage.18  
Remarkably, the voluntary, not-for-profit and philanthropic sector has been teeming with 
various new types of organizations. They include independent policy research and teaching groups, 
universities, senior leader-supported patronage institutions, issue-oriented organizations, 
professional and business associations, peasant associations, mutual assistance groups, users 
groups, marketing networks, sports fan clubs, charity groups, farmers cooperatives, medical 
volunteers, small savings and credit associations, disabled people associations, ethnic and clan 
groups, religious groups and even some political activism groups (Sidel 1997, Gray 1999, Kerkvliet 
2003, Wischerman 2003, Thayer 2009). These organizations fall outside the categories of party-
state sponsored mass organizations and professional associations. The Civil Society Index study 
conducted in Vietnam between 2005-06 using the CIVICUS-developed methodology grouped them 
into the Vietnamese non-governmental organizations (VNGOs) and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) (Norlund et al. 2006: 26). 
VNGOs are registered and usually small organizations which engage in delivering social 
services, social work programs, and/or consulting services for the government and donors on 
development programs. According to an estimate by Norlund (2007: 12), the number of VNGOs 
ranges from 1300 to 2000. In 2010, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations 
                                                          
18
 See the Proposal of the Government to the National Assembly on the draft law on association: Document no. 38/TTr-
CP dated 17 April 2006. 
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(VUSTA) provided an estimate of 1700 registered VNGOs of which 391 VNGOs had been 
registered under this umbrella organization. Other major umbrella organizations like the Vietnam 
Union of Literature and Arts Associations (VULAA), Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI), and Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO) and most popular associations 
linked to them also play host to numerous VNGOs in the sense that they sponsor these VNGOs’ 
registration with the party-state. According to the statistics released by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the number of all types of non-state, quasi-state and hybrid organizations (NGOs, 
GONGOs, mass organizations) in its register as of 31 December 2013 is 1192. The VNGOs are 
considered by international donors as key building blocks for Vietnam’s civil society (Thayer 2009: 
8). They work closely with international aid agencies, INGOs, mass organizations and local 
government to channel international finance to the community.  
The growth of VNGOs has been overtaken by the CBOs in terms of both number and 
significance. It is more difficult to have an accurate number because they are informal and mostly 
unregistered. It was estimated that 100,000-200,000 groups were operating in Vietnam by 2005 
(Norlund 2007:13) while another estimate put the number at 140,000 (Thayer 2009: 5). These 
informal and mostly unregistered groups operate at the grassroots level for the purpose related to 
people’s livelihood. As commented by Thayer (2009: 5), ‘CBOs have taken a leading role in 
managing natural resources, combating environmental pollution, promoting development for a 
sustainable livelihood, income generation and disseminating knowledge.’ The rise to prominence of 
the CBOs in Vietnamese society is clearly a harbinger for a more robust development of civil 
society. 
The explosion of associational activity has added to the growing interest in Vietnam’s civil 
society despite the continuing control of the party-state. The establishment and growth of VNGOs 
and CBOs stand in stark contrast to the common perception before mid-1990s in scholarly or 
journalistic accounts that Vietnam is a mono-organizational socialist system (Thayer 1992) and ‘an 
organization that is “non-governmental” is practically unheard of in Vietnam or China’ (Kerkveliet 
and Porter 1995: 26) or VNGOs are ‘virtually non-existent’ (Potter 1996: 14). Since the 2000s, 
many commentators have become more passionate about the expanding number and activity of 
these organizations and the implications for civil society development. Wischermann (2003: 868) 
was impressed with ‘a remarkable diversification of social, political, and economic practices’ taking 
place alongside various types of civic organizations. Hannah (2007: 254, 257) contends that 
VNGOs are ‘a thriving part of this kind of everyday civil society’ and ‘influential civil society 
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actors.’ Wells-Dang (2012: 2-3) describes them as ‘the new agents of political action’ and 
‘pathbreakers in constructing new forms of organizing and ways to engage in advocacy.’ 
As the party-state has been either unable or reluctant to prevent the growth of these social 
organizations, it has been employing a strategy of co-opting all these organizations by imposing 
structural ties and manoeuvring personnel appointments. As observed by Sidel (1997), the party-
state has been seeking to control the pace and directions of the growth of the voluntary, not-for-
profit, and philanthropic organizations. Thus, there have been a number of caveats about the 
VNGOs. A pertinent critique goes that the VNGOs’ sector is ‘in many respects a construct of the 
state: the state has created the frame within which NGOs operate, and control over the 'political 
space' available to NGOs remains firmly in its hands’ (Gray 1999: 694). As a result, personal 
political connections and elitism find VNGOs a fertile ground as they need some types of 
credentials with the party-state. The VNGOs are clearly led by individuals well-connected to the 
party-state officials and staffed by mostly well-educated professionals, which raises concerns about 
their responsiveness to grassroots needs (Gray 1999: 708-9). The findings by Wischermann (2013) 
reveal that authoritarianism is prevalent in the internal decision-making processes of these civic 
organizations, generating legitimation effects for the authoritarian rule of the party-state. Another 
root problem with VNGOs, as correctly identified by Hannah (2007: 14) is that they are partly ‘the 
result of the political economy of the international aid.’ In line with the policy of attracting foreign 
funding for development, Vietnamese authorities tend ‘to have certain state-related institutions pass 
for NGOs’ (Salemink 2006: 118). This situation has resulted in many donor-driven VNGOs 
operating for their own organizational development and/or their leaders’ interests.  
Despite the problems embedded in their very existence in Vietnam’s institutional 
environment, VNGOs, CBOs and their increased networks are important actors in a precarious 
position against the background in Vietnam. While most of VNGOs and CBOs focus on the role of 
implementing party-state policy concerning welfare and social services provision, a number of them 
also engage in policy advocacy and lobbying for policy change. Almost all of them use cooperative 
and non-confrontational dialogue with the party-state to push for changes or reforms. Few VNGOs 
or CBOs trespass the borderline of such critical roles as social watchdog or public critics. Beyond 
that point would be those non-state actors involve opposition and resistance to the regime, which 
would be unacceptable or intolerable by the party-state. The role that VNGOs assume or desires vis-
à-vis the party-state and the international donors remains ambiguous and inchoate. The range of 
such roles by non-state actors in Vietnam can be visualized by the continuum drawn by Hannah 
(2007: 7) in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2.3 Continuum of possible civil society roles (Source: Hannah 2007: 7, 93) 
Since Doi Moi, the emergence of the organizations that engage in overt opposition and 
resistance to the party-state and public policy has become more conspicuous and common in 
Vietnamese society. Even though many of them are illegal in Vietnam, their existence as part of 
civil society should not be discounted. The reality of associational life and non-state actors would 
be incomplete without a discussion of these organizations. They are the political activism groups 
and religious groups including Buddhist, Protestant, Catholic, Cao Dai churches and others. They 
are most often outlawed, suppressed or co-opted. While some underground organizations that adopt 
overt political opposition like the Vietnam Unified Buddhist Church or the Bloc 8406 invited heavy 
crackdown from the party-state (Thayer 2009, 2010), some could pass the bureaucratic registration 
in the beginning and operate for a certain period of time as they reflect a loyal opposition and social 
criticism.  
The loyal opposition groups are those who ‘raise issues and policies that will strengthen 
Vietnam and rejuvenate the party’ (Abuza 2000: 5). One of the first high-profile cases was the Club 
of Former Resistance Fighters (Cau lac bo nhung nguoi khang chien cu) formed in 1986 in Ho Chi 
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Minh city by many former senior party members like Nguyen Ho, Nguyen Phong Ho Hieu, Tran 
Van Giau and Tran Bach Dang. Established with certain legitimacy to the party-state, the Club had 
a rapidly expanding membership and became the first independent pressure group that challenged 
the regime with veterans’ demands for free speech, freedom of assembly and the rule of law. It was 
suppressed and co-opted by the party-state in 1990 (Sidel 1997: 289; Abuza 2004: 161-182). 
Another well-known case of a loyal opposition group was the Institute for Development Studies 
(IDS) established in 2007 by respected intellectuals such as Hoang Tuy, Nguyen Quang A, Chu 
Hao, Pham Chi Lan, Tuong Lai, Le Dang Doanh. They conducted research and produced prominent 
reports highly critical of the existing policies by the party-state. The Prime Minister quickly issued a 
decision known as Decision No. 97/2009/QD-TTg that would practically outlaw the IDS. In a 
response, the IDS decided to disband in September 2009. The case of the Club of Former 
Resistance Fighters and the IDS exemplified the concern and fear of the party-state to even loyal 
opposition groups because the latter possessed such impeccable credentials, moral authority, sound 
reasoning, and charismatic leadership that can mobilize wide public support. Even though these 
organizations finally faced coercion and/or co-optation by the party-state, they have lasting impacts 
on the development of civil society in Vietnam. These issues are illuminated in Chapter Four on 
environmental governance and Chapter Five on poverty reduction governance.   
 
2.4 Engagement with the international community and global civil society 
In this section, I will discuss how Vietnam’s engagement with international community and 
global civil society has opened up new space for civil society. Civil society support has been a key 
pillar in the aid policy by international donors and global civil society. As the most visible and 
tangible actors of global civil society and a key element of its structure (Anheier and Katz 2003), 
INGOs are working towards an expansion of civil society in Vietnam explicitly or implicitly. 
In line with Doi Moi, the Vietnamese party-state has been implementing a new foreign policy 
of diversification, openness, and integration with the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern European socialist bloc in early 1990s. The policies of reforms and open foreign 
relations have set the stage for Vietnam’s integration into the international community and its 
engagement with global civil society. From an initial resistance to extensive engagement with the 
international community in late 1980s, Vietnam changed gear for a complex realignment of regional 
and global relations in 1990s and moved toward “taking the plunge” in 2000s for greater 
participation in the global economic system (Elliott 2012). Doi Moi marks a dramatic shift from 
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self-strengthening strategies of autarky at home and revolutionary revisionism abroad, to use the 
words by Phillips (2011), to integrationist strategies the within a predominantly liberal international 
order. The settlement of the Cambodia issue in 1990 paved the way for Vietnam’s normalization 
with the West, Western financial and economic institutions, Southeast Asian neighbours and China. 
Following the US lifting of an embargo against Vietnam in early 1990s, multilateral donors such as 
the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) established its relations with the Vietnamese government. In 1995, Vietnam normalized 
diplomatic relations with the US, established official relations with the European Union (EU), and 
joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It settled key land border disputes 
with China in 1999, concluded the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US in 2000, and joined the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006. 
As a result of successful rapprochement with the international community, Vietnam had 
attracted US$64.32 billion in official development aid (ODA) commitments between 1993 and 
2010 at a steady rate.19  From 1993 till 2013, the annual Consultative Group (CG) Meeting was 
organized as a forum for international donors and INGOs to meet with the Vietnamese Government 
and discuss issues related to official development assistance (ODA). As from 2013, the CG Meeting 
has been replaced by the Vietnam Development Partnership Forum (VDPF) which focuses on 
policy dialogues between the Vietnamese government and international donors, INGOs.   
Various multilateral and bilateral donors and aid agencies, including the UN agencies and 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations rushed to Vietnam to conduct 
development activities. The number of INGOs entered Vietnam to register, open offices and/or 
conduct activities rapidly increased. In 1991, there were 125 INGOs operating in Vietnam and by 
2011, the number was 900 (See Figure 3). Between 2002-2012, the INGOs had conducted 28,052 
projects and/or programs worth more than US$2.4 billion in total.20 Their activities reach all levels 
from the central to local one, across 63 provinces and centrally administered cities, ministries and 
central agencies. Their work with Vietnamese partners at grassroots levels focuses on poverty 
reduction, healthcare, social problems, livelihoods for local people, preservation, environmental 
protection, climate change, emergency relief. They also work on macro-issues like support to policy 
making, legislative development, institution and capacity building and policy research.   
                                                          
19
 Summary Report 7501/BC-BKHDT by Ministry of Planning and Investment on November 1, 2011 on ODA 
Attraction and Use 
20
 The database is compiled by the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM) under the Vietnam Union of 
Friendship Organizations (VUFO). 
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Figure 3.4 Number of INGOs having relations with Vietnam between 1991 and 2011 (Source: 
PACCOM, VUFO). 
 
 
International donors and INGOs have placed in their Vietnam development programs with 
civil society as ‘a key ingredient in promoting good governance’ (Howell and Pearce 2001: 4). 
Their approach and conceptualization of civil society have influenced the way international donors 
and VNGOs reliant on their funding have formulated and implemented development projects in 
developing countries including Vietnam. It has presented civil society, the state, and the market as a 
triadic development model for developing countries. Their models of development support 
counterpart VNGOs as ‘the best way of carving out space for civil society activity in authoritarian 
system’ (Thayer 2009: 4). Hannah (2007: 8-9) strikes a similar note that ‘the international donor 
community is pushing for more support of VNGOs as a form of civil society, an idea that the 
Vietnamese state is ambivalent about.’ They all need local partners as part of their mission 
statements to promote civil society to attract funding for their activities. Vietnamese organizations, 
whether mass organizations, their affiliates, VNGOs, and CBOs, have promptly taken up the 
opportunities to engage with the international community and global civil society under new 
development agendas. Salemink (2006: 117) highlights ‘the persistent attempt on the part of many 
foreign donors and NGOs to create a Vietnamese civil society, narrowly defined as development 
NGOs.’  
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Obviously, international donors have been working in close partnership with VNGOs and/or 
Vietnam’s state agencies to deliver their projects. Particularly, there has been a keen interest by 
international donors in developing Vietnamese civil society. The UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) 
sponsored a VNGO’s project between 2012-2014 on “Building Advocacy Capacity for Vietnamese 
CSOs” which established the Action for Civil Society Organization Development Alliance 
(Vietnam CSA) in March 2013.21 The Asia Foundation in collaboration with VUSTA ran a three-
year project between 2008-2011 on “Civil Society Empowerment and Participation in Policy and 
Law-making Process in Vietnam.”22 The European Union (EU) funded a project on ‘Promoting 
efficient interaction between the National Assembly and civil society in Vietnam’ implemented by 
Konrad-Aenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Vietnam in collaboration with the Office of the National 
Assembly (ONA) between 2010 and 2013.23 The Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) financed the Good Governance and Public Administration Reform (GOPA) Program II: 
2012-15 with a large component co-funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) for the Public Participation and Accountability Facilitation Fund (PARAFF) to promote the 
engagement of VNGOs with legislative processes and government policies.24
 
Many other 
government aid agencies, for example SIDA, CIDA, NORAD, Irish Aid, USAID, AusAID, 
multilateral donors like the WB, ADB, and UNDP, and INGOs like Care International, Oxfam, 
Action Aid have also been active in initiating various funding schemes specifically for civil society 
development in Vietnam.25 
Meanwhile, the attitude by the party-state towards deepening engagement with international 
donors and INGOs is ambivalent. It has been adopting a dual strategy of both cooperation and 
struggle in dealing with them to win more assistance in social and economic development while 
fencing off threats to the security of the political regime. After all, Vietnam needs to consolidate its 
international legitimacy. On the one hand, it recognizes important role of foreign funding, expertise 
                                                          
21
 The case in point is a project managed by the Research Centre for Management and Sustainable Development 
(MSD), a VNGO registered under VUSTA in 2008. MSD acts as the national coordinator for CSA Vietnam, CSO 
Transparency and Accountability Initiatives (CSO-TAI), and CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness.  
22
 The Asia Foundation funded project was implemented by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) under VUSTA, the 
Vietnam Environment & Sustainable Development Institute (VESDI) under the Vietnam Association for Conservation 
of Nature and Environment (VACNE), and the Center for Education Promotion and Empowerment for Women 
(CEPEW) under the Vietnam Association for Promoting and Supporting Educational Development. 
23
 See introduction on the project on the website of KAS Vietnam Office at http://www.kas.de/vietnam/en/pages/9745/ 
(accessed 15 October 2013).  
24
 The Office of the National Assembly (ONA) is the lead agency on Vietnam’s behalf for the GOPA II Program, 
including PARAFF. 
25
 See the Annex on Civil Society Grant Schemes in Vietnam.  
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and technology to bolster economic performance. This view is clearly expressed in various policy 
statements: ‘The Vietnamese state encourages and creates favourable conditions for INGOs to 
conduct humanitarian and development activities in Vietnam.’26 The government also publicly 
expresses its support for partnership for development between INGOs and VNGOs:  
The Government and international donors appreciate the role of political, political-social, and social 
organizations, VNGOs and INGOs, and the private sector for the social and economic development of 
Vietnam. The Government is committed to creating a favourable environment for and supporting the 
participation by these entities in the development process as the beneficiaries, participants and 
watchdogs of implementation at all levels.
27 
 
 
On the other hand, the party continues to have deep suspicions over the so-called ‘peaceful 
evolution’ strategy by the West which includes the attempt to create a civil society in Vietnam in 
order to challenge and subvert the communist party-led regime. The official attitude by the party-
state remains anathema to the ‘civil society’ agenda by international donors and INGOs. This view 
is best captured in an opinion piece on Nhan Dan (People), a daily newspaper as mouthpiece of the 
party-state:  
The realities in past years have indicated that a number of INGOs are keenly interested in political-
social organizations in our country and have attempted to infiltrate, influence, and transform those 
organizations toward political activity in the absence of oppositional groups. By means of such 
activities as implementing projects, supporting, financing, and holding workshops and conferences 
with VNGOs, a number of foreign organizations have tried to grasp the internal understanding and 
viewpoint trend of VNGOs on the party’s leadership over popular organizations, provoke their 
separatism from the leadership by the party and state, and advocate the freedom to association in the 
Western standard (Duong Van Cu 2012).  
 
Imbued with this point of view, the party-state has been highly vigilant of activities by INGOs 
in partnership with Vietnamese organizations. They identify this area of engagement as highly 
sensitive to political security and adopt preventive measures against the INGOs working on network 
development, support to workers’ activities, promotion of civil society, independent unions, 
institutional and legal reform, journalism training, religious freedom, democracy and human rights. 
Applications for registration or activities by INGOs related to the ‘colour revolutions’, particularly 
the US-based organizations like Soros Foundation, the International Republican Institute, National 
Endowment for Democracy are blocked. INGOs working on human rights issues like Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Committee to Protect Journalists and Freedom House are 
discouraged in Vietnam.   
                                                          
26
 See Decree No.12/2012/ND-CP dated 1 March 2012 issued by the Vietnamese Government on “Registration and 
Management of Activities by INGOs in Vietnam” (Article 3). 
27
 See Document no. 1045/BKHĐT-KTĐN issued by Ministry of Planning and Investment on 18 February 2013 on 
implementing Vietnam Partnership for Development (VPD). 
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One of the key fronts that challenge Vietnam’s international legitimacy is its human rights 
record. Its claim and commitments to protect and promote human rights have come under closer 
scrutiny by the international community, particularly the UN agencies and Western countries. It has 
engaged in dialogues on human rights the US, Australia, Switzerland, the EU and Norway. It put 
forth a candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council and won a seat in November 2013. It is 
noteworthy that while the party-state has gradually accepted the official channel between 
governments for human rights dialogues as a gesture of good will, it remains unresponsive to the 
idea of opening up discussions with rights INGOs. Using the state-owned mass media, it continues 
to condemn the foreign intervention with distorted information and wilful intention by foreign 
organizations on Vietnam’s human rights record. In fact, the rights activists in Vietnam who are 
praised and/or supported by rights INGOs are blacklisted by the Vietnamese security forces.      
In sum, the engagement with the international community and global civil society is a central 
factor influencing the development of civil society in Vietnam. It has generated conducive 
conditions for the various links from the domestic sphere to the international arena. Approaches and 
issues of international concern have been finding their ways to reformulate and reshape the 
development agenda in Vietnam. Given less control over the interactions between Vietnamese 
society and the international society, the party-state has to reconfigure and adapt its governance 
mode for new challenges to its hegemonic power.   
 
2.5 The Internet and the virtual networks  
In this section, I discuss the influence of the Internet and blogosphere as a new political space 
for civil society to interact with the party-state and the response by the party-state. The dramatic 
advancement of information and communication technologies has become a key factor for the 
development of civil society by providing new opportunities as well as creating new challenges. 
According to Chang, Chu and Welsh (2013: 153), the Internet and social media have three 
important implications for the development of civil society: (1) providing alternative sources of 
information; (2) lowering cost of political participation; and (3) increasing the mobilizing capacity 
of opposition forces. While in Vietnam the existence of any opposition force is seriously questioned 
due to the thorough destruction of any independent power centers as a result of the Revolution wars 
(1945-1975), cyber dissent has been on the rise and is likely to get organized in a more cohesive 
way. In response, the party-state has recognized the importance of managing and disciplining cyber 
dissent. It has been able to adope a combination of repressive and responsive measures to to 
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mitigate the adverse effects of economic mal-performance and public frustration in the cyberspace. 
They include technological measures like access restriction by firewalls, filtering, list blocking and 
political measures like extensive use of compliant networks and legal measures to force compliance.     
 
Influence of the Internet and blogosphere 
Vietnam has been one of the fastest Internet growing countries in the region and the world 
with a very high Internet penetration rate and young users.28 By the end of 1997, the Internet began 
to go commercial in Vietnam with limited users from state agencies at first. Within 15 years, the 
number of Internet users went into an explosion. According to the Vietnam Internet Centre under 
the Ministry of Information and Communication, 31.3 million people, accounting for 35.58% of the 
population, have been Internet users by November 2012 and the number continues to grow by 
time.29
 
In terms of mobile broadband internet users (3G subscribers), there are approximately 20 
million in 2013. Most of the Internet users are young, urban and educated, belonging to the middle 
class. Just as the Internet has done worldwide, Vietnamese society is now increasingly empowered 
to spread information, build ties among geographically separate peoples and connect them via 
common interests. 
The high level of Internet penetration in the population has a number of important 
implications for virtual association in Vietnam. There are now plenty of Internet communication 
vehicles blogs, microblogs, social networking sites, chatrooms, emails, mailing lists, instant 
messaging, and online forums that can be used to connect dissenters and distribute their opinions. 
The Internet and mobile phone data services have provided a fertile ground for the blossoming 
blogosphere and cyber activism that challenge the mainstream press owned by the state in many 
significant ways. The social media users are the important target audience of the emerging players 
in the development of civil society in Vietnam. The new players have been taking advantage of the 
blogosphere and social media to circulate their contestations and dissent over governance ideas and 
norms. They include informal groups of intellectuals, retired government officials, professors, 
students, writers, and independent activists.   
                                                          
28
 See analysis of Digital Media in Vietnam at https://wiki.smu.edu.sg/digitalmediaasia/Digital_Media_in_Vietnam 
(accessed 20 December 2013). 
29
 VNNIC, http://www.thongkeinternet.vn/jsp/thuebao/table_dt.jsp [accessed 20 October 2013]. 
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The ascendency of the Internet in Vietnam has been a major landmark for a  
disproportionately expanding independent cyber space of discussion and deliberation. It has been 
providing a crucial support for the re-emergence of civil society in Vietnam. The Internet has 
increased access to different sources of information and advanced freedom of information. In doing 
so, it has contributed to reducing the party-state’s control over information flows and the opening of 
space for some aspects of civil society to thrive. There has been a marked increase in the social 
interactions over the Internet. In the context of an authoritarian state with strict control over 
physical association, the virtual association tends to encourage political involvement and active 
citizenry as it ‘is typically more anonymous than traditional group membership, and usually is less 
formal’ (Kittilson and Dalton 2008: 4). Anonymity and information access are among important 
reasons for an increasing number of people choosing to use Internet communication tools. 
The use of anonymity in online life also reflects societal worries - whether it be possible 
detection by the state regarding taboo issues like politics, or whether higher authorities, whether 
their bosses, parents or teachers. In essence, Vietnam's society structure has partially transposed 
onto the Internet where the older generation are less prominent than they are in real life.30  
Social media, particularly Facebook, is an important outlet for dissent over the party’s control 
of the society. And by an account of Socialbakers, a social-media analyzing company, Vietnam’s 
Facebook users reached 13 million in 2013.31 Besides Facebook, some other Vietnamese home-
grown social networking sites like ZingMe and Go.vn also have growing users. Blogging and 
microblogging are also very popular among Internet users. It is estimated that 3 million Vietnamese 
people have their personal blogs.32  
                                                          
30
 Digital Media in Vietnam at https://wiki.smu.edu.sg/digitalmediaasia/Digital_Media_in_Vietnam (accessed 20 
December 2013) 
31
 Socialbakers, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/vietnam [accessed 20 October 2013]. 
32
 Statistics from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Report prepared by Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2013 to be submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council. 
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Figure 2.5 Vietnamese blogosphere landmarks 
2001: Talawas is established and run by Writer Pham Thi Hoai (the website closed 
down in November 2010) 
2005: X-cafevn is established as an online forum and Yahoo! 360° launched in Vietnam 
2006-2009: The pinnacle of Yahoo! 360° in Vietnam with 2 million users (closed down 
in July 2009): Anh Ba Sam in September 2007 (Nguyen Huu Vinh and associates), Dieu 
Cay (Nguyen Van Hai) and Free Journalists Club in September 2007, AnhbaSG (Phan 
Thanh Hai), Osin (Huy Duc), “Change we need” in March 2009 (Tran Huynh Duy Thuc) 
use Yahoo! 360° for political blogging. 
Mid-2009: Bauxite Vietnam is established by Nguyen Hue Chi, Pham Toan, and Nguyen 
The Hung. 
2009-onwards: Facebook is the most influential social media in Vietnam and a number 
of other blogs had been established: Que Choa (Nguyen Quang Lap), Truong Duy Nhat, 
Nguyen Xuan Dien, Huynh Ngoc Chenh.  
Aug 2010. Danlambao (Citizens’ Journalism) blog is launched. 
May 2012. Blog Quanlambao begins going online. 
Jan 2013. Group of 72 launches Petition on Constitutional Amendments through 
Bauxite Vietnam and other blogs. 
Apr 2013. A group of rights activists (Free Citizens Group) makes a call on the social 
media for human rights picnics in May at public parks in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh city and 
Nha Trang to discuss human rights issues.  
May 2013. Blogger Truong Duy Nhat was arrested. 
Jun 2013. Blogger Pham Viet Dao was arrested. 
Jul 2013. Vietnamese Bloggers Network and the statement demanding an abolition of 
Article 258 of the Criminal Code appear. 
Sep 2013. 130 persons initiate “Dien dan Xa hoi Dan su” (Civil Society Forum) 
May 2014. Blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh who runs Ba Sam was arrested. 
Nov 2014. Blogger Hong Le Tho who runs Nguoi lot gach was arrested. 
Dec 2014. Blogger Nguyen Quang Lap, owner of Que Choa, was arrested.  
Dec 2014. Blog Chandungquyenluc goes online. 
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It is important to note that social media and blogosphere have become the major battleground 
for contested ideas and norms in governance. Various civil society organizations and better-
informed citizens have turned to the Internet to associate virtually and articulate their demand for 
more effective governance and popular participation in policy-making. Using data from Asian 
Barometer Survey (ABS) to investigate regime legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Chang, Chu and 
Welsh (2013: 153) observe that “conflicts are taking place more and more online nowadays, and 
bloggers are often the front-line combatants.” In Vietnam, blogs, microblogs and social media have 
served as effective outlets for increasingly vocal calls from the public demanding democratic rights, 
the freedom to association, assembly, and participation in the public realm. Well-known political 
blogs and websites include Anh Basam, Bauxite Viet Nam, Danlambao, and Dien dan Xa hoi Dan 
su (Civil Society Forum). They all attract millions of readers and thousands of followers each day 
despite various firewalls set up by the party-state to restrict access. They have stirred up a new form 
of political activism and added to the complexities of state-society relations. As the traditional 
media in Vietnam is solely owned and strictly controlled by the party-state, the social media is 
virtually the only effective and practical way to navigate through the censorship and restrictions 
over the information and critical knowledge.  
The issues that attract the social media started from governance problems and 
mismanagement by the party-state over the economy, the environment, foreign affairs, system and 
officials’ integrity, education, healthcare, culture. Initially compartmentized in specific issue areas, 
they have quickly spilled over and become inter-related. The establishment and development of 
Bauxite Vietnam is a typical example. The blog started in 2009 as a forum to air criticisms over the 
party-state’s policy of bauxite mining in the central highlands of Vietnam mostly on an 
environmental ground. The critiques had developed to incorporate an economic analysis of costs 
and benefits and strategic security arguments against the bauxite mining policy. It had been very 
influential among the intellectuals and the general public despite the party-state’s determination to 
proceed with the project. The blog has now become a generic forum for various topical 
development issues and critical governance problems even though it still keeps the original name of 
Bauxite Vietnam.    
The rise and fall of Quanlambao within a short period is also a notable case. It was launched 
as a forum to fight against official corruption amid the dramatic infightings among top political 
leadership in Vietnam before the 6
th
 Plenum of the CPV Central Committee in 2012. It had exposed 
detailed profiles of high-ranking officials in the Vietnamese party-state in collusion with 
businesspeople supposedly implicated in corruption. While the provenance and authenticity of their 
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reports and information cannot be confirmed with certainty, it triggered a lot of suspicions and 
distrusts about top officials. In some particular cases, they even disclosed secrets and highly 
sensitive news that were later confirmed by the official media. This blog attracted millions of 
regular readers and followers at the peak of their time. The blog witnessed a declining interest from 
the public in 2013 as the political leadership reached a certain point of compromises and it failed to 
sustain reporting news and analysis about corruptible officials and their dealings that could be 
confirmed. An important reason was the shift of public attention towards the process of amending 
the 1992 Constitution. Group of 72 and Civil Society Forum occupied the foci of attention from the 
public in 2013. They constantly analysed and criticized the proposed amendments of the 
Constitution made by the party-state institutions, convincingly pointing out various flaws in the 
amendments for the national development and the rights of people. After the conclusion of the 
constitution amending process, the Civil Society Forum has been highly responsive to sustaining 
the public interest by initiating a series of projects focusing on critical governance issues and civil 
society development.       
 
Response by the party-state 
The party-state has serious concerns over the influence of the social media over the public 
deliberation of governance issues through possible uses of convenient, widespread social 
networking due to their lack of capability to control them. Although the party-state maintains firm 
control over information access and public discussion via traditional media, it has found it 
increasingly difficult to moderate content over digital channels, especially those related to 
politically sensitive issues and religious freedom. Nhan Dan, the mouthpiece of the party-state, 
cautions about the underground power of the social media (Anh Khoi 2012). The history of 
insurgents using innocuous Internet communication means, particularly in Arab uprisings in the 
early 2010s, has resulted in the state being more wary of Vietnamese political comments and 
content online.  
The press in Vietnam has always been considered as a strong propaganda tool of the party-
state. There are 812 press agencies which produce 1084 print outlets including daily newspaper and 
periodical magazines, 1174 news websites, and 67 broadcasting organizations with 101 television 
channels and 78 radio channels.33 However, all of them are owned by the party-state and subject to 
                                                          
33
 Statistics from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Report prepared by Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2013 to be submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council. 
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regular instructions and direction from the Ministry of Information and Communication and the 
CPV Commission for Ideology, Education and Propaganda. They are supposed to serve as the 
instrument of generating and disseminating particular kind of knowledge and narratives in the 
interests of the party-state. The party-state’s propaganda and communication officials often lament 
that the mainstream press is falling behind on the information front and giving way to the citizen 
journalists or free bloggers who are more interested in the production and dissemination of critical 
knowledge, which frequently embarrass or undermine the authority of the party-state.
34
 The 
situation raises grave concerns by the party-state about regime security on the virtual cyber space. A 
high-ranking official responsible for information and propaganda once acknowledged that the party-
state sponsored press is ceding ground to the social media in terms of reporting critical governance 
issues and sensitive news updates.35
 
 
The party-state’s information and propaganda sector has been trying to gain ground back for 
influencing the public opinions in favour of the party-state policies and results. The Vietnamese 
party-state has been applying numerous techniques and considering more for tightening security on 
the cyber space. It employs political influence and financial incentives over networks of compliant 
businesses, universities, hacker groups, and other civil society actors to enforce its will on the 
Internet by technically filtering, putting up firewalls and placing certain websites on block lists. For 
example, it is widely assumed that the state is responsible for Facebook's inaccessibility at times in 
Vietnam. The state requests cooperation and assistance from Internet and telecommunications 
companies which are all either partly and/or wholly owned by the state or structurally tied to the 
state. The communications technologies and service providers are required to provide the state 
competent agencies with information they need and facilitate state surveillance through data mining 
and information analysis on individuals’ background, history, preferences, tastes, habits… In May 
2013, a decision issued by the Prime Minister requires foreign news channels like BBC and CNN to 
translate all the contents into Vietnamese language for the purpose of broadcasting. Some cable 
service providers in Vietnam have suspended the broadcasting of CNN and BBC on their channels. 
New measures of restrictions on civil and political liberties on virtual networking have been 
considered and implemented as a kind of soft repression. In April 2012, the Ministry of Information 
and Communication introduced a draft Decree on the Management, Provision, Use of Internet 
Services and Information Content Online. In effect, the Decree would force foreign content 
                                                          
34
 See http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-tri/131596/ba-o-chi--khong-dang--ma-ng-xa--ho-i-se--chie-m-li-nh.html 
35
 Do Quy Doan, Vice Minister of Information and Communication, repeats his comment on various occasions. See 
http://tuoitre.vn/Pages/Printview.aspx?ArticleID=529150 (accessed 20 November 2013).  
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providers to increase cooperation with Vietnamese authorities by removing content deemed illegal 
and potentially housing data centres within the country. Decree would also require users to use their 
real names online, which could severely restrict free speech. In fact, hard repressive measures are 
also employed to punish those bloggers who “misuse their democratic freedom to infringe on the 
interests of the state” or “conduct propaganda against the state.” In July 2013, the official Decree 
No.72/2013 was promulgated and caused an immediate outcry from human rights defending groups 
like the Reports without Border, Freedom Online Coalition and Vietnamese bloggers. The Decree 
prohibits bloggers and users of social media from ‘providing aggregated news’ and imposes a 
number of restrictions on sharing and providing information. Decree 72/2013 put many restrictions 
on circulating and aggregating news and analysis on the social media, targeting to effectively 
eclipse the influence of social media over the public. Most concerns focus on the attempt of the 
state to exercise massive and constant surveillance over the cyberspace to police the online 
population and its vague language to give almost blanket authority to punish any netizens at the 
state’s discretion. Another strategy employed is hiring opinion-influencers and online commentators 
to follow political blogs and social networking sites to engage in online battles against hostile 
forces.36 However, the effectiveness of these strategies by the part-state is still limited. The coercive 
measures mostly invite resistance from the Internet users and the hired commentators do not have 
the capacity of providing persuasion of argument on rational grounds. Social media continues to 
grow beyond its control and represents a major source of support for the development of civil 
society.    
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has examined various factors influencing the development of civil society to date. 
The interplay of a number of key structural factors both conditions and constrains the development 
of Vietnam’s civil society. The analysis of the institutional environment, economy and middle class, 
associational life and non-state actors, international engagement and the virtual association has both 
provided a comprehensive background and highlighted conditions and constraints for the 
development of civil society in Vietnam since Doi Moi. The chapter has sought to illuminate 
fundamental characteristics in each of the factors examined with a focus on the phenomenal 
                                                          
36
 In an annual national meeting of the information and propaganda sector in December 2012, Ho Quang Loi, Head of 
Information and Propaganda of Hanoi’s Party Committee disclosed that 900 online commentators had been mobilized 
for blogosphere battle during the year. See Dao Tuan 2012, http://laodong.com.vn/chinh-tri/to-chuc-nhom-chuyen-gia-
but-chien-tren-internet-98582.bld (accessed 20 January 2013). 
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changes over the past decades conducive to a more vibrant civil society. They include, but are not 
limited to, decentralization, declining salience of formal governance system, expanding middle 
class, thriving associational life, versatile engagement with international community and global 
civil society, and cyber activism. A key element that has not been explicated in this chapter is the 
spread of legality into governance in Vietnam. This is a highly complex and richly informative 
theme that merits a separate chapter to deal with. It involves unravelling political and legal 
discourses that shape ideas and meanings, structure and coordinate actions in a critical governance 
area for civil society. It is an important case related to the development of a more enabling legal 
framework for civil society. Chapter Three will be dedicated to that purpose.  
The complex and fluid nature of various factors examined in this chapter represents a 
challenge to make sense of situations regarding the development of civil society in Vietnam. These 
phenomena in Vietnam’s civil society require a new way of conceptualizing the changing dynamics 
of state-society relations. The chapter demonstrates inherent and immanent conflicts of these facets 
and provide basic terms of analysis and understanding for civil society and governance in Vietnam. 
Such a framework needs to capture the nuanced aspects of civil society’s dynamic engagement with 
governance in an authoritarian party-state.  
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Chapter 3 
The evolving legal framework for civil society development 
 
Politics and law in Vietnam have always been so closely intertwined and it is difficult to 
separate distinctly. Treating them as separate realms separate realms with distinctive rationalities 
and consequences would make the study of civil society in Vietnam seriously incomplete or 
virtually impossible. In a Gramscian perspective, law and politics are the superstructures that have 
the primacy over the economic structure (Mouffe 1979: 3). As such, the complex entanglement of 
politics and law informs, structures, and disciplines civil society. In this sense, civil society is seen 
as an epiphenomenon or a reflection of the underlying logics of politics and law in a single-party 
state. Civil society takes place in a political environment and legal framework prescribed by the 
single-party state which is portrayed as highly restrictive and unconducive to civil society 
development. This pervasive image of civil society, however, is only one side of the coin. While the 
legal framework for civil society is important for its health, vibrancy and sustainability, it is 
difficult to measure the impact of the legal framework. Furthermore, political, social, economic, 
historical, cultural contexts also come into play. The other side that is often underestimated conveys 
the idea that civil society has the agency to bring changes to both politics and law even in a single-
party system. In this chapter, my central argument is that civil society is constitutive of both 
Vietnam’s politics and law, and civil society has been able to shape the dynamics of governance 
related to the development of a regulatory framework. Understanding both faces of civil society in 
this way will help shed clearer light on its nature and manifestations, how it is conditioned and/or 
enabled by the entanglement of politics and law in Vietnam.   
The previous chapter introduces key factors influencing the development of civil society. This 
chapter extends upon this by undertaking two major tasks. First, it discusses the existing legal 
framework, problems and challenges to civil society. It is to demonstrate how law expressed as “the 
political will of the ruling class” in a socialist legal tradition informs, structures and disciplines civil 
society. The legal framework regulates major aspects of civil society by defining ‘who will be 
accepted as a legitimate actor and what will pass as rightful conduct’ (Reus-Smit 2004: 3). Second, 
it investigates some critical elements of such a legal framework for civil society development, i.e. 
freedoms of association, speech, press, assembly, and access to information to track the evolution 
and subtle changes that have happen as well as draw attention to the transformative potential of civil 
society in these elements. The legal framework consists of rules and norms that the party-state and 
civil society actors shape and reshape their understandings through discourses and practices. The 
empirical cases in section 2 and 3 of this chapter point to the mutually constitutive relationship 
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between civil society and law, which argues for a more expansive way of understanding civil 
society in Vietnam.  
 
3.1 Constitutional basis for public participation in governance and associational life 
Public participation in governance has always been highly acclaimed by Vietnam’s political 
leaders and propaganda apparatus. Indeed, they take great pride in their notion of a socialist 
democracy which allows broad participation by the mass led by the Communist Party in 
governance. The CPV’s Political Platform for building the country in the transitional period to 
socialism (amended in 2011) reasserts the socialist democracy as the nature of the regime. This 
notion of democracy is closely associated with a particular order and discipline which is 
institutionalized and guaranteed by law. Accordingly, the people participate in the conduct of public 
affairs through mass organizations and the CPV and in the form of representative democracy by 
electing representatives to the NA and people’s councils. In line with previous Constitutions 
(promulgated in 1959, 1980, 1992), the 2013 Constitution continues to affirms the general principle 
of public participation in governance both at collective and individual levels (Articles: 6, 7, 9, 10, 
and 28).  
Civil society is to a great extent affected by a constitutional and legal framework and the 
extent to which it protects and promotes civil and political rights, including fundamental freedoms 
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. Vietnamese state is a signatory party to most 
important international treaties on these fundamental human rights, i.e., the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICEAFRD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
37
 Indeed, the 
Constitution of Vietnam, past or present, recognizes these fundamental freedoms. Article 25 of the 
2013 Constitution provides that ‘the citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, 
freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold 
demonstrations. The practice of these rights shall be provided by the law.’ Taken at face value, 
Vietnam’s legal system generates a misleading impression about an enabling framework for civil 
society. A closer examination of key rules and norms in the legal system reveals some inherent 
tensions in the legal system and practice that have significant implication for civil society 
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 Vietnam acceded to ICCPR in 1982, ICEAFRD in 1981, CEDAW in 1982 and CRC in 1991. 
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development. There is a wide gulf between constitutional declarations of basic freedoms as such 
and conditions on the ground.    
It is important to note that the grundnorm of the system is the supremacy of the CPV which 
exercises leadership over the entire state and society (Article 4, Constitutions in 1980, 1992, and 
2013). The principle of party’s leadership is codified into rules and norms, both explicitly and 
implicitly, in the Constitution, that govern the interactions, communication and behaviors between 
actors and institutions in Vietnamese politics. The most explicit rule is Article 4 of the 2013 
Constitution which implicitly overshadows almost every other article in the Constitution: 
1. The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the working class, concurrently the vanguard of 
the labouring people and Vietnamese nation, faithfully representing the interests of the working class, 
labouring people and entire nation, and acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh’s 
Thought, is the force leading the State and society. 
2. The Communist Party of Vietnam is closely connected to the People, serves the People, submits 
itself to the supervision of the People, and is answerable to the People for its decisions. 
3. Organizations and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam operate within the framework of 
the Constitution and law. 
 
This rule has become an absolute truth to be tightly securitized so that no attack on it can 
exert any effect or be legitimated at all. Thus, besides the regulative meaning (what 
discourse/behavior is permitted and what is prohibited), it acts a constitutive norm in the sense that 
it shapes what kind of actor that actor actually is (Searle 1995: 27-28). In this line of logics, the 
CPV claims to command the absolute allegiance of the military in Constitution. The CPV assumes 
the absolute leadership without allowing any political and social force to challenge. It dismisses any 
conflict with the notion of democracy or the principle of public participation in governance due to 
its claim to be the sole legitimate and loyal representative of entire people’s interests. This argument 
is hard to sustain where the modus operandi of the system presents abundant counter-evidences. 
The overarching principle of party leadership is reflected in the role of the Constitution itself and 
power concentration norm, which discipline public participation in governance. 
The role of the Constitution in Vietnam has been traditionally understood in an 
instrumentalist perspective. In fact, it has been a tool of governance by the CPV whose edges 
should be re-sharpened from time to time in response to new needs at the total discretionary power 
of the CPV. In the orthodox thinking of the CPV leadership, the Constitution is a manifestation and 
institutionalization of the party’s political platform. The CPV General Secretary asserted this line of 
thought at a meeting in his constituency in Ha Noi on 28 September 2013, noting that ‘the 
Constitution is the most important political and legal document after the party’s political 
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platform.’38 The instrumentalist view of the Constitution is an outcome of the party leadership 
norm.  
The party supremacy is also the foundational principle for a key norm of power concentration 
in Vietnam. Even though there are legislative, executive and judiciary branches in the Vietnamese 
state apparatus, they are not based on the separation of powers but instead unified under the party 
leadership. Article 2 of the 2013 Constitution reads: ‘The State powers are unified and allocated to 
state bodies, which shall coordinate with and control one another in the exercise of the legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers.’ The principle of power concentration severely restricts formal 
independence of any institutions, whether state or non-state. It dominates the legal framework that 
allows and governs the establishment, space, scope to function in public life of civil society 
organizations. Writing in early 1990s, Sidel (1995: 300) noted that the regulatory confusion and 
restrictive regulations governing the voluntary sector and associational life ‘has lagged behind the 
rapid development of the sector.’ Two decades after, the situation has not changed much.   
 
3.2 Legal regulation of civil society space 
In an instrumentalist perspective, law is to serve the political goals of the party-state and 
reflects the will of the ruling class, thus resulting in a frequent conflation between policy and law 
(Bui 2014: 81-82). Given the political task of establishing a system of command and control, legal 
rules regulating the space of civil society are beset with restrictions, confusion. In the conventional 
understanding, the law is employed by the party-state to constrict the space available for civil 
society by creating regulatory burdens including barriers to establishment, barriers to registration, 
government interference in the internal affairs of CSOs, excessive taxation, barriers to foreign 
funding, punitive sanctions, and other legal constraints (ICNL 2009: 24). Furthermore, what 
complicates the legal framework is the role of party directives, which in practice ‘still trump laws 
and are frequently the primary source of rules governing state regulation’ (Solomon&Vu 2010: 
141). The lack of transparency in making the party directives and the lack of public access to these 
party laws in effect leave much discretionary power for party-state officials in imposing their will. 
This sense of uncertainty is described by Gainsborough (2010: 88-110) as an instrument of rule by 
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 “Tổng Bí thư: Đề phòng thế lực muốn xóa bỏ Điều 4 Hiến pháp” [General Secretary: Take caution of hostile forces’ 
attempt to remove Article 4 of the Constitution], VnExpress, September 28, 2013, http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-
su/tong-bi-thu-de-phong-the-luc-muon-xoa-bo-dieu-4-hien-phap-2886937.html (accessed 10 October 2013). 
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the party-state. All these have chilling effects on the development of civil society and its meaningful 
participation on issues of public importance.   
The freedom of association is fundamental to the health of civil society either in a liberal or a 
critical perspective. The Constitution stops at a mere declaration of this freedom without providing 
for any meaningful constitutional protection for it. Although the law on the right to form 
associations which was promulgated in 1957 is considered as till in force,39 it is almost outdated and 
fails to regulate a complex associational life in Vietnam.40
 
There had been numerous debates on a 
new law on associations and thirteen drafts had been produced before a decision in 2006 by the 
party-state to block the adoption of the law and put aside any debate on it. Instead, the party-state 
employs a number of executive decrees issued by the government and directives by the Party 
Secretariat to regulate the associations and CSOs given the thriving voluntary sector in Vietnam. 
The voluntary or not-for-profit sector is broadly defined to include party-related mass organizations, 
trade unions, business, professional associations, scientific and technological organizations, policy 
research groups, social service groups, social relief establishments, religious organizations, clans, 
charities, private and semi-private universities, social and charitable funds, volunteer groups and 
other institutions. INGOs that have appropriate permits to carry out activities in the areas of 
development and humanitarianism in Vietnam can be part of the voluntary sector. As commented 
by Sidel (2010), the party-state continues to maintain ‘strict control and management of the 
emerging Vietnamese nonprofit community.’ In practice, the legal framework places exclusive 
emphasis on retained state control rather than protection and promotion of freedom of association. 
With regards to the creation, registration, governance, operation and management of 
associations, various restrictions have been in place. Decree No.88/2003/ND-CP on the 
organization, operation, and management of associations issued on July 30th 2003 (hereinafter 
referred to as Decree 88) was the first of its kind to serve as a guiding document for implementing 
the 1957 Law on the right to form associations. Decree 88 was subsequently replaced by Decree 
No.45/2010/ND-CP on the organization, operation, and management of associations, issued April 
21, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as Decree 45) with some minor changes. Decree 45 was amended 
with Decree 33/2012/ND-CP on a small number of articles. An obvious problem with these decrees 
is its substantial curtailment on one of the fundamental civil and political liberties stipulated by all 
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 See the Decree No. 102-SL/L-004 dated 20 May 1957 and signed by President Ho Chi Minh promulgating the Law 
on the right to form associations.    
40
 This comment is reflected in the Report No. 38/TTr-CP dated 17 April 2006 by the Government to the National 
Assembly on the draft law on associations.  
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Constitutions of Vietnam (Democratic Republic and later Socialist Republic) in 1946, 1959, 1980, 
1992 and 2013, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Vietnam acceded in 
1982) as well as the 1957 Law, that is the right to freedom of association. Article 2 of Decree 88 
and Decree 45 reads:  
1. An association under this Decree means a voluntary organization of Vietnamese citizens or 
institutions with the same business or interest or in the same circle that unite for a common 
goal and operate regularly and disinterestedly to protect lawful rights and interests of the 
association, its members and the community; and support one another to operate effectively, 
contributing to national socio-economic development. Associations shall be organized and 
operate under this Decree and relevant legal documents.  
2. Associations may be called differently as society, union of associations, general association, 
confederation, association, club with the legal entity status and other names under law 
(below collectively referred to as associations). 
It strictly limits the forms of associations allowed in Vietnam according to their purposes. The 
Decrees interprets differently Article 1 of the 1957 Law which reads:  
The right to form associations by the people shall be respected and ensured. The purpose of 
establishing an association shall be legitimate, appropriate for the people’s interests, uniting the people 
with a view to contributing to building a people’s democratic regime in our country. 
 
As commented by Nguyen Lenh (2013), the Decrees completely distort and overstep Article 1 
of the 1957 Law.41 Clearly the definition of associations and their purposes in the Decrees is 
extremely vague and ambiguous, giving the authorities a carte blanche in interpretation and 
decision-making. While the Decrees recognize associations as legal persons, it deviates 
significantly from the 2005 Civil Code on the purposes and legal entity status. According to the 
2005 Civil Code (Article 100-105), a legal person is categorized based on its operating purpose 
which can be political, social, economic, and/or professional. The Decrees are silent which types of 
legal entity status associations can have. Furthermore, the Decrees explicitly excludes the VFF (a 
political organization) and five political-social organizations (Vietnam General Confederation of 
Labour, the Vietnam Women’s Association, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League, the 
Vietnam Farmers Association, and the Vietnam War Veterans Association), collectively referred to 
as mass organizations, from the scope of regulation.42 In a sense, this discrimination means a 
confirmed existence of a hierarchical order among social organizations.  
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 Nguyen Lenh. (2013). ‘Da co du can cu phap ly de thanh lap mot dang khac ngoai Dang Cong san Viet Nam?’ [Is 
there sufficient legal ground for establishing another political party besides the Communist Party of Vietnam?], 
Commentary on basam.info on 29/8/2013. 
42
 For an official typology of these organizations according to their purposes, see Article 9 of the 2013 Constitution of 
Vietnam. 
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Both Decree 88 and Decree 45 maintain a firm position that the establishment of associations 
must be allowed by the party-state, meaning that it is a formal requirement for associations/civic 
organization to receive registration status with the authorities. The firm control by the party-state is 
also reflected by conditions imposed on registration, procedures, monitoring, and operation of 
associations that are allowed to be established. However, a small number of large, state-affiliated 
umbrella groups enjoy some special privileges in the category of associations with special 
characteristics (Hoi co tinh chat dac thu, in Articles 33-35, Decree 45). Sidel (2010) identifies key 
constraints on the conditions and procedures for establishing associations, associational speech and 
advocacy rights and serious obstacles by vague dual management of associations set out in these 
decrees. For example, Decree 45 (Article 23(7)) limits the associations’ commentary, advocacy, 
feedback roles to circumstances in which there is a request from relevant government agencies. For 
example, even VUSTA could only provide feedback on the Government’s bauxite mining plan in 
the Central Highlands at the request of the Government Office or Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment. The restrictive nature of these government decrees regulating the Vietnamese 
associational sector is widely criticized (V26).
   
 
Legal rules on Scientific and Technological Organizations (STOs) also continue to assert the 
party-state’s firm control. There are three types of STOs (i) scientific research organizations, (ii) 
scientific research and technology development organizations, and (iii) scientific service and 
technology organizations. They can have the names of institutes, centers, offices, laboratories, 
research and observation stations, or experimental stations. STOs are regulated mainly by Law on 
Science and Technology, Government Decree 81/2002/ND-CP dated October 17, 2002 
implementing the Law on Science and Technology (“Decree 81”), and Circular 02/2010/TT-
BKHCN dated March 18, 2010 of the Ministry of Science and Technology providing guidance on 
the establishment and registration of STOs (“Circular 02”). The licensing authorities for an STO are 
either the Ministry of Science and Technology or the Provincial Department of Science and 
Technology. A lot of VNGOs have been registered as STOs under a particular line Ministry, a local 
government agency or an umbrella organization like VUSTA. The regulation seeks to impose 
various structural ties between the STOs to party-state institutions. Furthermore, the scope of 
operation by STOs are severely restricted by Decision 97/2009/QD-TTg issued by the Prime 
Minister that limits the areas in which STOs are allowed to do science and technology research and 
service. Decision 97 lists a certain number of areas available to organizations established by 
individuals without an umbrella organization to be able to work in. In effect, it prohibits works in 
the areas outside the list, particularly prevents individually formed groups to work on public policy, 
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political issues, and a range of other sensitive issues like human rights. This decision is widely 
considered as ‘a broader set of steps to limit the ability of associations and other groups to express 
commentary and criticism of party or state policies, a set of restrictions on the right to provide such 
view or commentary’ (Sidel 2010). Any STO that had been working on areas outside this list was 
forced to be closed43 and human rights NGOs are explicitly not permitted.      
Regarding other types of groups like social relief establishments (SREs), social and/or 
charitable funds (Funds) and voluntary groups, strict control by the party state over their formation 
and operation is also in place by the use of traditional mechanism of dual management by licensing 
and supervising government agencies even though their growth is generally encouraged. These type 
of organizations are mainly regulated by Decree No.68/2008/ND-CP dated 30/5/2008 and Decree 
No.148/2007/ND-CP dated 25/9/2007 along with related Circulars issued by relevant ministries 
(MOLISA, MOHA, MOF). SREs are typically those with a mission to assist individuals 
experiencing social difficulties, such as orphans, abandoned children, HIV/AIDS-infected children, 
lonely elderly persons, seriously disabled persons, HIV/AIDS-infected persons in poor households, 
victims of domestic violence, sexually abused victims, trafficking victims, and victims of forced 
labor. For the organizations that broadly regarded as apolitical, the legal registration process is still 
long and complex (Hayman et al.: 31). 
Given the general restrictive framework for the voluntary sector, legal rules on INGOs and 
foreign funding are no exception. The establishment and operation of INGOs is regulated by the 
Government’s Decree 12/2012/ND-CP dated March 1, 2012 on Registration and Operation 
Management of INGOs in Vietnam (“Decree 12”) which replaces Prime Minister's Decision No. 
340/QD-TTg of May 1996. According to Decree 12, an INGO may operate under one of three 
different permits: (1) a Permit to Operate; (2) a Permit to set up a Project Office; and (3) a Permit to 
establish a Representative Office. A Permit to Operate is the initial stage that is required if an INGO 
want to set up a Project Office or a Representative Office. The competent authority responsible for 
administration of INGOs and foreign funding is the Committee for Foreign NGO Affairs 
(COMINGO) and its focal point, the People's Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), a 
specialized and functional body of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO). 
Established by the Prime Minister in 2001, COMINGO is headed by a Foreign Vice Minister and its 
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 A high-profile case was, as result of Decision 97, the 2009 dissolution of the Institute of Development Studies which 
was established in 2004 and run by a number of well-known intellectuals like Hoang Tuy, Nguyen Quang A and a 
number of former advisors for previous Prime Ministers.  
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members are representatives from Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Government Office, Government Commission for 
Religious Affairs, and CPV Commission for External Relations, and VUFO. PACCOM acts as a 
functional body responsible for managing relations with INGOs and for aid mobilization. The 
regulatory time for PACCOM to examine and decide to issue a Permit to Operate, to set up a 
Project Office, or to establish a Representative Office is 45 working days but in practice, it should 
take much longer time as PACCOM may assess the activities of the INGO and consult the opinions 
of the authorities in the province where the office is located or where the projects/programs will 
take place.44 As commented by International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), Decree 12 
contains broad terms on prohibited activities, including a full range of profit-making activities, for 
foreign NGOs, as well as a number of other vague and general terms that could lead to a substantial 
lack of clarity and predictability in foreign NGO activities in Vietnam (Sidel 2010). 
Concerning foreign non-governmental aid, the legal rules also reflect the general strategy of 
the party-state to limit the space for domestic civil society, particularly the ability of independent 
groups to organize. Christensen and Weinstein (2013: 79) draw attention to a trend across 
authoritarian regimes to increase restrictions on foreign support for civil society, particularly 
targeting international flows of democracy and civil society assistance for nongovernmental groups 
that monitor the government, promote human rights, and strengthen the democratic process. As 
noted by Hayman et al. (2014: 3), the foreign funding in this area can cause tensions between the 
state and CSOs due to the blurred line between political activism and social justice work that many 
NGOs are doing. Given this sensitivity, foreign funding for CSOs in Vietnam is an important 
concern for the party-state.  The government issued Decree 93/ND-CP on the Regulations on the 
Management and Use of Foreign Non-Governmental Aid in October 2009, followed by Circular 
07/2010/TT-BKH issued by the MPI providing implementation guidelines in March 2010. Decree 
93 and implementation rules maintain and enhance state control over foreign non-governmental aid 
to Vietnam. The restrictions and imposition of burdensome process related to appraisal and 
approval of foreign funded projects, heavy and difficult reporting requirements for recipient 
organizations are evident in Decree 93 and Circular 07. As a result, it usually involves much greater 
costs for compliance and longer time for appraisal approval (Pham & Nguyen 2014: 33):
45
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 Interview with an informant in Vietnam in August 2012. 
45
 Decree 93 stipulates the deadline of 20 days for appraisal of foreign non-governmental aid items following the receipt 
of the full and valid dossiers but no specific deadline for approval after the conclusion of appraisal.    
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Organizations that are more independent from the state, like local NGOs established under VUSTA, 
sometimes face double approval: once by VUSTA at the central level and once by the People’s 
Committee at the provincial level. With regards to appraisal and approval time, the questionnaire 
surveys reveal that the process usually takes longer than permitted by Decree 93. 
Undoubtedly, the restrictive nature of the legal framework for foreign funding adds to an 
adverse effect for the civil society space in Vietnam. Furthermore, legal limits on freedom of 
speech, press and peaceful assembly, including demonstration, access to information are among 
different ways the party-state uses to control the space of civil society and prevent any group or 
individual from potentially engaging in political advocacy. Draconian restrictions and severe 
punishment for violators are present in the Press Law 1989 (amended in 1999), Penal Code 1999 
(Article 88 and 258),46 Government Decree 72/ND-CP dated 31 July 2013 (placing limits on the use 
of blogs and social media), Government Decree 174/ND-CP dated 13 November 2013 (stipulating 
sanctions against social media users violating restrictions) and Government Document 7169/VPCP-
NC dated 12 September 2012 (banning the use and dissemination of information on some 
“reactionary” websites). They have been subject to criticisms about curtailing freedom of speech 
and press freedom. International press freedom watchdogs like the New York based Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ), Reporters Without Border (RSF), Freedom House, Human Rights Watch 
have consistently listed Vietnam as one of the world’s harshest environments for the press. While 
the Constitution recognizes the right to demonstration, it does not provide any guarantee for the 
enjoyment of this right. Amidst the absence of a law on demonstration, the Government issued 
Decree 38/2005/ND-CP and Decree 136/2006/ND-CP to placing severe restrictions or bans on 
public gatherings and collective expression/petitioning. The authorities refuse to grant permission to 
meetings, marches, protests that they deem political and are not organized by themselves such as 
anti-China demonstrations amid South China Sea territorial disputes in 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2014.                 
In sum, the legal framework related to civil society in Vietnam is overshadowed by confusion, 
restrictions, and lack of transparency in official procedures that serves as a fertile ground for wide-
ranging discretion by party-state officials, nepotistic networks and corruption. They all contribute to 
‘an insecure and unpredictable operating environment’ (Hayman et al.: 31). Based on this 
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 Article 88 criminalizes the conduct of propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Article 258 
criminalizes the abuse of democratic freedoms o infringe upon the interests of the State. Article 258 reads: “(1) Those 
who abuse the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of belief, religion, assembly, association and 
other democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interest of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of organizations 
and/or citizens shall be subject to warning, non-custodial reform for up to three years or a prison term of between six 
months and three years. (2) Serious offenses shall be subject to a prison term of between two and seven years.” These 
articles are under harsh criticisms about its ambiguous language, the wide and vague formulation that give authorities a 
carte blanche to sanction people for all sorts of activities (Vu & Ng 2010; Bielefeldt 2014). 
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assessment of the legal framework, there are some observations about a shrinking civil society 
space in Vietnam (CIVICUS 2013). However, this has never been a complete picture of civil 
society. The key argument I makes here is two-folded. First, indeed the legal environment is 
cumbersome and restrictive, allowing for a great level of control and discretion from the party-state. 
Second, focusing on this point alone then misses the way that emergent forms of civil society are 
negotiating ways to work within these restrictions as outline in Chapter 2. The negative picture of a 
restrictive legal framework fails to account for the vibrant reality of civil society in Vietnam. Albeit 
true, it represents only a piece of the puzzle. It is also important to appreciate other aspects that are 
usually missing in the understanding about civil society development in Vietnam. The restrictions 
are often re-negotiated and contested in practice under various forms. The following section is to 
address these issues in further details concerning the legal framework for civil society.    
 
3.3 Contestation and challenges for a more enabling environment for civil society  
The rules and norms regulating civil society space and actors have emerged out of complex 
processes of wartime struggles for decolonization and reunification, and nationwide construction of 
socialism. This is the area viewed by the party-state as a battle front against the enemies in the form 
of “peaceful evolution”, thus it is understandably fraught with conspiracies and subversive plots 
against the regime (Duong Van Cu 2012). This mentality is deeply rooted in the construction of the 
rules and norms for a blanket treatment towards civil society space and actors. It is typically 
reflected in the controversial article on Nhan Dan newspaper, the mouthpiece of the party-state, on 
31 August 2012 authored by a security colonel that conflates civil society with “a trick of peaceful 
evolution” and plots of anti-party forces with foreign assistance to overthrow the political regime 
and set up a Western-style democracy. While the primary target of the article was arguably critical 
political blogs and dissidents, it raised serious concerns from development NGOs in Vietnam, 
resulting in the latter’s collective protest letter to Nhan Dan Editorial Board (Wells-Dang 2014: 
174-5). It reveals the long-standing suspicious attitude from a significant circle in the CPV elites 
against non-state actors. The meanings, rules and norms in the regulatory framework for civil 
society are thus constructed and maintained ‘through the conscious, and at times unconscious, 
application of taken-for-granted cannons and repertoires of appropriate state conduct’ (Reu-Smit 
2001: 526). However, they are not fixed but the discursive practices and communicative processes 
surrounding them change from one issue and context to another.     
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The restrictive legal framework for civil society has never produced a linear process in which 
civil society actors are consistently subservient to the party-state’s command and control. Instead, 
the restrictions are often contested and challenged in various forms: communicative actions, 
discursive practices, fence-breaking or non-compliance to push the limits of the legal framework, 
explore the tolerance of the party-state institutions and influence changes in the political-legal 
agenda and legal rules. This section presents an account of civil society expansion that appreciates 
the agency of civil society actors in the process of deconstructing the restrictive legal framework to 
renegotiate the meanings and norms in the regulatory framework. This section offers an insight into 
the dynamics of change taking place in this area by discussing the discourses and practices 
involving the constitutional reform, the law on associations, the law on demonstration and the law 
on access to information in Vietnam.   
 
Constitutional reform: the expansion of deliberative space 
Amid serious problems in governance and institutional weaknesses since 2008, proposals for 
amending the 1992 Constitution were discussed in the years leading to the National Congress of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in early 2011. A major decision was reached at the Party 
Congress, allowing amendments of the Constitution to be put on the table for discussions beyond 
limited official circles and with wide participation from the public. The process of reforming the 
Vietnamese Constitution opened up a Pandora’s box of resistance and contestations over orthodox 
rules and norms. It catalyzed the emergence and assertion of plural identities and interests with the 
contemplated amendments to the 1992 Constitution representing a focal point in the exercise of 
discursive power and struggles for change.  
As the constitutional reform process took place amid poor economic performance and 
increased political infighting between different rival factions, the party leaders made every effort to 
tread carefully and control the debates for the purposes of consensus and unity. Party leadership and 
discipline were exercised through 81 senior politicians from the 175-member Central Committee of 
the CPV, including all members of the Politburo and Secretariat who hold seats in the 498-member 
National Assembly,47 to ensure a compliant legislature over the course of the constitutional 
amendments. The sheer fact that the Politburo assigned 8 out of its 14 members to the CAC 
indicates the high caution by the party to guard the constitutional reform process in line with its 
instructions. All principal drafts were carefully considered by the CAC, the NA Standing 
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 All 18 members of the Politburo and the Secretariat elected at the 11
th
 Party Congress are concurrently members of 
the Central Committee and the National Assembly.   
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Committee, the Politburo and the CPV Central Committee before being released to the NA for 
deliberation.  
The direction for the process was fixed at the outset by the party leaders. The 5th Plenum of 
the CPV Central Committee in May 2013 delivered a conclusion on the scope and level of 
constitutional amendments. Accordingly, amendments were acceptable only for those issues where 
clarity and maturity had been reached, their relevance had been confirmed by realities, and there 
was a high level of consensus.48 The instruction was repeatedly asserted by the CPV General 
Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng throughout the constitutional reform process.49 This move to pre-
determine the scope of amendments indicates the reactive mentality prevailing among party-state 
leaders, and promised little space for any visionary changes or breakthrough for reform in the 
process of amending the Constitution. The instruction served as a prompt for both the CAC and the 
NA to keep discussions reined into an appropriate line.  
Despite close control by the party over the process, new players and new forums for 
discussing constitutional amendments emerged during the constitutional debates, voicing strident 
calls for change. Upon the release of the draft constitutional amendments to the public in early 
2013, the process of amendment was widely embraced and elicited immense political participation 
from a variety of societal groups representing plural identities and interests.  
It is important to note that the blogosphere emerged as the major battleground for contested 
ideas and norms in the constitution amendments consultation process. Social media, particularly 
Facebook, was another important forum for dissent over the party’s control of the constitutional 
amendments. In addition to the use of unofficial structures and personal connections to engage with 
policy advocacy (Wells-Dang 2014: 164), the new players in diverse expressions of civil society 
like physical and/or virtual networks, individual activisms, community groups, and religious 
activity took advantage of the blogosphere and social media, to circulate their contestations and 
dissent over the constitutional ideas and norms to the wider public.   
In a move to challenge the dominant narratives in the draft constitutional amendments, a 7-
point petition was initiated by a group of 72 intellectuals, retired government officials, professors 
and independent activists on the well-known blog of boxitvn on 19 January 2013. The petition was 
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 Thông báo Hội nghị lần thứ 5 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa XI (Notice on the 5th Plenum of the XIth 
Central Committee of the CPV). 
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 “Dự thảo chưa vang vọng như lời hiệu triệu” [The Draft has not resonated as a great appeal], Tuổi trẻ, October 23, 
2013, http://tuoitre.vn/Chinh-tri-Xa-hoi/576098/du-thao-chua-vang-vong-nhu-loi-hieu-trieu.html (accessed 26 Octber 
2013) 
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heavily influenced by liberal ideas and its emergence in the constitutional debates had significant 
meanings. Such a collective action was unprecedented in any constitutional reform process in terms 
of scope and level of participation outside the party-state sanctioned outlets. Its content contained 
critical contestations over key constitutional ideas and norms that stood to test the limits of 
toleration by the party-state. It made bold recommendations such as the removal of Article 4 of the 
1992 Constitution, regarding Party domination, and about the separation of power, the recognition 
of private and community land ownership, stricter abidance by international human rights law, the 
neutral position of the armed forces, people’s right to a referendum over the Constitution, and 
extension of the date for public consultation on the draft constitutional amendment. These demands 
were indeed conducive conditions for a greater political space if approved. For example, the 
demand for separation of power echoes the idea articulated by Gramsci 1971: 245): ‘The separation 
of powers, together with all the discussion provoked by its realization and the legal dogmas which 
its appearance brought into being, is a product of the struggle between civil society and political 
society in a specific historical period.’ 
Most of the 72 group members possessed long-established credentials recognized by the 
party-state and society at large. Those people like Tương Lai, Nguyễn Trung, Đào Xuân Sâm, Phạm 
Chi Lan, Trần Đức Nguyên, and Lê Đăng Doanh used to serve on the advisory boards for former 
Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt and Phan Văn Khải. Former high-ranking officials like Nguyễn Đình 
Lộc, former Minister of Justice, and Chu Hảo, former Vice Minister of Science, Technology and 
Environment, Nguyễn Minh Thuyết, former Vice Chairman of the NA Committee for Culture, 
Education, Adolescents and Children Affairs, and Hồ Uy Liêm, former Vice President of the 
Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) also joined them. Well-
respected public figures such as Nguyễn Quang A, Hoàng Tụy, Hoàng Xuân Phú, Nguyên Ngọc, 
Nguyễn Huệ Chi, Tống Văn Công, Lê Hiếu Đằng, to name a few, added intellectual force to the 
petition. Together, they were in a strong position to enter dialogues with the party-state on the one 
hand and appeal to a wider audience for support on the other. On 4 February 2013, fifteen members 
representing the group handed over the petition to the 1992 Constitution Amending Committee at 
the Office of the National Assembly where they had a brief meeting with the CAC representatives. 
The petition attracted more than 14,000 signatures in support.       
The bold initiative by Petition 72 was soon resonated with various other voices from ‘Cùng 
viết hiến pháp’ (Let's Draw up the Constitution), a project managed by public figures like Ngô Bảo 
Châu, Đàm Thanh Sơn and Nguyễn Anh Tuấn on 1 February, the ‘Petition for the 1992 
Constitutional Amendments’ by a group of Hanoi Law University alumni on 21 February, the 
‘Declaration of Free Citizens’ on the blog Dân Làm Báo (Citizen Journalist) on 28 February, and 
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the official letter from the Vietnam Episcopal Council to the Committee for the 1992 CAC on 1 
March. Also in March, representatives of 35 Vietnamese non-governmental organizations (VNGOs) 
and disadvantaged people collectively submitted to the CAC a critique of some provisions of the 
Constitutional amendments and their own proposals. The diversity of collective interests outside the 
party-state sponsored sphere finding voice in this process was the first of its kind in the history of 
the party-state. 
The party-state responded in an effort to protect the hegemonic discourse, but by using old-
style techniques of propaganda and mass mobilization. A large-scale propaganda campaign was run 
on Vietnam Television and a series of conservative state-owned newspaper like Nhân dân, Quân 
đội nhân dân, Công an nhân dân, Đại đoàn kết, Hà Nội mới with coordination from the CPV 
Commission for Popularization and Education to play down or marginalize the voices differing 
from the orthodox narratives during the constitutional consultation process. The 1992 CAC took 
another step to instruct local authorities to disseminate the draft constitutional amendments to each 
household throughout the country for their feedback. According to a report to the NA Standing 
Committee, more than 26 million contributory comments had been collected and 28,140 seminars 
and meetings held during the three months of public consultation, of which an absolute majority 
indicated general agreement with the draft.50 This exercise is reminiscent of the same tactics used 
for the preparation of the 1980 Constitution and 1992 Constitution. The draft circulated for public 
feedback in 1980 claimed to receive 20 million contributory comments and in Hanoi alone, half a 
million people participated in 3,600 meetings and contributed 1.4 million ideas on the 1992 draft 
Constitution.51 
Various non-state actors vigorously supported a referendum on the Constitutional 
amendments as a direct way of exercising popular sovereignty. Petition 72 Group is among the first 
collective efforts to assert the people’s sovereignty in the process of making and amending 
Constitution by returning the constituent power from the National Assembly to the people: ‘The 
constituent power (making, enacting, or amending the Constituent) is the original power from 
which derives other powers (legislative, executive, and judiciary), thus it belongs to the entire 
people and cannot belong to any institution, even the National Assembly.’52 The Vietnam Episcopal 
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 Ủy ban Dự thảo sửa đổi Hiến pháp 1992 [The 1992 Constitution Amending Committee], Báo cáo Những nội dung cơ 
bản còn có ý kiến khác nhau trong việc nghiên cứu, tiếp thu, giải trình ý kiến nhân dân để chỉnh lý Dự thảo sửa đổi 
Hiến pháp 1992 [Report on the some basic issues with dissenting ideas in studying, incorporating, and explaining 
people’s comments for the revision of the draft 1992 Constitutional Amendments] (Hanoi, April 11, 2013). 
51
 Rusell Heng (1992: 228) cited statistics from Nhân dân in December 1980 and Hà Nội mới in February 1992. 
52
 Petition on amending the 1992 Constitution (Hanoi January 19, 2013). 
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Council in its letter to the CAC had a similar argument.
53
 The proposal by the 35 VNGOs to the 
CAC also emphasized that ‘ensuring the constitution making and amending power belonging to the 
people is a key element to implement the people’s right to participation in governance of the state 
and society.’54 A survey conducted by the Vietnam Lawyers Association (VLA) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Vietnam revealed that 316 out of 345 professional and 
social organizations (PSOs), 25 out of 36 civil society organizations (CSOs), and 4 out of 9 
religious organizations subscribed to a vote on the amended constitution.55   
The radical demand for a referendum on the amended constitution was compromised by the 
party-state leaders. In fact, it was mediated through the construction of language in the draft 
constitutional amendments: ‘The Constitution is passed with affirmative votes of at least two-third 
of total NA deputies. The referendum on the Constitution shall be decided by the NA.’ This 
provision placed the possibility of organizing a referendum at the discretion of the NA. It implicitly 
meant that the CPV still holds a firm control on such a decision and that a referendum would not be 
organized for this round of the 1992 Constitutional amendments. The proposed provision received 
consensus among the party-state leaders and it remained unchanged in the final version of the 
amended Constitution in November 2013.  
While the 2013 Constitution failed to meet the demands for democratic developments and 
more enabling environment for civil society, the discourse across key themes in the process of 
amending the Constitution are enlarging the political space for plural interests and identity claims to 
find expression. Meanings and power relations are not as fixed as assumed in the dominant 
narrative of orthodoxy, but are changing because they are constantly constructed, reconstructed and 
deconstructed by the representatives of different societal interest groups. Owing to this kind of 
contestatory pluralism, overt disputes and challenges now broadly characterize constitutional 
reform discourse. They come in the various forms of defiance to rules and norms both codified in 
the existing Constitution and constitutive of the view and practices of the party-state. The party 
leaders’ resistance to major reforms of the Constitution reflects a defensive position and an 
ambivalent view about dealing with critical governance problems. However, the very robustness of 
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 See http://www.hdgmvietnam.org/thu-cua-hoi-dong-giam-muc-viet-nam-nhan-dinh-va-gop-y-sua-doi-hien-
phap/4750.116.3.aspx 
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 Viện Nghiên cứu Xã hội, Kinh tế và Môi trường [Institute of Society, Economy and Environment (iSEE)], Kiến nghị 
của các tổ chức xã hội dân sự Việt Nam về sửa đổi Hiến pháp 1992 [Petition of Vietnamese Civil Society Organizations 
on the 1992 Constitutional Amendments] (Hanoi, March 29, 2013). 
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 VLA and UNDP, Consultation with Social Organizations on Amendments of the 1992 Constitution between October 
2012 and March 2013 (Hanoi, October 20, 2013): 15-16. 
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the process suggests that it might be impossible to defer indefinitely key reform proposals if the 
political regime is to survive.      
It should be noted that dialogues, debates and clashes in constitutional politics are not a new 
phenomenon in Vietnam or elsewhere but what is unprecedented in recent years in Vietnam is their 
visibility, scope and intensity. What makes contemporary constitutional debates in Vietnam so 
interesting are the dynamics of the discourses which show how conflict is openly driving significant 
changes in public thinking about foundational political principles. Contestations and conflict 
accumulated since Đổi mới have been raised to such a level and scope that it has become extremely 
difficult for fixed dominant orthodox narratives to maintain hegemonic entitlement without 
recognizing differences and co-opting new elements.           
 
Law on Associations 
The right to freedom of association is respected and ensured by all Constitutions of Vietnam. 
The 1957 Law on the Right to Form Associations, which is still in force, also provides this 
guarantee. This law includes political organizations, social organization, and professional 
organizations in its scope of regulation, only excludes economic organizations. However, the 1957 
Law requires permission from competent authorities for the establishment of any association and all 
associations established before the effective date of this law (20/5/1957) must re-apply for 
permission. Due to this law, the number of associations had been considerably reduced as many did 
not pass the re-application process and were subsequently dissolved. For example, according to 
historical records there were nearly 30 political organizations active in 1946. However, after the 
1957 entered into force, only the CPV, the VFF and the Democratic Party of Vietnam and the 
Social Party of Vietnam remain operative in the North. After the dissolution of the Democratic 
Party of Vietnam and the Social Party of Vietnam in 1988, only the CPV and the VFF exist as 
political organizations in the unified Vietnam.  
Despite the absence of the long-awaited Law on Associations, the number of civic 
organizations in different forms of associations is rapidly increasing as noted earlier in Chapter 3. 
Generally these organizations can be referred to as CSOs which include both formally recognized 
and legally registered organizations and active unregistered social groups and informal networks. 
The sheer increasing number of CSOs is an evidence of diverse interests in the society that the mass 
organizations cannot represent. Thus, the debate about the Law on Associations is closely related to 
the politics of interest groups in Vietnam. In contrast with the traditional image of unity and 
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consensus on the interests of the entire society represented by the party-state and mass 
organizations, the post-Doi Moi society has witnessed the rise of different interest groups. A 
number of interest groups are powerful and can effectively manipulate public policy to their 
advantage across all major sectors of the economy, especially in banking, land and housing 
development, oil and petroleum.56 Gillespie (2008) also demonstrates how state control over public 
discourse results in the commercial legislative framework is increasingly reflecting the interest of 
business interests. For example, the Vietnam Steel Association benefits from its close political 
connections and financial resources of its forty-nine state-owned and foreign members to protect 
domestic production from foreign competition and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI) favours the business elites’ interests at the expense of its small-scale 
entrepreneurial members (Gillespie 2008: 683-686). The state control has been a fertile ground for 
the monopoly by a number of powerful interest groups over the access to resources and political 
connections, making corruption become more prevalent.  
There have been several efforts to revise the 1957 Law to update with the management of 
proliferating number of social organizations and social-professional organizations and other types 
of organizations. Many drafts of the revised law had been submitted to the National Assembly for 
deliberation during 1993-94 and 2005-06 but none has been adopted. In lieu of a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for the associational section, Decree 88 and later Decree 45 had been issued 
as provisional measures. As commented by Wischermann (2011: 393), the overriding intention of 
the party-state in the making of these decrees is ‘to formulate a legal corridor allowing for the more 
efficient management and addressing of the issues surrounding the establishment, registration, etc., 
of various types of civic organizations.’ This objective has been repeatedly asserted in different 
draft versions of the Law on Associations.57 One of the problems facing the party-state in the long 
drafting process and delay related to the Law on Associations is to strike a balance between the 
obligation of the party-state in ensuring citizens’ right to form associations and the grave concern of 
‘ensuring the state management and preventing hostile forces and reactionary organizations to take 
advantage of the right to form associations for realizing their plots of peaceful evolution against our 
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 See comments of various Vietnam specialists on this issue at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2014/01/140123_vn_policy_and_interest_groups.shtml  and 
http://vneconomy.vn/thoi-su/nhan-dien-loi-ich-nhom-2013011310272962.htm. 
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 See the Government’s submission of the draft Law on Associations to the National Assembly in Document 
No.38/TTr-CP dated 17/4/2006. 
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State.’58 However, the block of the passage of the Law on Associations is arguably due to the 
disagreements from the leadership of the party-state and mass organizations on the equal status and 
treatment of associations. The prevailing official view has still favored a hierarchical order of 
associations in which the party-sponsored mass organizations like the VFF should be at the 
commanding height.  
In face with the state control on the right to form associations and the strict requirements for 
obtaining registration status, civil society actors have resorted to various of ways to push the limit 
and expand the space for association life ranging from engagement, advocacy, critical feedback, 
contestation to resistance and challenge. Legally registered organizations tend to choose a strategy 
of engagement and advocacy to influence changes in different government decrees and to advocate 
for inclusion of progressive provisions in the draft laws. During the debates for the law on 
associations, representatives from a number of social-professional organizations criticized the 
privileges of the VFF and five other mass organizations and the emphasis on state management at 
the expense of associations’ interests. They request equal treatment of associations and a relative 
autonomy of associations from the line Ministries. For example, Pham Si Lien, Vice Chairman of 
Vietnam Federation of Civil Engineering Associations commented: ‘There should not be any 
differentiation with the six social organizations as stipulated in Article 2 (3) as it is exactly a major 
obstacle for these organization in their integration process.’59 To Ngoc Thanh, Chairman of Vietnam 
Folklore Association, Pham Huu Nghi from Vietnam Academy of Social Science, and Truong Van 
Dan, Vice Chairman of Ho Chi Minh city Gardeners’ Association voiced their opposition to the 
mechanism of line Ministries to manage associations.60 
The state control over associations, particularly large political-social organizations and social-
professional organizations is also exercised in the form of interventions in the internal governance 
and organizational matters of associations. These interventions from party-state are a controversial 
issue in the drafts of the Law on Associations and received criticisms from civil society actors. In 
practice, associations are often subordinated to arbitrary interventions from party-state institutions 
in terms of appointments, elections, and activities. It is not rare that these interventions meet with 
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 See the appraisal report by the NA Law Committee on the draft Law on Associations, Report No.1617/UBPL11 dated 
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 See the media report available on http://speri.org/info/348/Nen-tham-khao-Luat-Hoi-cua-cac-nuoc-khac-nhung-
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strong resistance although the coercive forces are finally applied to impose the will of the party-
state institutions. The establishment and performance of the Vietnam Bar Federation (VBF) in 2009 
is a case in point. The VBF Chairman and Vice-Chairman were handpicked from outside the 
lawyers circle61 by the Ministry of Justice which is the line ministry in charge of management of 
VBF. Nguyen Dang Trung, an outspoken lawyer, Chief of Ho Chi Minh city Bar, led the protest 
against this decision unsuccessfully. He continued to criticize the incompetent leadership of the 
VBF on various occasions and illegal, arbitrary interventions into its internal governance. In Notice 
No.135E/DLS dated 1/8/2014, the Ho Chi Minh city Bar called for the support to the protection of 
autonomy for a professional organization like the VBF: ‘The defense of democracy, self-
governance and autonomy is not only the issue of the Ho Chi Minh city Bar, but becomes a 
common concern of all lawyers nationwide.’62 He was finally expelled from the CPV in July 2014 
and lost nomination for re-election. However, the dissatisfaction among lawyers about party-state 
interventions into their professional practice and VBF internal governance has never been 
quenched. Ngo Ngoc Trai, another outspoken lawyer, points out repeated failures of the VBF to 
protect the legitimate interests of its members due to the incompetent leadership and interventions 
from the party-state.63  
As a result of pressure from public discourse during the recent Constitutional amendment 
process, the party-state has to accept to reinstall the law on association into the legislative agenda of 
the National Assembly in 2015-16 even though it is not a burning issue for the party-state 
leadership. Two other long-awaited key legislations for civil society development and human rights 
protection, that is, the Law on Demonstration and Law on Access to Information are also included 
in this law-making agenda. This legislative agenda offers a renewed opportunity for civil society 
actors to take advantage of the invited space to engage with the draft law. One example is the 
Advocacy Coalition Support Program led by Oxfam Vietnam under an initiative designed by the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) for Vietnam Empowerment and 
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 Phan Thuc Anh, VBF Chairman, was a former Vice Chief of Justice at the Supreme People’s Court, and Nguyen Van 
Thao, VBF Vice Chairman, was a former official at the Ministry of Justice (Deputy Director of Department for Judicial 
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Accountability Program (VEAP). It aim is to increase opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to 
participate in decision-making by supporting coalitions to engage in policy advocacy, monitoring 
the implementation process to ensure that the policies are relevant and responsive to people’s needs 
and expectations. This program is joined by a number of members of VNGOs like Centre for 
Community Support Development Studies (CECODES), Institute for Studies of Society, 
Economics and Environment (iSEE), Action to the Community Development Center (ACDC), 
Centre for Development and Integration (CDI), and LIN Centre for Community Development (LIN) 
with a view to sensitively engaging with development of the law on associations to achieve desired 
impact. The People’s Participation Working Group, a network of some VNGOs, also organizes 
advocacy efforts to influence the making of the Law on Associations.    
Meanwhile, unregistered social groups and informal networks have become more critical of 
and resistant to the restrictions imposed by the existing legal framework on the association life. The 
informal actors in civil society take more flexible approach and fluid form of organization and 
activity to contest the restrictive nature of the regulatory framework. The appearance of an 
increasing number of unregistered actors like Civil Society Forum (2013), Vietnam Independent 
Writers Association (2014), and Vietnam Independent Journalists Association (2014) represents a 
challenge to the formal requirement by the party-state to obtain a registration status. The rising 
number of unregistered reading groups, art-related groups, entrepreneur groups also reflects a 
resistance to the strict regulatory burden of registration and control by the party-state. Many civil 
society actors, particularly informal groups, prefer a registration system that the party-state offers 
them to register instead of a formal requirement (V26, V34). They emphasize the obligation of the 
party-state to fulfill their obligation under international human rights commitment and the 
Constitution to ensure the right to freely associate rather than the current intention of intensifying 
effective state management over associations.  
During the debates about the Constitutional amendments in 2013, across the bloggosphere 
there was a keen interest in the legal grounds for the establishment of political organizations other 
than the CPV and VFF. There emerged a general consensus that the constitutional and legal 
framework in Vietnam does not prohibit the establishment of a political party other than the CPV 
and such an establishment is even not subject to formal requirement of registration approved by 
authorities despite the firm position by the CPV against any multi-party system. Tran Vu Hai, an 
independent lawyer, made a submission to the National Assembly Standing Committee to request 
an interpretation of the Constitution and related legal documents on the legal grounds for 
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establishing a political party.64 Although the relevant state institution is silent on this matter, it is 
implicitly understood that the legal framework cannot deny the people’s fundamental political right 
to freedom of association. The discursive practices in the social media have significant impacts on 
the behaviour and attitude of different actors. The unregistered social groups have increasingly won 
more deliberative power and more confidence to take important issues to the legal battle. It is the 
unregistered social groups and informal networks that are likely to push further the limit of the legal 
framework on the associational life.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the legal framework related to different aspects of civil society in 
Vietnam. I argue that civil society is constitutive of both Vietnam’s politics and and, and civil 
society has been able to shape the dynamics of governance relared to the development of a 
regulatory framework. While the legal framework for civil society space in Vietnam is generally 
restrictive, there are abundant evidences of the expansion of civil society in its pursuit of a more 
enabling legal framework by influencing changes in different ways. 
Civil society actors, whether formal or informal, registered or unregistered, have contributed 
to the dynamics of such a legal framework through various ways of advocacy, resistance, 
contestation and challenge. While the vagueness and ambiguity in the legal framework give the 
party-state much discretionary power in their interpretation of law and decision-making, it also 
creates fluidity and flexibility that can be seen as opportunities for civil society actors to shape and 
reshape the construction of the legal framework. There exists a great transformative potential for 
civil society actors to realize and bring about changes to the legal system regulating the space of 
civil society.  
 The dynamics in the interaction between civil society and the party-state are explored 
further in the next chapters on environmental governance, poverty reduction governance and anti-
corruption governance. Each of these key themes is also related to a respective legal framework that 
sets the parameter for civil society action as well as the rules and norms. However, they have never 
been fixed but are open to contestation and change. It indicates how power is diffused in civil 
society to a different extent in each case.   
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Chapter 4 
Civil society and environmental policy in Vietnam: An emergent source of 
governance 
 
Vietnam has been increasingly faced with many serious environmental challenges due to the 
impacts from economic and social development, natural disasters, and climate change. They have 
been well documented in the most recent national report on Vietnam’s environment released by the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRO) in 2011. As such, consequences of 
environmental degradation on the development of Vietnam and remedies have now been high on 
the agenda of both the party-state and civil society in Vietnam. The environment is a critical 
functional area of governance and the party-state is increasingly faced with the lack of both 
resources and expertise, and the limited capacities of its “transmission belts” in dealing with newly 
emerging problems.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the engagement of civil society with environmental governance. 
My key argument is that civil society constitutes a new source of critical environmental discourse of 
and ameliorative soulution to governance problems despite a number of limitations. Civil society 
has been widely engaged with environmental activism by promoting a radical discourse and 
organising actions to assert its role for better governance and outcomes over the environment. The 
making and implementation of environmental policy in Vietnam is an area where civil society’s 
activism has been established through such a process negotiated with the party-state within a green 
public space. Civil society’s struggle for governance space has been manifested by a wide range of 
activities from state policy implementation, policy advocacy, lobbying for policy change, and even 
contestation to certain policies.   
As the party-state calls for participation from all social actors, governance process over the 
environment has involved civil society which has the potential of going beyond the hegemonic 
control of the party-state. It is this tension and duality that this chapter will explore. In the next 
section, I first discuss environmental activism and governance in Vietnam. It will employ the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and the concept “embedded environmentalism” 
constructed by Peter Ho (2007), is recalibrated to be operationalised in Vietnamese context. Ho 
(2007) develops the concept of “embedded social activism” in the environmental realm to 
emphasize the resourceful adaptation by environmentalism to the political conditions of the era in a 
strategy of effecting incremental change. It is in this situation that civil society actors engage in 
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collective action ‘in the name of environmental conservation and protection’ (Ho & Edmonds 2007: 
334).  
Some key aspects of environmental governance and the engagement of civil society with 
governance over the environment in Vietnam will be subject to critical analysis with a focus on 
existing practices and actors involved. I will argue that civil society has the potential of becoming a 
new source of critical environmental discourse of and ameliorative solution to governance 
problems. However, the existing limitations to civil society in environmental governance are still 
substantial given the long-standing practices and decision-making structures maintained by the 
party-state. It is the dilemma between compliance with and resistance against party-state’s 
hegemonic discourse that civil society has to compromise and negotiate a symbiosis in 
environmental governance. In other words, “embedded environmental activism” has successfully 
captured major characteristics of civil society action in response to the existing political conditions.   
 
4.1 Environmental Activism and Governance in Vietnam 
After the collapse of the socialist bloc in late 1980s, the party-state of Vietnam had an 
extremely difficult time to adapt to a new world and address political and economic problems. What 
made things more complicated was the worsening environmental problems that critically emerged 
at sub-national, national, and global level, especially at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The 
MONRO report on National Environment in 2011 identifies five major urgent environment-related 
problems: increased environmental pollution, reduced biodiversity, threatened environmental 
security, inappropriate mechanism of governance over the environment, and lack of community 
participation. Thus, they had a conspicuous effect on the awareness and policy of Vietnam’s party-
state toward environmental problems.  
Like China, the “greening” process in the party-state of Vietnam has since become apparent in 
‘the proclamation of an impressive body of environmental laws and regulations, and the 
strengthening of the environmental bureaucracy’ (Ho 2007: 197). Since early 1990s, against the 
background of the “greening” of the socialist states, opportunities had been open up for civil society 
to penetrate into this area of governance and expand its political space. The Vietnamese state has 
been a signatory to various international treaties relating to the environment: the Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance (RAMSAR), the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
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Change (UNFCCC).
65
 A number of important laws related to the environment have been made 
and/or revised: Law on Environmental Protection (1993 and 2005), Law on Mineral (1996), Penal 
Code (1999 and amendments in 2009), Law on Water Resource (1998), Fisheries Law (2003), Law 
on Forest protection and Development (2004), Law on Biodiversity (2008), and Law on 
Environmental Protection Tax (2010). Numerous decrees by the Government of Vietnam have also 
been issued. Simultaneously, the party-state of Vietnam has made tremendous efforts in 
strengthening institutional arrangements concerning environmental governance throughout 
structures at the Government, the National Assembly and the Party itself. Key central institutions at 
the forefront are now Ministries as Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Committee of Science, 
Technology, and Environment of the National Assembly, and the Commission for Education and 
Popularization of the CPV Central Committee. They are the major contributors to the Party 
resolutions and strategies relating to the environment on which basis the National Assembly passes 
laws drafted by the Government (the Cabinet). In this process, the Vietnam Environment 
Administration (VEA) and the Institute of Strategy and Policy on Natural Resources and 
Environment (ISPONRE) under MONRE are two key government institutions responsible for 
drafting many government policies, strategies and decrees relating to the environment.  
Decision-making in the field of the environment in Vietnam is traditionally an exclusive task 
of party-state and basically a centralised process. It inherits major characteristics of Soviet 
bureaucratic system in policy approach which is rigid, hierarchical, top-down, authoritarian and 
campaign-like (Ho 2001: 895). Hence, environmental policy-making has long been a relatively 
closed process that normally takes into account the contributions and comments made by party-state 
institutions only. With a view to formulating an environmental policy document such as a law, a 
strategy, a national target program or a decree, a drafting committee is established to include 
members representing different party-state institutions and in some cases, mass organizations. It is 
an established practice that a Ministry plays a chairing and coordinating role in the drafting process 
and provides staffing who serves the drafting committee and are responsible for most technical 
work. Environmental policy or program documents normally have to travel dual paths before they 
can officially be promulgated. The first path is inter-institution where a draft has to gather 
comments from all relevant institutions and to be revised. The second path is intra-institution where 
such a draft has to go through the party committee of the line Ministry to the party committee inside 
the Cabinet, the party committee inside the National Assembly, and to the CPV Secretariat or in 
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 Vietnam put a signature on RAMSAR in 1989, CITES in 1994, and UNFCCC in 1994. 
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some cases, to the Politburo. The intra-institution channel is particularly important for those issues 
controversial among different party-state institutions that remain unsettled after negotiations. The 
second path is a mechanism for resolving conflicts of interests during the drafting process. The 
participation from non-state actors or civil society has been very limited or absent from 
environmental impact assessment for environmental policies or development projects. According to 
the findings from a study conducted by Parenteau and Thong (2005: 247), ‘civil society 
organizations were not involved in the planning, design, implementation, operation or maintenance 
of the larger technical projects’ and they did not find ‘any mechanism for environmental conflict 
resolution, nor for hearing and treating grievances.’     
This mode of governance has not recognised civil society actors but favour corporatism. In 
this corporatist mode governance over the environment, powerful interest groups and rent-seekers 
greatly influence the making and implementation of environmental policy in Vietnam. The 
powerful interest groups are represented by Ministries and state-owned corporations like Vietnam 
National Coal and Mineral Industries Corporation (VINACOMIM). They are able to wield power to 
lobby the policies in their interests in various development projects66 at the expense of the 
environment.    
Once the policy documents are issued, such mass organizations as the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front (VFF) and its members are traditionally expected to play the role of “transmission belts.”67 
Traditional mode of governance over the environment follows that model. Once the laws and 
policies are enacted, these mass organizations are tasked with organising widespread campaigns to 
raise the awareness of people and educate them about the rules in those laws and policies on the 
environment. Moreover, the enforcement agencies from the state apparatus play their roles to 
support the implementation of environmental policies and laws. The enforcement of the 
environmental policies and laws were strengthened by the establishment of a specializing force, the 
Environmental Police Department under the Ministry of Public Security responsible for dealing 
with environmental law violations in 2006. At provincial and city level, there is a division of 
environmental police acting as a local enforcement agency.   
The traditional mode of governance has found it increasingly difficult to cope with 
environmental challenges, deviations and violations in practice from the policies and laws. The 
party-state has conceded a situation of environmental ungovernability and recognised the increasing 
                                                          
66 Bauxite mining projects in the Central Highlands of Vietnam are a typical example of how these interest groups influence 
environmental governance. 
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 See discussion on the functions of the transmission belts or mass organizations in Chapter 2. 
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degradation of the environment in industrial and densely populated areas within major cities and 
some rural regions and the damaging effects of heavily contaminated rivers (Cau river, Dong Nai-
Sai Gon river, Nhue-Day river, Tien Giang-Hau Giang river…), canals, ponds and lakes across the 
country.68 The pollution of the land, water, and air, worsening solid waste problem, and rapid 
decline in biodiversity are all burning issues on the agenda of environmental governance. Part of 
causes of such a situation is attributed to the week management capacity of party-state institutions. 
Therefore, amendments of policy documents and strengthening of related forces involved in the 
environmental policy-making and implementation take place regularly. However, party-state 
institutions have not been effective in dealing with new problems or finding long term solutions to 
the old environmental problems (V1). The annual national environment report does not point to any 
substantive improvement in this area. Each year, old problems still exist and new ones arise. The 
worsening environmental situation has become a great concern for the party-state and all members 
of the society.   
In such a context, there has emerged a shifting pattern of governance over the environment in 
recent years. In addition to traditional emphasis on the mass organizations in this process, the party-
state has begun to recognise the greater role of non-state actors, particularly social organizations, 
NGOs, community-based organizations (CBO). There has been a marked change in the official 
documents and the discourse of those non-state actors. In important environmental policy 
documents like the 1993 Environmental Protection Law and the 2003 National Strategy on 
Environmental Protection until 2010 and orientations to 2020, the non-state actors were still absent 
in the provision on implementation. Even the 2005 Environmental Protection Law only mentioned 
the role of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and its member mass organizations, excluding other 
types of organizations. However, a noteworthy change has been recorded in recent policy 
documents. Non-state actors have been given a greater role than the traditional one which only 
emphasizes the promotion of awareness, information, education, and communication about 
environmental issues. The party state has endorsed this role most clearly in the National Target 
Program on Response to Climate Change in 2008 by recognizing the participation of NGOs in the 
formulation of policies, programs, and plans as providers of social feedbacks and critiques as well 
as financial resources. As a result of this policy, a network of dozens of Vietnamese NGOs working 
on climate change (VNGO&CC)69 was established in 2008. Meanwhile, international NGOs 
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 See the Vietnam National Environment Report in 2010. Hanoi: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. 
69
 Members of this network include the Centre for Sustainable Rural Development (SRD), Centre for Marinelife Conservation and 
Community Development (MCD), Consultative and Research Centre on Natural Resources Management (CORENAM), Institute for 
Social Studies (ISS), to name a few.   
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operating in Vietnam also formed a Climate Change Working Group70 to join efforts of Vietnam in 
addressing the challenges from climate change.    
 
4.2 The engagement of civil society with environmental governance 
Over the past two decades, proliferating concerns voiced by citizens over contentious 
environmental governance problems supported by the media and the Internet ascendency in 1997 in 
Vietnam have given rise to a dynamic environmentalism. Many environmental problems are no 
longer limited to localised discussions at some particular communities and cause heated debates 
about policies at the national level. The critical discourse has been produced by controversies over 
the Bauxite mining projects in the Central Highlands, Vong Canh Hill Life Resort in Hue, Hanoi’s 
Reunification Park redevelopment plan, and Vedan case in Dong Nai province. When discussing 
similar contentious environmental cases in China, Yang and Calhoun (2007: 211) argue that ‘the 
occurrence of such public debates indicates the rise of a green public sphere of critical 
environmental discourse.’ This argument well fits in the Vietnamese context, pointing to the fact 
that a fledgling green public sphere emerges along with the greening of the state. The emergent 
green public sphere is to give the breath of life to Vietnam’s environmentalism which is inherently 
fragmented, highly localised, sporadic, and non-confrontational in its character.        
The emergent green public sphere, as identified by Yang and Calhoun (2007: 212), has 
significant implications, that is, its ability to foster political debates and pluralistic views about 
environmental issues, to engage politics and public policy at the national dimension without being 
primarily political, and to create a variety of new forms of public engagement, most importantly 
rights activism. Through such a green public sphere, civil society can manage to carve out spaces 
for advocacy, critical discourse and possible policy changes. Using the strategy of appropriating the 
language of environmental protection rather than critical political discourse, civil society actors are 
able to navigate the censorship and control imposed by the party-state. By highlighting governance 
problems in high profile contentious issues, environmental activism of civil society has induced 
issue-specific public that consumes the environmental discourse or a “greenspeak” (Yang and 
Calhoun 2007: 212). As shown in the case studies to follow, one of the key to successful collective 
action by civil society in producing desired outcome is its capacity to link environmentalism to 
broader rights activism. Civil society action proves to be more effective when it is organised around 
                                                          
70 Core members of this working group are Oxfam Great Britain; CARE International; Catholic Relief Service (CRS); SNV; 
RECOFTC; EMW; World Wildlife Fund (WWF). 
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marginalised interests. For example, farmers in the Vedan case had their interests infringed but 
found it difficult to get organized themselves to protect their legitimate interests which are broadly 
linked to environmentalism. Thus, different actors from civil society are able to form an informal 
network to amplify their voices in the farmers’ interests.    
On the party-state’s side, it is important to note the change in the traditional language of 
“mobilization” and “encouragement” used to include broader spectrum of roles played by non-state 
and quasi-state actors in the governance over the environment. It showcases the stronger presence 
of non-state processes recognised in the environmental discourse that affects policy-making. On the 
one hand, they indicate the strategy and efforts of party-state to engage with different elements of 
civil society to promote better governance over the environment. The party-state aims to take a 
more strategic, rather than minute, role by acquiescing in more political space to civil society. On 
the other hand, this change reflects a complex struggle from civil society to manipulate the extended 
space to fill in governance gap whether the actors find appropriate. It results from different sets of 
actions and processes from civil society to engage with governance process to claim and assert this 
space (V1). Consequently, the language of participation is translated into the discourses of both 
party-state and civil society. The participation from civil society into governance process over the 
environment has become increasingly vibrant for the past decade when Vietnam’s party-state 
advocates an acceleration of various development projects throughout the country at the expense of 
the environment.  
In many cities and provinces, the authorities have been particularly interested in development 
projects such as the construction of luxury hotels, villas, and golf courts in sensitive environmental 
and scenery sites without due consideration of environmental impacts. Such notorious development 
projects as Vong Canh Hill Life Resort in Hue city in 2004 and Hanoi’s Reunification Park 
redevelopment plan in 2007 had attracted strong actions from civil society to articulate the common 
interests for the community and for the sake of the environment by influencing changes in the 
authorities’ decision-making. Both redevelopment projects in Hue and Hanoi involved foreign 
ownership and had been initially approved by local authorities before they attracted the attention by 
the media and civil society. In the case of Vong Canh Hill Life Resort, intense collective action 
from active citizens, concerned social organizations, and the mass media using environmental 
claims protesting the project resulted in the Prime Minister’s review of Thua Thien-Hue authorities’ 
decision and it was suspended.  And the case of Reunification Park campaign in Hanoi to stop a 
plan of turning it into an entertainment theme park, as argued by Wells-Dang (2010: 98), ‘is a clear 
example of a civil society network, defined here as the joining together of organizations and 
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individuals to influence power around a shared conception of the common good.’ The green public 
sphere which gathered momentum throughout this controversy was decisive in bringing an end to 
the redevelopment plan initially approved by Hanoi authorities.   
Some particular environmental cases have indeed facilitated the expansion of the political 
space from which the force of civil society is manifested. Its effects have been spreading out widely 
beyond the end of those cases. The counter-hegemonic discourse by elements of civil society over 
environmental governance has taken shape more clearly with the formation of various voluntary 
groups and NGOs working in the interests in the environment for the last decade. For example, 
some highly active and well-organised groups are the Centre for Marine life Conservation and 
Community Development (MCD) established in 2003, the Centre for Sustainable Rural 
Development (SRD) in 2006, the Centre for Human and Nature (PanNature) in 2006. Almost all 
these groups have structural ties71 to VUSTA which serves as a façade institution for registration 
and were granted with licence for operations by the Ministry of Science and Technology. Despite 
asymmetric relationship with party-state institutions, these groups have critically engaged with 
many environmental policies through partnering with active well-informed citizens, different social 
organizations,72 and mass organizations. Their associative actions range from dialogues, debates, 
advocacy, to contestation. They all aim at influencing changes in the environmental policy-making 
and implementation. These environmental NGOs play a similar role of those in China described by 
Yang (2005: 46) as having “carved out a field of existence” in Vietnam’s social terrain. This field of 
existence represents a delicate response to existing political conditions in the country to maximize 
the benefits of symbiotic relationship with party-state institutions. This institutional dynamics of 
environmental NGOs present a new phenomenon in environmental governance. In the following 
two case studies, I will explore the extent to which these dynamics can gather effective collective 
action and produce changes in public policy or society.   
 
4.3 Vedan case study: civil society struggle for farmers’ interests 
Vedan Vietnam is a 100% foreign-owned Taiwanese company producing glutamic acid and 
monosodium glutamate products with the world’s greatest production capacity. Its plant is located 
in Dong Nai province. In September 2008, Vedan plant was caught in the act directly discharging 
untreated sewage into Thi Vai river. It was furthered discovered that the act had been going on for 
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 They were officially established by an administrative decision issued by VUSTA which acts as their governing body.  
72 Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature and Environment (VACNE) is one example.  
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14 years without being caught, heavily polluting the whole river, devastating the surrounding 
environment and damaging the livelihood of around 7000 thousand households in the area. As early 
as 1994, there were concerns from farmers making a living from aquaculture in the river about the 
heavy pollution from unknown sources. The fishermen found a steep fall in catches each year and 
the life of thousands of people in Dong Nai Province, Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province, and Ho Chi Minh 
City, where Thi Vai river flow passes, were affected by the bad-smelling and unhygienic water. For 
nearly fifteen years, the farmers had brought their complaints to many different state agencies 
including the courts to seek justice. However their efforts had been in vain as the courts returned all 
their complaints on the ground that they lacked evidence (Truong Trong Nghia, 2011). As the 
Environmental Police uncovered Vedan’s acts of “poisoning” Thi Vai river, which served as 
evidence of environmental violations, the complexities of power relations related to the case had 
also been exposed.     
 
Figure 4.3. The location of Thi Vai river 
 
 
 
Public attention to the Vedan case came from different party-state institutions at central and 
local levels, different societal actors and the media. In the first place, the case has exposed serious 
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loopholes in the legal rules to protect the interests of farmers damaged by environmental polluters. 
Although the Environmental Police made recommendations based on their investigation results to 
initiate a criminal case against Vedan company, the existing legal framework set by the 2005 
Environmental Protection Law and the 1999 Penal Code (Article 183) did not allow the 
criminalization of this case. Although the MONRE had imposed an administrative fine and 
collected an environmental fee from Vedan, it refused to take the responsibility of revoking the 
license or suspending the operations of Vedan. Faced with that fact, the authorities considered the 
question whether to negotiate with Vedan company to bring about some financial support for 
farmers or to help farmers initiate civil cases against Vedan to request compensation for the 
damages caused by the latter. It is interesting to note that during two years 2008-2009, Vedan 
company did not accept to negotiate directly with farmers, but agreed to talk with authorities on 
some financial support for farmers as their good will. Ironically, in 2009, Vedan company was 
awarded the prize “For the Health of the Community” by the Ministry of Science and Technology, 
which provoked widespread public anger and frustration from the media.    
The reactions from the three related local governments were different (Pham Duy Nghia 
2011; Dinh Van Que, 2011). In Ho Chi Minh City, upon the direction from the Municipal Party 
Committee and People’s Committee, the city’s Farmers Association acted as focal point to receive 
complaints from farmers73 and reported to the Central Committee of Vietnam Farmers Association 
which, in return, reported to the Party Secretariat. This resulted in the discussion of the case at the 
Cabinet meeting on 2 November 2008. In Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development under the Provincial People’s Committee was assigned the task 
of helping farmers to take account of damages and collect evidences for their cases before the court. 
However, in Dong Nai province, there was not any institution from the local government or any 
social organization assuming the task to help farmers in their civil cases (Vu Thi Thu Them, 2011). 
What is even worse for farmers, Dong Nai Province’s Farmers Association, which has the mandate 
to protect their interests, negotiated with Vedan and accepted the financial support of VND15 
billion while the farmers in the province were claiming compensation of VND119 billion. The 
party-state institutions at the central level or the local level did not take the responsibility to directly 
protect farmers’ interests by filing a lawsuit against Vedan company.  
As pointed out by Nguyen Van Nam (cited in Dinh Van Que, 2011: 6), the MONRE or 
authorities of these three provinces in the capacity of the representatives of people’s ownership of 
Thi Vai river as stipulated by the Constitution were completely eligible for initiating a civil lawsuit 
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against Vedan to request the latter to compensate for the damages and overcome the consequences. 
Moreover, it was a fundamental task of the state in this case to prove its legitimacy by protecting 
common interests of the farmers and society against the violator. However, the party-state 
institutions had avoided that responsibility, only playing the role of supporter to thousands of 
farmers in an unprecedented case in the legal history of the country. The farmers faced a great 
difficult in the lack of any legal rules on class action against a legal entity.
74
 The authorities’ 
reactions and attitudes have been heavily criticized by the media as they proved a notorious case of 
ineffective governance from the side of the party-state institutions. It is the kind of tolerance 
exercised by the party-state towards the media as an outlet of criticism of poor environmental 
governance.        
While the legal rules do not facilitate class actions for thousands of farmers and authorities 
seem to fail at securing the interests of affected farmers, the civil society actions by numerous social 
groups with the support of businesses’ actions have resulted in a solution in the interests of the 
farmers. Support by general public opinion had been mobilized by the mass media to form a 
counter-hegemonic discourse of the case. All major newspapers reported on the case to express 
their frustration about the disadvantages to farmers and to bring about pressure on solutions in the 
interests of farmers. Provincial Delegations of National Assembly Deputies and individual Deputies 
at the National Assembly meetings questioned the responsibilities of the MONRE. Hundreds of 
lawyers and dozens of law firms and lawyers’ associations and bars joined efforts in providing free 
legal services to farmers to prepare 4700 lawsuits against Vedan company. What made the final 
strike was the massive participation from associations of consumers and members of society. They 
all joined efforts in boycotting the products made by Vedan. Such large supermarkets as Big C, 
Maximark, Coopmart, Metro stopped doing business with Vedan. By September 2010, all kinds of 
pressures combined from actions of civil society had forced Vedan to accept direct negotiations 
with farmers and pay compensation of VND217 billion for the damages. The final settlement was 
reached without any court ruling.   
As can be seen from the case, the actions from civil society have effectively filled a 
governance gap and a legal gap, helped break the deadlock and asserted a role to bring about a 
solution beneficial to the victims of environmentally devastating acts. The case has raised some 
critical questions about the legitimacy of the party-state in protecting the marginalised interests of 
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 The debate about legal gaps in environmental cases continues to feature prominently since the Vedan case. See 
http://www.nguoiduatin.vn/khieu-kien-moi-truong-va-nhung-lo-hong-phap-ly-a99581.html (access 16 September 
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the disadvantaged farmers. This discourse has emerged from the failure of the authorities in 
determining a consistent approach to the case and taking a firm position and strong actions against 
the environmental polluters. The local authorities and central government institutions have done 
little to translate their words into deeds even after the environmental police found the evidence of 
violations. They showed little interest in utilizing the judiciary’s power to punish the environmental 
polluter with a view to holding high the commitment to protect the environment and do justice to 
the disadvantaged farmers. Rather, the party-state left thousands of farmers with no choice but to 
take class action without any clear outcome given the existing legal regulations unconducive to their 
actions. The party-state institutions still follow a long-standing practice of seeking instruction and 
direction from the higher echelons in the hierarchical order for dealing with their own issues to be 
on the safe side. This delayed and low responsiveness results in a wait-and-see attitude and lack of 
responsibility as they count on the final voice from the top decision-making structure of the Party. 
This has a clear potential to erode over time people’s confidence in the party-state to govern 
effectively.    
The National Assembly had held deliberations over the responsibilities of state institutions 
and the loopholes in the legal regulations for dealing with such acts of environmental devastation. 
However, the subsequent 2009 revisions of the 1999 Penal Code (Chapter XVII) on environmental 
crimes are still far from meeting the requirements in legal practice to deal with increasingly 
complex and serious acts against the environment (Phan Huu Vinh, 2011). As a result of the Vedan 
case, the National Assembly set oversight agenda on environmental cases as a priority task in 2011 
to continue reviewing and revising related legal rules in the 2005 Environmental Protection Law, 
the 1999 Penal Code, and the 2004 Civil Proceedings Code. While the related activities of the 
National Assembly are a good signal of better awareness on the governance problems, the real 
change in practices of party-state institutions will only emerge from the political will of the ruling 
CPV.   
The Vedan case also points to the limited capabilities of such party-sponsored mass 
organizations like the Vietnam Farmers Association (VFA). Although the VFA has the mandate to 
represent the interests of its members or the farmers, its first and foremost mandate is to transmit the 
policies and guidelines from the party-state. Thus, its working principle in practice actually is the 
party-state’s “democratic centralism” rather than voluntarism. The organization also operates in a 
hierarchical order under the leadership of an internal party committee at every level of the 
organization. Naturally, the executive committees at every level are held accountable vertically to 
higher echelons without downward accountability. Key members of VFA executive committees at 
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every level are structured from party committee at the same level and receive salaries and 
allowances from the state budget rather than from members’ dues (Pham Duy Nghia, 2011). These 
characteristics make the leaders of the VFA at every level less responsive to the needs and interests 
of the member farmers. Other party-sponsored organizations like the Vietnam Lawyers 
Associations (VLA) are no exception. In such cases as the Vedan one, because they have to seek 
instructions from party committees inside the organization and the higher echelons of party 
structure responsible for the organization, understandably it is very difficult for them to take an 
active and assertive role as an organization.         
In sum, the Vedan case is a typical case of environmental governance. The roles, attitudes, 
and capacities of each actor have been clearly exposed. The intense collective actions from civil 
society with the green light given by the party-state have brought about a beneficial outcome for the 
disadvantaged farmers. However, there remains an unanswered question about an uncertain 
outcome for the environment itself without any action to restore the good conditions of the 
environment. Clearly, it indicates a gap in environmental governance and legal issues that the party-
state and its sponsored organizations alone are unable to fill. This is partly because the structure 
constantly looks up for final say from elites in the party-state hierarchy and this has a serious impact 
on the effective tools for governance along the way as decision-making is impeded and institutions 
bcome stagnant to act. While there are other issues with the decision-making and party-state 
hierarchy that explain legal and governance gaps, this chapter only focus on the role and action of 
civil society. The case examined here is illustrative of civil society as a critical source of 
governance and demonstrate the concessions and compromise by the party-state to counter-
hegemonic discourse.  
 
4.4 Case study: Environmental Protection Tax Law 
In this section, I will examine the process of making the Environmental Protection Tax Law 
and how civil society has interacted with the formal governance mechanism. Civil society action 
came from some environmental NGOs mainly by means of advocacy using the invited space. The 
2008 Law on promulgating normative legal documents provides a legal framework for a 
consultation process involving non-state actors and quasi-state actors. The case study demonstrates 
the limited use of this invited space due to existing structural constraints while creating potential for 
expanding the political space for participation.  
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The Environmental Protection Tax Law was passed by the National Assembly of Vietnam on 
15 November 2010 and came into effect on 01 January 2012. The stated objectives of this tax law 
are to levy lax on environmental polluters to protect the environment, to contribute to changes 
towards a more environmental friendly awareness and behaviours, and to generate more resources 
for environmental and ecological rehabilitation. The process of drafting, collecting comments, and 
holding deliberations to the passage of this law presented various aspects of power relations in the 
environmental governance.   
The draft of this tax law was prepared by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) on behalf of the 
Cabinet. The drafting committee was established by the MOF on the 23 April 2009. According to a 
Government report, the drafting committee sought and received written comments and feedback 
from 80 organizations including Ministries, central agencies, provincial and municipal people’s 
committees, and state-owned corporations. This was in line with the requirements set by the 2008 
Law on promulgation of legal normative documents. A closer examination of the breakdown of this 
number indicates the categorization of five groups by the drafting committee: (1) Ministries and 
central agencies: 20; (2) State organizations: 2 (Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology and 
Vietnam Social Security); (3) Localities: 54 (provinces and cities); (4) Enterprises: 1 
(VINACOMIN); (5) Individuals: 20. All of the official written comments and feedback were 
received by the drafting committee within November 2009. As can be seen from these groups, the 
social organizations and NGOs working in the environmental field had not been consulted. The 
drafting committee had taken an exclusionary approach on a selective basis. Though it reported that 
two conferences had been organised to collect direct (verbal) comments and feedback from 
different organizations, lawyers, and other participants, and they also sought written comments 
from international technical advisors for a GTZ (Germany)-financed project and a STAR (the US)-
financed project, it did not show how they had incorporated them in the draft. The drafting had been 
basically a closed process of decision-making.   
Faced with the tyranny of a closed process with regards to an important tax law, some active 
groups made efforts to bring related issues to public attention and launched critiques over the 
objectives and nature of the law. The making of the environmental tax law captured some type of 
activism from civil society during the drafting process. Among the most active CSOs in 
environmental representation and mobilizational campaign were the Vietnam Environmental 
Network (VEN)75 and PanNature in partnership with the state-sponsored Vietnam Association for 
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 VEN is an open, voluntary, and informal network of organizations and individuals interested in the environment. It 
had 147 members by the time of May 2010.  
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Conservation of Nature and Environment (VACNE). They tried to gather like-minded people and 
organizations to contribute insights to different aspects of the draft laws (V1).76 They questioned the 
objectives of this law whether being to place emphasis on generation of increased revenues for the 
state budget or environmental protection. They expressed serious doubts over the effectiveness of 
the law in encouraging behavioural changes towards the use of greener and cleaner technologies. 
The distributive aspects of the tax collected under this law were also under question because it had 
not been made clear how the collected taxes would be used to increase spending on the 
environment. Thus, they raised a critical discourse over the making of this tax law.  
At a broad level, civil society actions managed to solicit certain influence in some state 
agencies. Their critical feedback was sent to the Committee for Budget and Finance of the National 
Assembly and these groups were actively involved in the draft appraisal process at the National 
Assembly institutions. One critical comment was indeed recorded at a group meeting of National 
Assembly members in May 2010. A member disputed the idea that the objective of the law was 
environmental protection. Based on his reading of the draft law, the objective is to focus on 
increasing the state revenues instead of environmental protection.
77
  
However, the deliberations at the meetings of the National Assembly mostly touched upon 
technical aspects of the draft law and did not reflect the critical ideas. The critical feedback did not 
appear in the final report of the National Assembly Standing Committee to the National Assembly 
before the voting as well as in the final version of the law. With the broad consensus reached 
between the Party Committee of the Cabinet and the Party Committee of the National Assembly, 
the law was passed at a high rate of approval by deputies without any controversy.          
The case has exposed certain limit and gap in civil society capacity for effecting changes in 
governance. In such cases where it is not clear that the legitimate interests of any disadvantaged 
groups would be affected, there is a lack of collective action strongly pursued by civil society to 
articulate common interests of the environment for the community. The absence of active 
participation from the mass media in this case indicates that the discourse over this law has not 
permeated the public sphere and not generated a political space for intense actions. While the role 
of mass organizations was mostly peripheral, the interest groups represented by state actors like 
Ministries and state-owned corporations were most influential in the making of this law. In fact, 
                                                          
76
 Interview with an informant from PanNature in July 2012. 
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 See the detailed report dated 02/6/2010 prepared by the Secretariat of the 7
th
 Seating of the 12
th
 National Assembly on 
group discussions on the draft law on environmental protection.   
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civil society action had not brought about a desired outcome in a process of negotiations with state 
agencies.  
The case highlights the fragmentary and non-confrontational character of Vietnam’s 
environmental NGOs. This kind of character is desired by the party-state but has limited success in 
collective action. Due to the constraints on their registration, operation, funding and political 
connections, the civic environmental NGOs in Vietnam are reticent about engaging directly in 
contentious cases like Vedan as they don’t want to be seen as a counter force against the party-state. 
Thus, it is unlikely for the environmental NGOs to transform environmental controversies in into 
contentious environmental movements from grassroots level as a source of pressure for political and 
social change.
78
 However, the very existence of these NGOs and the environmental activism 
promoted through pluralistic views opens up more avenues for critical knowledge about 
environmental issues and communicative actions. Environmental activism demonstrates the diverse 
forms and expressions of civil society. Successful outcome for policy changes often requires the 
combination and coordination of various sectors in civil society.   
   
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how key aspects of “embedded environmental activism” have 
been playing out. In relation to environmental governance, civil society is understood in a dynamic 
and heterogeneous character. Civil society embraces a process of struggle among some competing 
views representing different interest groups to promote their own version of discourse. It also serves 
as a foundation for a fledgling green public sphere which generates communicative spaces in 
Vietnam. The power of such a green public sphere is vested in “embedded environmentalism”. This 
kind of embeddedness in politics and civil society has both “constraining and enabling” effect, and 
more importantly possesses potentials unleashed. The pattern of duality is also manifested by the 
way environmental decision-making is negotiated and compromised with the party-state in fighting 
environmental polluters in light of the Vedan case and the case of environmental tax law making.  
Civil society manages to make its presence felt and fill a governance gap where a green light is 
given by the party-state and it can gather a capacity of organising collective action around 
marginalised interests. The actions by civil society are especially strong and effective when it 
comes to articulating and protecting the rights of the disadvantaged groups affected by poor 
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 In the context of China, Stalley & Yang (2006) and Tang & Zhan (2006) made a similar point on the limitations of 
China’s environmental NGOs in influencing government decisions and official behaviours.  
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environmental governance. In such a situation, civil society is able to gather enough force to 
influence changes in governance process. However, when it comes to the common interest of the 
general community in a well-sustained environment or environmental rehabilitation, civil society 
has limited capabilities in influencing changes in the practices and decision-making of the party-
state. The limitations are bound by the corporatist model of governance in which the interests of 
Ministries and state-owned corporations outweigh others, including those of the environment. 
Furthermore, the continued adherence by the party to a minute role with which it retains the highest 
power to give instructions and intervene in every decision of state institutions sets the limits over 
the capabilities of civil society to effect meaningful changes in environmental governance.    
The discourse promoted by civil society in environmental governance has emerged as a 
positive signal even though the actions by civil society to effect change have not always been 
successful. This discourse has challenged the practices and structuring of decision-making of the 
party-state, and the role of mass organizations. In the interest of the environment and its political 
legitimacy, the party-state is increasingly faced with a critical question of redefining the party 
leadership and management activities of state institutions. The actions of civil society have the 
potential of becoming more intense and gathering stronger forces of change as more critical 
problems in environmental governance accumulate and erupt. Prevention of such a crisis in 
governance inevitably requires the CPV to move towards a more strategic role in its leadership and 
to be more responsive to civil society. The capacity of the party-state to navigate through 
environmental problems depends on the extent to which the structural features of hierarchy change 
to facilitate greater responsiveness. Processes by civil society are likely to serve as catalyst for 
changes in the way the party-state conducts environmental governance, expanding the public space 
and managing different stakeholders for substantive participation.    
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Chapter 5 
Civil society and poverty reduction governance: Potentials and limits in 
influencing rules and norms 
 
Vietnam has embarked on market-based reforms since late 1980s and recorded remarkable 
achievements in poverty reduction. Its performance on the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) of halving extreme poverty between 1990 and 2015 has been 
highlighted as a success story. While Vietnam’s good performance in poverty reduction has long 
been attributed to the role of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) government, there has not 
been due attention in the policy-making circles to the role of civil society and its dynamism in 
decision-making on poverty reduction. Interestingly, poverty reduction is among few functional 
areas of governance that civil society has been most active and clearly made its presence felt in the 
authoritarian system where the Leninist political structures dominate the entire society. Market-
based reforms have led to more relaxed control of the party-state over a number of governance 
areas, particularly poverty reduction and creating opportunities for more inclusive governance. It 
has been increasingly difficult for the government to exercise good governance in such an area 
where it is faced with the lack of both resources and expertise, and the limited role of its 
‘transmission belt’ in dealing with poverty. In practice, Vietnam’s party-state policy has been 
advocating broad social participation (‘xa hoi hoa’) in poverty reduction.  
Actors in civil society are perceived by international donors as relevant to making 
contribution to improving the quality of governance, empowering public participation, and enabling 
poverty reduction. The idea about the roles of these social actors has been promoted by international 
governance agencies such as the UNDP and the WB who expedite development goals and good 
governance. The making and implementation of poverty reduction programs in Vietnam have been 
an area where civil society’s activism has been established through such a process negotiated with 
the party-state to expand a political space for civil society actors’ participation. This process is 
strongly supported by the international donors and global civil society. Civil society’s struggle for 
governance space has been manifested by a wide range of activities from state policy 
implementation, policy advocacy, lobbying for policy change, and even opposition to certain 
policies. This chapter examines the way civil society can penetrate into and claim some governance 
space over poverty reduction, and how it is “tolerated” and “endorsed” by the party-state through 
such a process. And further on, it explores the extent to which civil society has been able to effect 
changes in governance. It will demonstrate that civil society has become an emerging source of 
123 
  
123 
 
ameliorating governance problems, helping reinforce the political legitimacy of the party-state to 
which good performance in poverty reduction serves as a critical element. This chapter provides a 
contrast and extension upon the previous chapter on the environment. In this area of governance, 
controversies are covered up by success stories in poverty reduction. Contentious issues are hidden 
behind the consensual language and action by CBOs at the grassroots level.  
The chapter first presents a background on poverty reduction in Vietnam, actors and their 
discourses about the role and influence, and discuss how civil society action has effectively claimed 
that gap, asserted the role to bring about better governance over poverty reduction. This chapter 
focuses on the CBOs as a key actor to engage civil society processes. The inter-relationship 
between CBOs and the party-state at the grassroots level illuminates various aspects of diversity and 
power relations. The case study of two CBOs in Quang Tri provices illustrates how CBOs act as a 
complementary source of governance with a view to legitimating the existing power relations at the 
grassroots level while they wield transformative potentials of being a catalyst for changes in the 
way party-state expanding governance space and inviting different stakeholders for participation.    
 
5.1 Background to Vietnam’s poverty reduction  
The performance by Vietnam in poverty reduction had been by most standards remarkable 
over the two decades. In mid 1980s, the party-state faced a serious economic and social crisis. One 
of the visible indicators of the crisis was the extreme poverty and hunger in the country. In 1985, 
more than 75% of the population lived under the official Vietnamese poverty line (Sanders 2014: 
46). According to the Vietnamese official standard, the poverty rate has fallen sharply since Doi 
Moi was initiated. By 1990, the rate was more than 58% using the basic needs assessment and the 
GDP per capita was US$114 (Luong 2003: 12). By 2010, the national poverty rate was 9.45% 
according to official statistics (Resolution No.80/NQ-CP dated 19/5/2011 issued by the 
Government) and the GDP per capita reached US$1130, which is an indicator that Vietnam has 
become a middle-income country. The rate was 14.2% if using official urban and rural poverty lines 
of VND 500,000/person/month and VND 400,000/person/month respectively. According to the 
poverty line estimated by the World Bank supposedly to better reflect living conditions of the poor 
in Vietnam (equal to VND 653,000/person/month or $2.25/person/day), the national poverty rate in 
2010 is 20.7 percent, which is still an impressive achievement (World Bank 2013). The remarkable 
progress in poverty reduction has been a major component of the performance-based legitimacy 
claim both domestically and internationally.  
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Vietnam’s success in poverty reduction has been widely attributed to the policy-making and 
implementation by the party-state. It has benefited tremendously from market-based reform that 
Vietnam can increase and maintain relatively high economic growth rate over the past decades. 
Vietnam issued the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy in 2002 and has made 
substantial investment into major poverty reduction programs such as Program 132 (a government 
programme that supports production and residential land for ethnic minority people in Tay Nguyen 
based on Prime Minister’s Decision No. 132/2002/QD-TTg dated 8/10/2002), Program 133 
(National Targeted Program on Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction), Program 134 (a 
government program that supports production and residential land, and water for domestic 
consumption for ethnic minority people based on Prime Minister’s Decision No. 134/2004/QD-TTg 
dated 20/7/2004), Program 135 (Program on Socioeconomic Development in Especially 
Disadvantaged Communes in Mountainous, Isolated and Remote Areas based on Prime Minister’s 
Decision No. 135/1998/QD-TTg dated 31/7/1998), and Program 30a (Sustainable Poverty 
Reduction for 62 poor districts). The budget for Phase II (2006-2010) of Program 135 was US$1 
billion and the estimated budget for Program 30a reached VND156,411 billion (nearly US$7.5 
billion) in 2010. By these programs, the party-state has tried to demonstrate their pro-poor 
development policy.     
Over the years, Vietnam has also received considerable support from international donors. 
Vietnam received US$196 billion in FDI registration and US$64.32 billion in ODA commitments 
between 1993 and 2010 at a steady rate (Statistics released by the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment in 2010, Summary Report 7501/BC-BKHDT by Ministry of Planning and Investment 
on November 1, 2011 on ODA Attraction and Use). By 2011, Vietnam’s foreign loans amount to 
US$50 billion, equivalent to 41.5% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at an average of 15% year-on-
year increase (Ngo 2012). Part of these resources has been transferred to support the government’s 
poverty-reduction programs or NGOs implemented projects. For example, a review by Australian 
Government in 2009 concluded that the Australian funded NGO projects worth AU$22 million over 
five year period 2004-2009 provided valuable evidence and examples for linking good local (sub-
national) practice, with efforts to enhance and implement the national policy efforts of Government 
of Vietnam as well as complementing and/or providing leverage for Programs 133 and Program 135 
of the Vietnamese Government. 
While Vietnam’s performance on poverty reduction has generally been remarkable, a number 
of challenges remain. Despite the fact that tens of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, 
their vulnerability is still extremely high as many of them are so close to the poverty line. Poverty 
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prevalence among the rural areas and ethnic minority groups is now a growing and persistent 
challenge. It is noted that socio-economic gaps are widening between rural and urban areas, 
between regions and ethnic groups (Taylor 2007: 8). Incidence of poverty among the ethnic minor 
groups is particularly alarming as 66.3 percent of minorities were poor in 2010 compared to only 
12.9 percent of the Kinh majority population. (World Bank 2013: 2). Many of the existing problems 
that hinder poverty reduction are structural such as rising inequalities and limitations in access to 
education, training, healthcare, infrastructure, production factors like land, capital, and information 
that make poverty reduction ‘less responsive to economic growth’ (World Bank 2013: 2). It is even 
becoming more difficult due to the negative impact of marketization and rural modernization on the 
overall well-being of people in rural areas. Taylor (2007: 8-9) points out the increasing insecurity of 
farmers and their deteriorating quality of life due to exposure to market forces and industrialization. 
These problems in poverty reduction governance have emerged as a source of contestations against 
the state’s development policies.  
 
5.2 Actors and discourses in poverty reduction governance 
In Vietnam, the party-state plays a dominating role over the economy and development. The 
economic success over the two decades after the market-based reforms in 1986 is arguably 
attributable to the developmental state model that Vietnam has been following in line with that of 
East Asian countries (Beeson & Pham 2012). Vietnam’s party-state demonstrates certain attributes 
of the developmental structure like stable and centralised government, cohesive institutions and 
effective coercive institutions for suppression of labour demands to perform relatively well in 
poverty reduction governance. The party-state has always emphasized the strategic importance of 
poverty reduction and poverty as a major policy question. The Resolution of the 11th National 
Congress of the CPV sets the tasks in poverty reduction:   
Focusing on implementing effectively poverty reduction programs in remote areas and specially 
difficult areas; diversifying resources and methods for poverty reduction in link with agricultural and 
rural development, education, vocational training, and employment generation for sustainable poverty 
reduction. 
As such, the party-state has assigned various institutions to take the lead and coordinate 
efforts as well as resources for this important area of governance. While poverty reduction is framed 
as a task for the entire people of the country in the political discourse, line ministries are responsible 
for major programs. For example, Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) is 
responsible for the National Targeted Program for Poverty Reduction in cooperation with other 
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Ministries such as the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). And the Committee for Ethnic 
Minority Affairs (CEMA), a ministerial level agency under the Government, is tasked with 
managing Program 135 aiming at reducing poverty in ethnic minority areas across 1874 communes 
in 45 provinces in Vietnam. In order to better coordinate the state institutions in poverty reduction, 
the Government established the Central Steering Committee on Sustainable Poverty Reduction in 
June 2012. The Steering Committee is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Vu Van Ninh and its 
members include Minister of MOLISA, Minister of CEMA, Vice Ministers from relevant ministries 
and leaders from major mass organizations. Those state institutions at the central level along with 
local governments are the major actors in poverty reduction governance. They conduct needs 
assessment and promulgate policies drawing on various resources for poverty reduction. The mass 
organizations play an instrumentalist role in implementing the related policies and receive funding 
from the state for such purposes.  
In the political discourse by major actors in poverty reduction governance, remarkable 
progress is the highlight. The state-owned media always conveys an image of the party-state as a 
caring guardian of well-being for the people and the good policy outcome in poverty reduction. 
Numerous examples of people being lifted out of poverty show their deep gratitude to the party-
state for the supportive policies and subsidies to alleviate poverty. While some problems remain, it 
is argued that the failures in the top-down approach by the party-state are mostly due to technical 
reasons and poor implementation in some places: 
Poverty reduction policies are related to many fields in the society and are expressed in many different 
documents, thus it is difficult to monitor and apply, they are also overlapping and repetitious, some 
policies are simplistically egalitarian, the subsidies are low and the balance of account in the budget 
has not been considered. (Government Office 2014) 
International donors are those actively supporting the Vietnamese party-state in poverty 
reduction governance by providing resources, expertise and advisory opinions. The international 
donors emphasize the need for reform to increase market integration as well as transparency and 
accountability for inclusive growth. As argued by Fforde (2011: 175), donors have started moving 
away from early 1990s policy positions “that could easily ignore political aspects of development.” 
The World Bank in Vietnam identifies this reform as a critical to poverty reduction governance: 
‘Improving governance through greater transparency and accountability will help to increase local 
participation and reduce inequalities in voice and power that work to undermine inclusive growth’ 
(World Bank 2013: 8). This position on the policy question of poverty confirms Fforde (2011: 
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175)’s argument that ‘poverty as a policy question increasingly appeared to require institutional 
change if Vietnam’s development success were to continue.’ 
While their direct support to the state in poverty reduction governance is significant, INGOs 
are also an important vehicle through which the funding is disbursed for poverty reduction. 
International NGOs have been able to channel a significant amount of international development 
assistance to Vietnam as they have built a reputation for promoting local initiatives in working with 
community-based organizations on small scale projects, being innovative and cost effective in their 
administration of the funding. They have been able to experiment new ideas and approaches via 
flexible and small-scale projects on a pilot basis at the grassroots level. 
INGOs in Vietnam have a strong focus on community development and social mobilization 
for the poor and vulnerable communities. The INGOs with the same concern and area of work on 
poverty reduction form an informal network with international aid agencies, Vietnamese NGOs and 
interested individuals. The People's Participation Working Group (PPWG) was established in 1999, 
acting as an informal network and a forum for organizations and professionals - such as donors, 
government employees, NGOs, project managers, consultants and researchers - to exchange 
information and ideas on issues relating to people’s participation, grassroots democracy and civil 
society. One of the key objectives of the PPWG is to advocate and promote an enabling 
environment for effective people's participation in the development and poverty reduction process 
of Vietnam. As of 2008, 275 organizations and individuals participated in the group’s activities on a 
frequent basis (PPWG 2008). This group provided inputs on poverty reduction policy and programs 
to the Consultative Group (CG) Meeting held semi-annually from 1993 to 2013 between 
international donors and Vietnam’s Government. Since the CG Meetings have been replaced by the 
Vietnam Development Partnership Forum (VDPF) since 2013, INGOs continue to send their 
representatives and share the PPWG’s inputs on development policies with the Government.   
INGOs’ participation in Vietnam’s poverty reduction governance mainly takes the form of 
service providers and/or advocates for the poor. As service provides, they offer a range of 
livelihood interventions through innovative models based on their experiences in other countries 
and local consultation and research. Their work has impact on a number of areas such as agriculture 
and rural development, nutrition, micro-credit, education and healthcare. Involved primarily with 
service delivery, INGOs in Vietnam want to be seen as a reliable partner with the Government and 
their activities seen as professionalized and depoliticized. This stance can be summed up by a 
remark of an INGO representative: 
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A major lesson that has emerged from the INGO experience in Vietnam has been regarding the 
importance and the value of working with and through the Government. This has been a challenge to 
the philosophy of many INGOs, who typically work more independently in other countries, and focus 
primarily on developing partnership directly with local civil society organizations and beneficiaries. 
However, many INGOs in Vietnam have identified the Government – together with the mass 
organizations – ultimately provides an effective structure for capacity building and for the 
sustainability of interventions, as well as a ready made channel for sharing experience and replicating 
INGO models. (Payne 2003)   
While the INGOs adopt a highly accommodating approach with the party-state in poverty 
reduction governance, they do at the same time want to play the role of advocates for the poor, and 
to a lesser extent, supporter to the poor to be advocates for themselves. By acting in advocacy and 
empowerment, INGOs have been trying to bring to this area of governance more democratic quality 
in the sense that people’s voices and opinions are shared and heard. As they are vastly constrained 
in this sphere of action, their activities focus on capacity building and sharing of critical knowledge 
through research to inform people and policy-makers about important issues. For example, Oxfam 
and ActionAid who are among the pioneers working on poverty reduction in Vietnam commission 
regular reports on different aspects of poverty in an effort to influence the party-state’s policy. At 
times, they can become critical of current policy highly praised by the party-state like 
“socialization”: 
Socialization has helped to mobilize society to reduce poverty and improve education and health care. 
However, socialization is often understood as the requirement to make contributions in return for 
services, thus creating financial burdens for the poor and widening inequalities in accessing services. 
(Oxfam and ActionAid 2012) 
Vietnamese NGOs and CBOs have been active partners with the INGOs and international 
donors to channel the international finance and expertise to the poor and vulnerable communities. 
VNGOs adopt similar roles as INGOs in working with people at the grassroots level and the 
government at different levels. The VNGOs indeed have close ties to the INGOs in terms of 
personnel connections, funding, experience, and expertise. And INGOs now also adopt policies to 
increase the local ownership of their programs. Many VNGOs are the local versions of the INGOs 
after they left. The VNGOs also want to tap into informal networks to amplify their influence. 
VNGOs both join the existing networks initiated by the INGOs like the PPWG and establish their 
own informal networks and fora like Civil Society Inclusion in Food Security and Poverty 
Elimination Network (CIFPEN), Gender and Community Development Network (GENCOMNET), 
VNGOs and Aid Effectiveness Network. The VNGOs also seek strong collaboration and linkages 
with the party-state and mass organizations at all levels in order to articulate their interest in service 
delivery. This idea is clearly conveyed to the Government at the 2014 VDPF by a VNGO 
representative:  
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NGOs are taking part in providing services of training, agricultural extension, microfinance, small-
scale infrastructure like clean water, medical station, schools with good quality for poor communities 
in remote and mountainous areas. Therefore, we request the Government to enact a Decree 
implementing the Public Investment Law with a view to generating a fair environment for NGOs and 
Associations to participate in providing public service. (Le Quang Binh 2014)  
 In the area of service delivery, VNGOs and CBOs have engaged in various activities like 
helping poor people to improve their lives by directly solving specific livelihood problems or 
bringing them together around their own problems or addressing some specific needs, by setting up 
income-generating activities.  
In the area of advocacy, VNGOs and CBOs also tread carefully to seek issue-based 
sympathy and understanding of the party-state for regulatory changes and a more enabling 
environment in poverty reduction governance, particularly related to easing restrictions on receiving 
funding and registration requirements. In this way, VNGOs and CBOs can achieve ‘empowerment’ 
as an indirect outcome of their wider service delivery activities and grassroots capacity building 
with a view to fostering a stronger democratic culture and participatory approach in which “changes 
are hypothesised to feed into local and national institutions and processes (Banks and Hulme 2012: 
10). Therefore, intentionally or unintentionally, VNGOs and CBOs are engaging with political 
dimensions in civil society. In this sense, civil society embraces a wide range of actions by VNGOs 
and CBOs from collaboration to contestation in poverty reduction governance. In the Hannah 
typology (Figure 2.3), the roles of VNGOs and CBOs are mainly confined to implementing party-
state policies in social services, conducing advocacy for changes in policy implementation and 
lobbying for policy changes related to social service delivery. 
 
5.3 Contestations in poverty reduction governance 
In civil society, there is a diverse and complex range of actors with different activities 
participating in poverty reduction governance. However, the focus should be on the interaction and 
negotiation around power. The major problem with poverty is still the inequality in power relations 
and the extractive nature of development policy by the party-state. As argued by Tuong Vu (2010: 
6), the developmental structure embedded in Vietnam party-state has been able to ‘draw power 
from direct control of productive organizations.’ This kind of developmental structure has borne 
detrimental effects on the long-term wellbeing of its people as it has placed too much emphasis on 
economic growth and material prosperity at the expense of adequate attention to social justice 
mechanisms. As such, the role of the party-state as a guardian of security and well-being for the 
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people is being increasingly tested by the tensions and perceptions of unfair treatment arising in the 
poor and vulnerable communities.  
The people in Vietnam have traditionally relied mainly on the party-state to enhance their 
livelihood. The arrival of INGOs in partnership with VNGOs and CBOs has provided them with 
more resources and expertise to better their life. However, these organizations seem to have 
contributed to strengthening and legitimizing the existing power relations through incremental 
changes in technical and managerial solutions to the problems faced by the poor and vulnerable 
communities. For example, the party-state has embraced the neoliberal logic of market integration 
championed by international donors with a promise of delivering inclusive growth. While some 
studies point to the lack of market access and infrastructure in the rural and mountainous areas as a 
driver of poverty (World Bank 2013), other studies demonstrate that how marketization has resulted 
in wider gap between rural and urban areas as well as a deepening erosion in capital and material 
security for rural people (Taylor 2007). While the mixed impacts of large state programs on 
material accumulation through development infrastructure and rural modernization have not been 
considered adequately, the state is still investing more resources into pushing the rural communities 
to market integration. In the mindset of party-state leaders at all levels, a significant driver of 
poverty is still attributed to the laziness, lack of rationality and calculation by the poor people 
(Government Office 2014). It is an underlying assumption that the more exposure of the rural poor 
people to market forces will help overcome these problems.  A study by Oxfam in 2014 reveals the 
failures of a major state program on poverty reduction, i.e. Program 30a, in addressing basic needs 
of the poor people (Thanhnien News 2014). The Ethnic Minorities Council of the National 
Assembly also recognized a number of shortcomings in Program 30a in its Report No.193/BC-
HDDT13 dated 16/5/2012 on the outcome of oversight over Program 30a submitted to the National 
Assembly Standing Committee. 
The increasingly salient inequality between rural and urban areas and between regions has 
become a potential source of social unrest and conflict in contemporary Vietnam. While little 
attention is paid in official discourse to the negative impacts of market integration and government 
policies and programs on the poor and vulnerable communities, a number of studies have 
highlighted the serious contradictions in poverty reduction governance in Vietnam. Luong (2003b) 
noted the growing landless peasantry in the Mekong delta and disenfranchised ethnic minorities as 
well as the increasing number of slum dwellers in urban poverty. It is no coincidence that many of 
the most serious social unrest cases happen in these areas. The Mekong delta region records a high 
number of petitions and denunciations about land grabs and unfair treatment by local officials in 
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infrastructure development projects. The economic marginalization of indigenous ethnic minorities 
in the Central Highlands was among the root causes of the uprisings in 2001 and 2004. The large-
scale migration from rural to urban areas as a result of socioeconomic urban bias produces an 
increasingly high number of poor workers living in urban slums. Many of these poor workers 
participated in the riots and looting of factories in Binh Duong province in May 2014. Luong 
(2003b: 91-98) makes a detailed analysis of how the state’s measures like income transfer among 
regions, targeted public spending, and market interventions through decrees and incentive schemes 
to redress regional and urban-rural imbalance have had limited impacts. One of the major problems 
that limit or even divert the state efforts in poverty reduction governance is rampant bureaucratic 
corruption.    
In response the problems entrenched in the existing mode of poverty reduction governance, a 
number of civil society processes have begun to emerge. The power of these civil society processes 
is embedded in the context and space where the formations and interactions take root and take 
place. Taylor (2007: 43-46) demonstrates that the social injustices and processes of alienation 
embraced by the party-state are driving counter-state formations in the Mekong delta region among 
the Khmer Theravada Buddhist community, the Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, 
Catholics and Protestants. These civil society processes are not involved with NGOs formally 
registered with the party-state but are contingent on local sociocultural dynamics. They are finding 
alternative ways of responding to structural inequality, unfairness and corruption outside the party-
state channels. Taylor (2007: 46) argues that socialization policies are ‘going in the wrong 
direction’ as they are exacerbating the equalities, social injustices, and the sense of alienation.  
It can be seen that local sociocultural dynamics powerfully shape and reshaped civil society 
processes in a diverse ways in response to the problems with the existing mode of poverty reduction 
governance. While some of the processes can have the potential of developing into over opposition 
to the state like the uprisings in Thai Binh province in 1997 and demonstrations in the Central 
Highlands in 2001 and 2004, others can be resilient enough to mobilize more social capital and 
human capital to cope with poverty and inequality and maintain cooperative approach with the 
party-state at the same time. As noted by Luong (2003b: 100-101), that social capital is embedded 
in the tighter community networks and stronger egalitarian ideology in the rural northern and 
central Vietnam. In this region, the civil society processes can produce ‘greater vigilance and 
assertiveness of local populations’ (Luong 2003b: 100) in dealing with local officials that help to 
reduce effectively the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption and social inequalities. Promotion of 
stronger civil society processes is essential to enable participatory governance by enlarging the 
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political and social power of the poor and vulnerable communities. In the context of the Philippines, 
Angeles (2004: 183) argues that ‘it is not so much the creation of competent government programs 
for the poor, but the creation of competent communities within the poor that matters in participatory 
governance.’ This point has a strong resonance in the Vietnamese context. In the following case 
study, I examine the civil society processes in the form of interaction and negotiation with the 
party-state’s power by community-based organizations to influence poverty reduction governance 
and mitigate the adverse impacts of market forces and government policies. 
 
5.4 Case study: Grassroots organizations and poverty question in Quang Tri province 
Quang Tri is a province in central Vietnam that has substantially undergone economic and 
social transformation after some decades of Vietnam’s rapid growth. Although the living standard 
of Vietnamese people in general has been raised thanks to the rapid economic growth for the past 
decades, Vietnam is still a poor country and Quang Tri is long plagued by a high prevalence of 
poverty. Poverty rate was as high as 48% in 2008 by the national standard although it was reduced 
to 30% by 2010.
79
 While the aftermath of war is still being settled (i.e. clearing land mines, 
assisting victims of agent orange), new development challenges have emerged in many areas 
essentially related to the civic life of the people. Among the prominent issues are the rights and 
welfare of the vulnerable and disadvantaged people with their increasing needs to organize and 
better promote their interests and for the sake of the community and its people’s welfare. There 
have been a number of initiatives being taken by some community-based organizations which were 
established in response to these needs. Given the fact that the institutional and legislative 
environment has not been conducive for their development, these organizations are mostly weak in 
institutional governance and underfunded. The stronger and more resilient development of these 
CBOs is important for the people’s civic life and societal development.  
In a liberal perspective, Quang Tri has a number of good conditions for civil society as it is 
rich in social capital. A number of social norms and attitudes including trust, tolerance, mutual 
spiritedness which are found declining in metropolitan areas do still have strong presence in CSOs 
in Quang Tri. These values in the socio-cultural context of Quang Tri help as the glue that holds the 
community together through networks and associational activity. This kind of social capital has 
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 See http://hoinghicg.quangtri.gov.vn/index.php/vi/news/Doi-thoai-Giam-ngheo/Cac-van-de-chinh-trong-thuc-hien-
cac-chinh-sach-giam-ngheo-o-tinh-Quang-Tri-42/ (accessed 20 February 2014). 
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enabled the resilience of the community both in wartime and in the peacetime struggle against 
poverty. 
In Quang Tri province, one of the groups most vulnerable to poverty is the disable people. 
Most of them live in poverty. Cam An commune of Cam Lo district and Vinh Tu commune of Vinh 
Linh district in Quang Tri province are the two communes with a high prevalence of poverty, 
particularly among disabled people. For example, Vinh Tu commune has a total area of 3500 
hectares and a population of about 3000 people or 918 households. According to the national 
poverty line, 185/918 households are listed as living in poverty, accounting for 20% of the 
commune’s population. The disable people are allowed by the local party-state level to get 
organized themselves into associations in each commune with an aim to better their livelihood. My 
research focuses on the Disabled Peoples’ Organization (DPO) in Cam An commune (Cam Lo 
district) and the DPO in Vinh Tu commune (Vinh Linh district). In order to explore their social 
capital in dealing with vulnerabilities to poverty, I examine these DPOs in relation to five themes: 
civic engagement, level of organization (organizational structure, management, and membership), 
practice of values, perception of impact, and environment (networking and engagement with other 
sectors like government, mass organizations, and businesses).     
These organizations are relatively new. The DPO of Cam An commune was established in 
2005 and the DPO of Vinh Tu commune in 2000. These organizations have all incorporated their 
own charter or rules or operations though these documents remain simple.The membership of these 
organizations is of medium size. The DPO of Cam An commune has 95 members who elected 13 to 
the Executive Committee in its most recent Congress in June 2013. They establish a fund 
management board headed by a Vice Chairman of the People’s Committee of Cam An commune 
and the Chief of the Medical Station as vice head. The DPO of Vinh Tu commune has 75 members 
and held the last Congress in 2010 where 6 were elected to the Executive Committee.  
The DPOs can be defined as social groups or community-based organizations. The 
appearance of DPOs in Quang Tri is salient as this province used to be a ferocious battle front in the 
Vietnam war, causing a high prevalence of disabled people in this area. DPOs are the grassroots 
organizations of vulnerable and disadvantaged people without an official status. The DPOs of Cam 
An commune and Vinh Tu commune have to use the official stamp from the People’s Committee of 
their respective commune, thus limiting their capacity in conducting external relations with legal 
entities across the province and outside. According to legal rules set out in Decree 45/2010/ND-CP 
promulgated by the Government, every CSOs must register with a relevant government agency or 
an umbrella organization under a mass organization (MO). Thus, the DPOs have nebulous legal 
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status. They depend totally on the People’s Committee of their respective commune for any legal 
standing. Hence, they don’t have any umbrella organization to sponsor their status. However, they 
are both members of the Fatherland Front of the commune. This status is due to the status 
sponsorship from the People’s Committee of their commune.  
Despite their nebulous legal status, they have managed to employ some effective strategies to 
cope with poverty. They are active in seeking informal and formal assistance within the commune 
and beyond. Furthermore, they have been trying to take advantage of their privileged access to 
interest-free borrowing or loans with low interests from the National Target Programs on Poverty 
Reduction. These resources have helped the people mitigate the impact of vulnerabilities to poverty 
and the DPOs to organize their activities.  
 
Operational issues of the DPOs 
A common problem that faces CSOs across Vietnam and can be seen in Quang Tri is the 
sense of competition among CSOs. The nature of completion might be different depending on the 
location and time. In Quang Tri, it is the competition for more attention and benefits from party-
state agencies and MOs. For example, the existence of many organizations with overlapping 
mandates may cause the exhaustion of scarce resources from the state and society and increase the 
sense of competition among themselves. For example, in the areas of persons with disabilities, there 
are a number of organizations with similar missions: the Association of Victims of Agent Orange, 
the Association of the Blind People, the Association of protection for people with disabilities, the 
Association of Charity, etc. All of them have structural ties with party-state agencies and compete 
for the resources from the state and society.   
In terms of leadership and management, these organizations are not dominated by their 
founders even though the role of the leader is still influential in these organizations. These leaders 
are well respected and very active in their job but they are not involved in every aspect of 
organizational operation. The dynamics of operations of these organizations depend to a great 
extent on the role and passion of their leaders.   
Recent economic slowdown and state budget difficulties have put more pressures on funding 
for the social needs. Thus the CSOs that are seeking more state subsidies would find the 
environment more challenging. Funding is the most significant issue of concern for these 
organizations. All of these organizations have experienced financial difficulty concerning financial 
resources at different level. They have made every effort to diversify the financial resources: 
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outside assistance, direct funding from international donors or other organizations, state subsidies, 
membership fees and revenues from fund-raising activities or business. Although they are not 
dependent on any single source for funding, their capacity for being financially resilient is quite 
limited. These organizations rely to a great extent upon the assistance of the Medical Committee 
Netherlands-Vietnam (MCNV), an international NGO with a substantial part of local ownership in 
Vietnam, either through direct funding or technical assistance. Remarkably, the DPO of Vinh Tu 
commune has taken an initiative to organise a business on an eco-tourist area and seek the approval 
of the commune authorities for a portion of land to plant trees. These business activities are 
conducted to bolster their financial bases and increase their financial independence although they 
need more loans for the initiatives to work out successfully. They hope to become more financially 
sustainable with diverse business activities. This kind of initiative is making significant contribution 
to enhancing the livelihood of their members. It is also supported by the MCNV to make it 
sustainable.  
In terms of the internal involvement or the level of participation by members in its 
organization’s analysis and planning and the external involvement in political organization or 
government, these DPOs have relatively low civic engagement. This level of civic engagement is 
basically reflected through the interviews with leaders of DPO of Cam An commune. The Chairman 
of the DPO of Cam An commune and other executive members stress the conditions of operation by 
the organization, particularly long distance and difficult travelling and members living in segmented 
areas. This has clearly become a structural constraint on the operation of the organization. It has 
limited the level and scope of engagement of members, particularly in activities such as analysis of 
problems of the organization and strategic planning of activities in dealing with challenges. The 
situation applies similarly to the DPO of Vinh Tu commune partly due to the mentioned constraints. 
Thus, the relative low level of civic engagement could be attributable to other factors rather than 
geographical conditions.  
The organizational culture and internal governance should be a determinant for the civil 
engagement. The practice of democratic centralism principle throughout the whole political system 
remains a certain level of influence over the governance of these organizations although their stated 
principle is volunteerism and self-management. The decision-making in these organizations is 
mostly reliant on leaders and there is an absence of formalized processes for problem analysis, 
strategic planning or decision-making. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
involvement by members is weak. In practice, the needs of target groups are relatively represented 
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in the organizations’ policy-making. This can be explained in part due to the clear and 
straightforward scope of work and operations by these organizations.  
In terms of political engagement, these organizations have a poor representation in power 
structures at their level. They have not got any representatives at the local People’s Council to make 
their voice heard in a stronger manner and to have their interests implemented more drastically. The 
most realistic structure that they could hope to have representation is the Vietnam Fatherland Front 
(VFF) at the local level, which is a mass organization. The Chairman of the DPO of Cam An 
commune is a member of the Executive Committee of Cam An commune VFF but his actual 
influence to promote the interests of the organization at the VFF is quite limited.  
We’re not invited to meetings to contribute to the local social-economic development planning each 
year. Our participation at the Fatherland Front is only superficial and very limited. In general, we’re 
disadvantaged in information access (V40). 
  
Despite their disadvantages, the strength of the DPOs lies mostly in the informal networks or 
relationship across the political system partly due to the sympathy with the difficulties of these 
disadvantaged groups and the voluntary nature of their work. In many cases, although there is a lack 
of formal mechanism that blocks their work, they can finally get it done through some primitive 
form of lobbying. Despite some obstacles, they would normally achieve the desired result with 
sufficient support from their close working partners from the relevant state institutions at local 
level. This is the reason why these grassroots organizations attach utmost importance to maintain 
and develop good relationship with authorities at the commune level.  
In terms of practice of values such as democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-violence, 
gender equity, and environment sustainability in relation to poverty reduction it is generally 
difficulty to measure although the dimension of participation is relatively low, indicating a certain 
level of democratic deficiency. As discussed earlier, the democratic centralism principle still has 
strong influence over the internal governance of the organization. Due to long-time practice of this 
principle throughout the political and social system as well as in the mindset of many people in the 
leadership of these organizations, democratic centralism is equated with real democracy. Therefore, 
it is hard to tell that the CSOs in Quang Tri strongly promote democratic values in society through 
their work. 
In practising and promoting transparency, interviews with these organizations reveal that they 
have a complete insight into their organization’s financial status and their internal procedures are 
followed.  
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The expenditure by our organizations is strictly monitored by the Commune People’s Committee, the 
Project Management, and the people. All spending is in line with the set procedure and practice. There 
has been no complaint or denunciation so far about financial irregularities. The spending is open and 
transparent to the members. Decision making is clearly delegated (V42). 
  
There can be a number of factors explaining the DPO members’ confidence in the financial 
management and decision making. Their financial resources are not large, the management is not 
complex, and the monitoring system from the authorities, donors and people is good, and the 
integrity of those in charge is reliable. This result is more encouraging than that from the 
metropolitan areas where CSOs in general do not promote the value of transparency in a substantial 
way in society. In terms of gender equity, it is observed that in the DPOs, the women are very active 
in seeking loans for their efforts of poverty reduction and organised themselves to support each 
other in the organization.  
 
DPOs as agent of poverty reduction governance 
DPOs have been recognized by local authorities as an actor in poverty reduction governance. 
Their roles mainly involve implementing the party-state’s policy. In some particular cases, they try 
to engage with some advocacy work but the impact is very limited. The impact of the DPOs is 
understood in two folds. First, it denotes how they can influence the policy implementation and 
formulation at the grassroots level and their capacity to hold accountable authorities and businesses 
operating in the locality. Second, it illustrates the DPOs’ responsiveness to social interests and 
needs, and the empowerment of citizens. As it is with most studies on civil society in Vietnam, it is 
quite difficult to trace the actual impact of these DPOs on the policy area, societal development and 
citizens’ empowerment. In the interviews, they confirm that their services effectively respond to the 
needs of the target group, ascertaining their social impact by satisfying the social interests in 
assisting the disadvantaged people. Their work has contributed a great deal to social concerns about 
this group of people, poverty reduction and other problems that the community is facing.  
Many of their members used to be very unconfident of themselves, even have the feelings of 
inferiority or marginalization, but they have assured and encouraged them, and awarded them when 
they’re doing well. We have been able to mobilize them to participate in our activities. They run 
activities very effectively and can narrow the gap in social awareness about their members’ capacity. 
Their organization is highly appreciated by the local authorities, the Fatherland Front and the people 
(V43).   
 
In practice, the DPOs have little influence over the government policies, planning and 
budgeting processes of other entities, including international donors. By and large, these DPOs have 
hardly been involved in policy advocacy or lobbying. They have made some efforts to raise voices 
about their problems and policies for them, for example, the medical insurance regime, subsidies, 
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conditions for loans, but received little substantive attention. Moreover, they don’t have sufficient 
access to information on the socio-economic development planning and major decisions for 
investment or policy implementation even though in such a place like Vinh Tu commune they are 
actively seeking legal documents regarding the policies and subsidies for them.  
 In such areas as holding state and private corporations accountable, the impact of DPOs in 
Quang Tri is almost nil or very low. These DPOs even do not consider themselves as partner or 
counterpart of any government agencies or MOs or the private sector. They conveyed a self-image 
of being in an asymmetrical position towards other entities. They are all dependent on state 
subsidies and permission for their activities. The DPOs of Cam An commune and Vinh Tu 
commune receive direct instructions on major activities from the People’s Committee of their 
respective commune. The DPO of Vinh Tu commune has been trying to knock on the door of 
businesses to ask for their donations to sponsor their activities to better the livelihood of their 
members with little successes.  
In terms of the environment for DPOs, i.e, the legal environment, political context, and social-
economic-cultural context, the boundary between the areas is often blurred. The frequent criticisms 
about this the existing legal documents are levelled at the registration conditions and management 
mindset. Obviously, all CSOs are required to be affiliated with various state-controlled bodies, 
either government agencies or MOs. The registration procedures for these CSOs are often 
dependent on personal relationship, unreasonably lengthy and even unresponsive.80
 
It is a significant 
obstacle to improving the agency of the CSOs like those in Cam An and Vinh Tu commune. The 
meaningful empowerment of the DPOs and its poor members is unlikely without substantive 
changes in the structural environment.   
The restrictive conditions for registration have the most significant effect on CSOs across 
both urban and rural area. The negative impact is confirmed in the case of the DPOs in Quang Tri 
province. For example, in Cam An commune, the interviewees indicated their difficulty in 
achieving an official legal status for the organization. As earlier discussed, both DPOs have 
nebulous legal standing and are managed directly by the People’s Committee of their respective 
commune. However, it is important to note that they feel the lack of an official legal standing does 
not affect their smooth relations with the authorities and other MOs as they are still entirely 
supported and recognized.  
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In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city, CSOs are complaining about the discrimination against them 
by the party-state in various ways: They are not treated on an equal footing as those government-
sponsored organizations (GONGOs) or MOs in terms of providing critical feedbacks on policies 
and access to information. However, in Quang Tri province, the CSOs tend to be more sympathetic 
with policies from the party-state and understand and accept the difficult situation of getting access 
to resources and assistance. They do not aim to be exercise some independent check on the 
government policies but rather aim to have more instructions and attention from the party-state 
agencies.  
It is also remarkable to note about the implementation of rights of persons with disabilities. 
Vietnam joined the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2007, promulgated the 
Law on persons with disabilities in 2010, Decree 28/2012/ND-CP to provide guidelines for 
implementing the Law, and Degree 14/2013/ND-CP to provide for legal aid for persons with 
disabilities. However, there have remain a number of major problems and discrimination against 
persons with disabilities concerning the right to work, access to legal aids and access to public 
services as pointed out by CSOs in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city.81 The DPOs in Cam An commune 
and Vinh Tu commune are vaguely aware of these discriminatory problems, thus they are more 
interested in claiming disabilities benefits rather than having some strategies or policy advocacy to 
overcome the problems. This is partly because they lack appropriate knowledge about different 
forms of discrimination and they are willing to accept the situation as it is.  
This case study has confirmed the dynamic space for the development of CSOs in Quang Tri 
province despite many structural constraints and nascent stage of civil society. The case study has 
examined five different dimensions of the two DPOs in Quang Tri, i.e. the civic engagement, the 
level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and the environment, in a further and 
more in-depth manner while comparing and contrasting with the current trend in Vietnam and in 
metropolitan areas of the country.  
The case study has highlighted both strengths and weaknesses, both challenges and 
opportunities for the CBOs in relation to poverty reduction governance. While the CSOs in Quang 
Tri continue to face many challenges in the immediate future due to the resilience of the political 
system and some dominant practices and discourses, the existing space for the development of 
CSOs is still encouraging and there is great potential. Like most CSOs across Vietnam, those in 
Quang Tri hold a positive outlook and strong enthusiasm about their organizations and their 
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contributions. They are passionate about organising themselves in a better way to promote and 
protect their interests. Given the current structural constraints of the system, they are developing 
their own values and their own ways to navigate throughout with different techniques and 
technologies in dealing with the party-state agencies for their goals and objectives to work out. On 
the one hand, the consensual partnership depends a great deal on personal clanship and connections 
that will become a problem for longeveity and sustainability over time when people from both side 
of the equation leave the organizations. On the other hand, while their strategies are still in a 
primitive form and dependent on structural ties with the way of learning by doing, they are growing 
more mature and making more substantive and faster adjustments to produce a more dynamic space 
for civil society activity. The DPOs in this case study have demonstrated that their local social 
networks and their strong egalitarian ideology have helped constrain the rent-seeking activities by 
local officials, thus reducing the sense of alienation and inequality. Local sociocultural processes 
also condition their social capital to deal with vulnerabilities to poverty.  
      
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the diverse and complex processes of civil society involving 
interactions and negotiations with power in the area of poverty reduction governance. My analysis 
appreciates both the potentials and limits of this kind of processes in overcoming structural 
constraints and bringing about changes to the existing mode of poverty reduction governance. 
Although the party-state has made large amount of investment in the rural development and poverty 
reduction programs, their outcomes have been uneven and ambiguous. Despite the widely praised 
achievements in poverty reduction at the national level, the party-state policies seem to push the 
poor and vulnerable communities to depend to a greater extent on the market forces and subsidies 
from the government, resulting in more salient social and economic inequalities and social 
injustices across the rural and mountainous areas. In this sense, the poor have been made powerless 
and more marginalized in the negotiation with power. This existing mode of poverty reduction 
governance has created a source of contestations and potential social unrest.  
In this context, the arrival of INGOs in working with CBOs, MOs and other types of civic 
organizations, as well as party-state institutions at different levels have contributed to the dynamics 
of poverty reduction governance. Understanding the dynamics of CBOS relationship with the party-
state at the grassroot level is important to make sense of civil society in Vietnam. Their role in the 
current context of development in Vietnam is significant in diversifying the approach and informing 
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about alternative s in poverty reduction. However, facing with the structural constraints imposed by 
the system to be non-political, the CBOs have limited ability or are mostly unwilling to engage in 
political debates and arenas. While they can generate some potential for transformative change in 
the power structure, they are not in a position to mobilize ideas and forces to challenge hegemonic 
ideas about how things should work in society. The case study provides a good illustration of how 
the CBOs in working partnership with the local government and CBOs are seeking the support from 
the existing system to find technical and managerial solutions to the poverty question. The best role 
they can play in the current context is to alleviate the suffering of the poor or improve their material 
conditions and lay the foundation for more transformative change in power relations.  
Civil society processes have begun to emerge in some particular regions where structural 
inequalities and social injustices have been exacerbated due to market integration and urban-biased 
government policies. These processes do not depend on the NGOs formally registered with the 
party-state but develop their own dynamics which are historically and culturally conditioned. They 
have the potential to bring together a great multiplicity of individuals, groups and organizations 
around a share collective identity or common interest to increase their negotiating power and 
challenge the existing power relations. While such processes have not been clearly made their 
presence felt on a substantial scale and level, they are on the rise to mount a more effective response 
to the current problems with poverty reduction governance. Civil society as a space of variations in 
collaboration and contestations across is the key to understanding changes in this area of 
governance.   
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Chapter 6 
Civil society and integrity reforms: Transforming norms and practices in 
combating corruption in Vietnam 
 
Corruption has long been identified as a serious threat to Vietnam’s national development and 
the very existence of the regime by the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). In the political 
discourse of the CPV leadership, corruption has been described as major threat to the survival of the 
regime. This was publicly recognized at the mid-term CPV Congress in January 1994. Formal 
commitments to fight corruption have been reiterated in various CPV’s resolutions, state laws and 
political leaders’ discourses.82 Beginning as party affair, anti-corruption has become a critical area 
of governance for the party-state. Various efforts by the party-state to build and strengthen the 
national integrity system have been put in place and broad engagement and cooperation with the 
international community through anti-corruption dialogues have been underway. However, 
corruption is still rampant and the post-Doi Moi period is accompanied with increased corruption 
(Gainsborough 2010: 50). In that context, civil society has emerged as a key pillar in the integrity 
system despite the continuing anathema by the party-state over the development of civil society. As 
a high level of corruption is an indicator of severe legitimacy problems for the regime (Holmes 
2007: 17), the party-state has been considering and implementing integrity-based reforms to tackle 
this issue. These reforms have opened up political space for civil society actors to influence the 
construction of new norms and practices in anti-corruption governance.  
In the absence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as an independent force that can 
mount outright challenges to corrupt practices by powerful party-state institutions and officials, 
non-state actors are increasingly circumvent and transcending the party-state as agents of integrity-
based reforms. Civil society processes and actions have sought to establish a moral high ground in 
anti-corruption governance. Despite inherent tension and contestation in these processes, the party-
state can no longer exclude or discount the role of civil society in this critical area of governance.  
This chapter will first outline the context of anti-corruption politics. It is followed by a discussion of 
integrity-based reforms that have been under way. The roles and participation of civil society actors 
will subsequently be critically examined. The paper will critically examine the integrity system and 
civil society processes and actions in influencing anti-corruption politics. The analysis of some 
recent high-profile cases in Vietnam will shed clearer light onto the contestations in civil society 
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over the anti-corruption politics and practice. This chapter draws from a wide range of sources 
including interviews, government documents, statistics, and media analysis.  
 
6.1 Background to anti-corruption politics in Vietnam 
The CPV has made formal commitments to fight corruption and showcased various efforts to 
build and strengthen the national integrity system since Doi Moi. The commitment has become an 
underpinning pillar for the anti-corruption strategy in the state apparatus in the years to follow. The 
political discourse of the threat posed by corruption has been transformed into legal rules and norms 
in combating corruption. Significant changes in the legal framework included more severe 
punishments for acts of corruption. It specifies the range of actions considered illegitimate and 
unlawful in relation to corruption. The amendments to the Criminal Code in 1992 introduced death 
penalty for some acts of corruption (Amendment to Article 225 on receiving bribes). One of the 
first high profile anti-corruption trials took place in January 1997 and Pham Huy Phuoc, Director of 
Tamexco, a state-owned company, was found guilty of embezzling about US$30 million and 
sentenced to death. The year 1997 was marked with the massive protests by peasants in Thai Binh 
province in which widespread corruption among local officials was a major cause (Tuong Lai 1997; 
Kerkvliet 2003: 47-49). Facing with the increasingly serious situation of corruption, Vietnam’s first 
anti-corruption legislation known as the 1998 Anti-Corruption Ordinance was adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly to strengthen regulative rules against corruption. 
The 1999 Criminal Code had a separate chapter (Chapter XXI, Part A) on corruption crimes and 
maintained the death penalty. With a legal framework on addressing corruption in place, the party-
state started to increasingly use the court to address corrupt practices of officials and party 
members. As argued by Gainsborough (2003: 69) this practice was new in the 1990s as the party 
traditionally used designated party institution (the Control Committee) to discipline wrong-doing 
party members.   
Along with legislative measures on anti-corruption, the party has intensified efforts to build 
the integrity system and the norms which set standards and/or expectations that govern and control 
the behavior of party members and public officials. A major milestone for these efforts was the 
second Resolution of the sixth plenum of the 8th Tenure Central Committee83 in 1999 on ‘some 
fundamental and urgent issues of party-building’ and the launch of an anti-corruption campaign 
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based on the traditional socialist tenet of criticism and self-criticism. Accordingly, a steering 
committee was established by the CPV Central Committee to fight corruption in party cells and 
members.84 Following this commitment, a number of high-ranking officials involving corruption 
had been disciplined. Ngo Xuan Loc, Deputy Prime Minister and a member of the CPV Central 
Committee was dismissed from office in December 1999. Two members of the CPV Central 
Committee holding senior positions in the state agencies were sacked in July 2002 and later 
imprisoned due to their involvement in a large-scale corruption case with a mafia boss Nam Cam.85
 
 
This steering committee played a critical role in addressing a number of high-profile cases between 
1999 and 2006 such as Nam Cam, PMU18, the trading of garment and textile export quotas at the 
Ministry of Trade, and the land grab case in Do Son (Hai Phong city). While the widely publicized 
anti-corruption trials demonstrate the commitment by the party-state, they are ‘equally an indicator 
of the pervasiveness of the problem’ (Dosch 2009: 379). The heavy media coverage of corruption 
also helps shaped the public perception of corruption in the country. The media plays a key role in 
the frontline of anti-corruption campaigns.  
In order to strengthen the integrity system across the state institutions, the 2005 Anti-
Corruption Law replacing the 1998 Ordinance formalized the establishment of a central anti-
corruption steering committee headed by the Prime Minister to coordinate national efforts. The 
implementation of this law should be seen in light of anti-corruption governance after the CPV 
National Congress in 2006. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung took office in June 2006 with a 
strong commitment to combat corruption. The 2005 anti-corruption law was amended in 2007, 
paving the way for consolidating the centralized authority of the Prime Minister in overseeing anti-
corruption governance (Article 73). In fact, while there were more centralized measures taken to 
tackle corruption, more tightening control had been applied to the press in reporting corruption. And 
despite a strong political commitment and centralized measures, the period following the 2006 Party 
Congress is notably marked with an increase in the scope for rent-seeking and political infighting 
between powerful interest groups (Vuving 2013). The worsening economic situation of Vietnam 
and his administration’s economic mismanagement since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 has 
cost the Prime Minister and his client-patron network certain political capital. Two large-scale 
corruption scandals were exposed at the two major state-owned conglomerates, i.e. Vinashin 
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 Ban Chi dao Trung uong VI (2) [The Central Steering Committee VI (2)] was established by the second Resolution of 
the sixth Plenum of the CPV Central Committee in February 1999 to deal with corruption among party members. It was 
dissolved in September 2006. 
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 The two members of the CPV Central Committee were Bui Quoc Huy, Lieutenant General, Deputy Minister of 
Public Security and Tran Mai Hanh, General Director of the Voice of Vietnam Radio. 
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(Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group) and Vinalines (Vietnam National Shipping Lines). Both 
were nearly bankrupt. Vinashin’s debt in 2010 totalled US$4 billion and Vinalines’ debts amounted 
to US$3 billion in 2012 due to embezzlement and mismanagement by the directors and chairmen 
who were appointed directly by the Prime Minister. In separate trials, Pham Thanh Binh, Chairman 
of Vinashin was sentenced to 20 years in prison and Duong Chi Dung, Chairman of Vinalines was 
sentenced to death.  
In face with widespread frustration about economic mismanagement and rampant corruption, 
the party-state decided to curtail the executive power from anti-corruption purview. The Resolution 
of the 4th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee Plenum in January 2012 set in motion another 
complex swerve for Vietnam’s anti-corruption politics. It reinstated the long-standing anti-
corruption measure of criticism and self-criticism as a means of political maneuvering. 
Subsequently, the 5th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee in May 2012 decided to establish the 
Central Anti-Corruption Steering Committee under the purview of the Politburo and the CPV 
General Secretary to be its head. It also decided to re-establish the Commission for Internal Affairs 
(Ban Noi chinh trung uong) as the permanent party institution designated for assisting the Central 
Anti-Corruption Steering Committee. The compliant National Assembly promptly adopted another 
amendment to the 2005 anti-corruption law in November 2012, abolishing the Prime Minister’s 
chairmanship over the central anti-corruption steering committee. As a result, anti-corruption 
governance has effectively been placed under the centralized power of the CPV Politburo.  These 
moves imply a re-emphasis on anti-corruption governance as fundamentally party affair. Setting up 
party institutions tasked with anti-corruption responsibilities and the appointment of Nguyen Ba 
Thanh, party secretary of Da Nang city, as the head of the Commission for Internal Affairs in 
December 2012 fueled speculation about internal completion inside the party and an countervailing 
force against Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s patron-client networks (Malesky 2014: 35). This 
also suggests that utilizing law to combat corruption was viewed by the party to have been 
inadequate.   
The constant changes in the key institution tasked with anti-corruption responsibilities and 
party-state leaders’ public acknowledgement of the unceasingly pervasive corruption send a 
message that the measures have not worked well so far. A major reason is that the rules and norms 
have failed to specify and maintain ‘strict boundaries between what belong to or should be 
protected by the state for the public good and what people in society, as individuals and groups, can 
use as their own’ (Kerkvliet 2003: 45). Furthermore, sanctions and punishment against violations of 
anticorruption rules and norms have not been well monitored and enforced. In the absence of the 
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rule of law,
86
 enforcement of anti-corruption sanctions is politically motivated. For example, when 
questioned in a televised session of the National Assembly in 2014 about the measures taken 
against the former Government Inspector General whose corrupt practices had been exposed by the 
media, the incumbent Government Inspector General replied that he did not have any answer 
because the person in question was under the purview of the Party Secretariat and investigation into 
this case by the Party Central Inspection Committee (Uy ban Kiem tra Trung uong) was still 
ongoing. The CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Chairman of the Central Anti-Corruption 
Steering Committee emphasized that combating corruption should give priority to maintenance of 
stability and unity in the party.  
It is noteworthy that anti-corruption politics in Vietnam tend to focus on big corruption cases 
involving high-ranking officials while corruption is rampant across all sectors like land 
administration, environmental governance, healthcare, education, policing, judiciary and entrenched 
in the system at all levels. Explaining the phenomenon of big corruption cases, Gainsborough 
(2003: 70) argues that they represent ‘an attempt by the political centre to discipline the lower levels 
of the party-state in a climate of increased decentralization.’ This argument seems to echo the point 
made by Vu Quang Viet (2006) about the decline in power by the political centre (the CPV 
Politburo) and the rise in local power due to decentralization since Doi Moi. While this might be 
true for some particularly anti-graft cases at the lower level of the party-state, it cannot account for 
many other cases with alleged connections to the top leadership. Vuving (2013) offers a different 
account of big corruption cases exposed, describing them as a consequence of political infighting 
between major factions in the rent-seeking party-state. This argument can find support from 
McKinley (2009)’s study which suggests a clear correlation between state-owned media coverage 
of corruption cases and politically important events.87 This account of anti-corruption politics 
echoes Khan (1998)’s thesis of patron-client networks built on incumbent elites’ political 
compromises in exchange for clients’ loyalty. According to this thesis, in combating corruption, it is 
highly likely that political masters are held hostage by their clients in the network. Nevertheless, in 
any account of the anti-corruption politics, significant changes in the way the party-state responded 
to corruption have emerged.   
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 The term “rule of law” is used here in two senses as suggested by Dicey (1959): (1) the idea of lawful constraint of 
authority; and (2) the idea of the right to equal individual subjection to the law  
87
 Politically significant events in Vietnam include the CPV National Congress, CPV Central Committee Plenum, 
National Assembly elections and meeting sessions.  
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The recent prominence of anti-corruption politics in Vietnam has generated more political 
space for reforms and participation from social actors. In their study of budget transparency and 
politics of accountability in Vietnam, Warren and Nguyen (2013) note a broadening and 
diversification of institutions under the parameter of the one-party state. This broadening of political 
space for anti-corruption governance has been made possible via integrity reforms and civil society 
processes in which the role of state institutions has dissipated and civil society action is on the rise. 
Before discussing the broadening of institutions and their changing roles, including civil society, it 
is necessary to turn to a discussion on the understanding of corruption in Vietnam. In the next 
section, I discuss the public perception of corruption through the TI survey and media analysis. I 
then examine integrity-based reforms to combat corruption. I use a section for discussing the role of 
civil society actors and their participation in this area of governance, focusing on the media, NGOs, 
CBOs and other non-state actors, and the social media. The case study of Do Son land grab 
illuminates the key point about the dynamic character and contestatory nature of civil society 
processes in anti-corruption governance.  
 
6.2 Perception of Corruption in Vietnam 
While corruption can have many forms and expressions, it has a clear connection to the 
misuse of authority or power. According Kerkvliet (2003: 45), corruption is ‘appropriating for the 
benefit of oneself or others in society that which is supposed to remain in the public domain or be 
used by state agencies in order to govern.’ For Transparency International (TI), corruption is ‘the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (CPI 2011). Gillespie (2001: 4-5) points out that legal 
norms in Vietnam formulate corruption as wrongdoing in the misuse of official power (predatory 
corruption) and public opinion tends to tolerate some official misbehaviors in receiving small bribes 
(petty/white corruption). Paradoxically, while corruption is a threat to the political regime’s 
legitimacy, it is ‘unavoidable part of maintaining political control’ (Khan 1998: 111). 
As it is highly difficult to measure the level of corruption, perception matters a great deal. 
There have been two main ways to capture the perception of corruption in Vietnam. The first 
measure is based on quantitative research to develop indices and the second is based on the analysis 
of the media, both mainstream and social media, which traces the frequency and dominance of 
corruption-related topics. TI has pioneered with the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which 
measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in a given country. According to TI’s CPI, 
Vietnam’s score has been consistently poor and has not been improved markedly over the years 
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(Table 7.1). Thus, Vietnam has never received a pass mark on the CPI. It demonstrates an 
increasingly widespread frustration from the public with corruption.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Vietnam’s corruption perception score in the Transparency International’s CPI over the 
period of 15 years (1997-2011). Scale: 0= highly corrupt; 10=extremely clean.  
Most surveys indicate that party-state anti-corruption efforts have been perceived as 
ineffective. For example, in a survey titled “Global Corruption Barometer 2010” commissioned by 
TI in Vietnam, 62% of the respondents said corruption had increased over the past three years. This 
raised an interesting puzzle about why the population’s confidence in corruption efforts has 
decreased over the years. This is very important because it will have direct implications for the 
perceived legitimacy of the CPV’s rule. While there is an argument that the Vietnamese media 
becomes more assertive in the fight against corruption (McKinley 2008), the mixed signals from the 
party-state over corruption reporting has complicated the role of media in this aspect. On the one 
hand, the CPV National Congress in 2006 urged the media to become more active in uncovering 
graft and the CPV Politburo called on the press to step up its anti-corruption reporting, increased 
censorship and discipline over corruption reporting occurred. In 2008, journalists who reported the 
PMU 18 corruption scandal88 suffered a serious blow. Two reporters were arrested and brought to 
court for charges of “intentional disclosure of state secrets” and seven others were heavily 
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 PMU 18 Scandal is named after a Project Management Unit No.18 at the Ministry of Transport which was charged 
with embezzlement of millions of dollars of public funds. This case is compared to the mother of all corruption scandals 
ever exposed before the CPV Congress in 2006 (Gainsborough 2007). 
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disciplined.89
 
The chief editors of Thanh Nien and Tuoi Tre, the two most influential newspapers in 
anti-corruption coverage, were dismissed from their positions in the same year. In 2010, the Editor-
in-Chief of Vietnamnet and two other journalists were disciplined after a report on Vietnamnet ran 
the headline that ‘Police ranks first in corruption’, carrying the results of a survey conducted by a 
consultancy company for TI.90 These are a few examples, among various cases, that suggest a limit 
on the capability of the media to report on corruption. Since the PMU 18 corruption scandals, the 
media seems to have uncovered less cases of corruption amid the rising prominence of a rent-
seeking party-state. While the media has been prominent in anti-corruption campaigns, it is far from 
fulfilling public expections in their roles of exposing corruption and offering forum for debates on 
fighting corruption. 
 
6.3 Integrity-based reforms to combat corruption 
Integrity-based reforms have been cautiously considered and implemented by the party-state 
in anti-corruption governance. Before discussing the reforms, it is important to understand the 
meanings of integrity. It is a concept that is as difficult to measure as corruption and the best 
possible way so far is to monitor perception. There have been various efforts to monitor perception 
of integrity, for example the Integrity Perception Index developed by the Korean Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) or the National Integrity System (NIS) developed by 
Transparency International (TI). According to TI, integrity is ‘the use of public power for officially 
endorsed and publicly justified purposes.’ In a democratic regime, the elected government and 
legislature set the officially endorsed uses of public power (Sampford 2005). However, in an 
authoritarian system, the use of public power is not always clearly set and it depends on substantive 
values. TI takes into account the substantive values in its definition of Integrity Systems. 
Accordingly, the Integrity Systems are ‘the institutions, laws, procedures, practices and attitudes 
that encourage and support integrity in the exercise of power in any given society’ and they 
functions to ‘ensure that power is exercised in a manner that is true to the values, purposes and 
duties for which that power is entrusted to, or held by, institutions and individual office-holders’ (TI 
2005). This concept was used in the country study report on Vietnam’s National Integrity System 
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 http://tuoitre.vn/Chinh-tri-Xa-hoi/257288/Hai-nha-bao-chuyen-viet-dau-tranh-chong-tham-nhung-bi-bat.html: 
accessed 31/8/2011. 
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 Vietnamnet reported a figure from the survey that a record high number (82%) of respondents said police is the most 
corrupt sector in Viet Nam. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2010/12/101217_vietnamnet_discipline.shtml: 
accessed: 31/8/2011). 
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commissioned by TI in 2006 to assess Vietnam’s holistic approach to combat corruption. The report 
provided a very broad picture of Vietnam’s NIS which covers a wide range of institutions from the 
Communist Party to civil society, private sector and the media. While this report can be a good 
entry point to understand the integrity system in Vietnam, it only provides a rough checklist of 
institutions with general description of their mandate and performance. 
While Doi Moi is usually referred to as market-based reforms in the economic sphere, 
integrity-based reforms have taken place across administrative, judicial, and legal spheres. These 
reforms are framed as “three-pronged attack” (Sampford et al. 2007: 1) on poor legislation, bad 
judicial practices, and complex administrative practices, or to put in another word, they aim at 
improving the public integrity. In this aspect, building the national integrity system has become a 
significant task for Vietnam’s party-state to bring about better governance in every aspect of 
society.  
The public administrative reform (PAR) is designed to tackle some of the root causes of 
corruption embedded in the size of bureaucracy, bureaucratic culture, complex and burdensome 
administrative procedures. It has been implemented on a gradualist basis since 1990s with a Public 
Administration Reform Master Plan promulgated every ten year since 2001. According to some 
neo-institutionalist theorists (Evans 1989), there is a high correlation between the level of official 
corruption and the size of bureaucracy in a country (with an exception of Sweden). The party-state 
has recognized that the administrative field is a fertile ground for corruption and has tried to reduce 
cumbersome and complex administrative practices that are conducive to corruption. The goal of the 
reform is to attain a ‘democratic, clean, strong, professional, modern and effective administration.’91 
It targets four key areas, i.e., institutional reform, administrative apparatus reform, public service 
and public servants reform, public finance reform. These reforms are to improve the integrity in the 
bureaucracy and its service. Particularly a measure to fight corruption by making public servants to 
declare their assets and income was adopted in the 1998 Anti-Corruption Ordinance and subsequent 
government decrees in 1998, 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2013. Accordingly, all state employees are 
required to declare assets worth more than VND50 million (around US$3300). The 2005 Anti-
Corruption Law also requires all state employees and their family members to declare their assets 
annually with a view to increase the transparency in government. However, until 2011, the 
declarations of assets and income by public officials were not made publicly available. As from 
2011, the declarations of assets and income can be made public but only at the office where the 
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 See Resolution No. 30c/NQ-CP dated 8/11/2011 promulgating the Master Plan on Adminstrative Reform between 
2011-2020.  
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respective public officials work. However, the competent authorities can decide whether to make 
public declarations of assets and income at a closed meeting or to post them on a notice board at the 
office. 
While there were high expectations on the measure of assets and income declaration to fight 
bureaucratic corruption, the results turn out to be disappointing. In a Government report presented 
by the Inspector General to the National Assembly, it was acknowledged that this measure has not 
been effective. Only one single case out of nearly a million asset declarations in 2013 was found 
inaccurate and the related official was disciplined.92
 
Indeed this sheer fact is indicative of serious 
problems in implementing and policing the government decree on assets declaration. It has been 
almost impossible for the inspection apparatus at all levels to detect the irregularities and 
inaccuracies in the asset declaration by public officials. Obviously a genuine political will is 
wanting in tackling this problem.   
Another significant aspect of administrative reform is the strong emphasis of ‘grassroots 
democracy’ in the aftermath of Thai Binh uprising in 1997. The Government promulgated a decree 
on grassroots democracy in 1998 and an additional one in 2003 and the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly adopted the Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy in 2007 to address the 
deficiencies in the 2003 Decree. Interestingly, the rhetoric employed by the party-state in the 
emphasis of grassroots democracy is ‘uncannily similar to the prescriptive analyses of “good 
governance” issued by the World Bank’ (London 2009: 391). It is hardly a coincidence that 
Vietnam’s economic performance had been promoted by the World Bank as a success story among 
developing countries before the 2008 global financial crisis. However, the transparency and 
accountability mechanisms for decision-making announced in the grassroots democracy law are 
‘rarely exercised’ (London 2009: 391).        
The judiciary and court-related institutions in Vietnam have been tasked with most important 
roles in conducting anti-corruption preventive and investigative activities. As commented by 
Sampford et al. 2007: 88), they are the provider of three types of public goods that are significant to 
anti-corruption governance: justice through protection of constitutional norms and monitoring of the 
law (litigation and investigation), effective frameworks for law protection through the improvement 
of judicial institutional capacity (facilitating reforms) and legal assistance to the ongoing general 
reform of state institutions (via expert advice and recommendations). Thus, reform in this section 
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 See http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-su/gan-mot-trieu-nguoi-ke-khai-tai-san-mot-nguoi-bi-ky-luat-3080427.html 
(accessed 20 September 2014). 
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has been considered crucial. The legal and judicial reforms are broadly outlined in Resolution 
No.48-NQ/TW on Legal System Development Strategy (LSDS) and Resolution No.49-NQ/TW on 
Judicial Reform Strategy issued by the CPV Politburo in 2005. The core of these reforms aims at 
addressing the problems of poor legislation and bad judiciary practices which are related to the 
integrity of the legal and judiciary institutions. The LSDS focuses on the improvements in the 
quality of laws and the availability of laws in the critical areas of governance as well as the capacity 
of legal institutions. Reforms in these fields have been implemented with a view to make the legal 
and judiciary institutions more responsive to the logic of transparency and accountability. A major 
step in this line was the legal norm set in the 2008 Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative 
Documents (the law on law-making) that requires any law drafting committee to seek comments 
and feedback from the people affected by the respective law. The incremental legal reform has been 
implemented in parallel with the judicial reform which focuses on the courts, the procuracy and the 
police.93 Part of the legal and judiciary reform aims at addressing the problems with integrity of the 
institutions and personnel in this sector where corrupt practices are common.  
The integrity-based reforms across the administrative, legal and judiciary spheres have 
significant meanings for anti-corruption governance. The party-state has allowed the opening of 
channels of communication with international donors via annual anti-corruption dialogues to 
discuss these issues. On the one hand, the outcomes of these reforms remain uncertain and 
ambiguous despite the heightened efforts and support from international donors. The continued 
poor score of Vietnam on international indices and independent reports has pointed to little impact 
of these reforms. On the other hand, the reforms have paved the way for a broadening of political 
space, both invited and newly created, for social actors to participate. Thus, the anti-corruption 
governance has become more dynamic and open to change.   
 
6.4 Civil Society and Anti-Corruption Politics  
Civil society plays a critically important role in the integrity system to tackle corruption. This 
role is widely recognized by the international community and promoted by international donors in 
Vietnam such as the World Bank, DFID, SIDA, and USAID although it is still circumvented in the 
official anti-corruption discourse. It is in civil society that a wide range of processes from 
consensual to conflictual approaches can be adopted to deal with corruption. In an opaque 
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 For a more detailed analysis of the legal and judiciary reform in Vietnam, see Nicholson & Pitt (2012). 
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environment of the rent-seeking party-state in collusion with predatory business interest, civil 
society embraces a promise of being potentially a countervailing force against the corrupt power. 
This point is resonated with Khan (1998)’s argument:  
If the pervasiveness of corruption is related to the types of contestation facing states, between and 
among capitalists and incumbent political elites, we need to examine the role of particular groups 
within civil society who generate this contestation in the first place and the possible effects of further 
attempts at strengthening ‘civil society.’ 
Civil society processes against corruption usually involve the activities to provide assistance 
for the development of accountability and transparency mechanisms, oversight public institutions, 
for the reform of state administrative institutions and the reform of social welfare systems, and for 
the making of public policy against corruption via the use of intellectual resources and critical 
knowledge. The main actors in these processes are the media, NGOs, informal groups, bloggers, the 
business sector and street protests. Given the context of Vietnam where the business sector is 
fraught with elitism and interest group manipulation (Gillespie 2008) and street protests are strictly 
banned, this paper focus on the media, NGOs, and bloggers.  
 
The media in anti-corruption 
Despite various constraints on the freedom of press and the control from the party-state via 
the censorship system, media reporting on corruption has played a number of roles. As the press in 
Vietnam is partially or wholly owned by the party-state institutions, they serve a political mission 
which includes uncovering corruption. The 1989 Press Law stipulates the role of the press in 
Vietnam as ‘the mouthpiece of party organizations, state bodies, and social organizations, and a 
forum for the people’ (Article 1). Thus, the press has been active in exposing corruption cases, 
monitoring and publicizing party-state’s anti-corruption efforts, and offering the public a forum for 
debate through which opinions can be shared and provided to relevant party-state institutions 
(McKinley 2009: 6-7). According to Transparency International and the Global Corruption 
Barometer (2010), the press in Vietnam is perceived as the second most trusted institution in the 
fight against corruption. The press has been able to make use of the invited and claimed space, 
albeit limited, to contribute to the dynamics of anti-corruption governance.  
The substantial and wide-ranging media coverage of corruption in Vietnam has generated 
social impact by influencing public opinion on the situation of corruption and generating increased 
pressures on the party-state for improved results in anti-corruption governance. One of the 
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dilemmas that the press faces is that it has to tread a careful line between reporting on corruption, 
and damaging the prestige of the party-state institutions and officials. Particularly coverage of high-
level corruption is more likely to receive greater censure and/or reprisal. In practice, the press is not 
always compliant with the party-state instructions. At times, it crosses the line and shapes the civil 
society action against particular cases of corruption beyond the party-state control. And when a 
particular media outlet/newspaper does take risk, it often has political patronage (McKinley 2008). 
A major difficulty that the press faces when reporting on corruption is the lack of access to 
information. The law on access to information has been overdue for too long although many drafts 
have been prepared and deliberated at the government meetings and National Assembly sessions. 
The vague regulatory framework on what kind of information the press can get and report creates a 
lot or risks for corruption reporting. Thus, the press has been ‘pushing the boundaries on what is 
acceptable in taking on their state-sanctioned anti-corruption role’ (Cain 2013: 18). The boundaries 
have become more blurred in the context of opaque environment of rent-seeking and political-
business interest collusion. The findings from McKinley (2009: 3)’s study on elements of state 
control constrain or abet the Vietnamese press’ ability to expose corruption suggests that:  
The problems associated with information access make it easy for political and business interests to 
manipulate the media, as the release of information by them may be linked to the settling of scores 
about which journalists are unaware. By publishing the information, reporters become unwitting ‘hit 
men,’ or pawns in a fight for power, and their coverage becomes necessarily biased. While clearly 
dangerous, this manipulation of the media by those in authority will, at the very least, ensure that 
someone is always willing to support the media’s work by providing information about corruption. 
Despite all problems it faces, the Vietnamese media remains at the forefront of the anti-
corruption governance. The desire by the party-state to enlist and direct the role of the media in the 
ani-corruption governance at times conflict with client-patron relationships and transgressed other 
more important party power relations and hierarchies.   
 
Non-state actors in anti-corruption 
The NGOs are increasingly, albeit slowly, making their presence felt in anti-corruption 
governance. While the NGOs are often portrayed as typical representative of civil society 
organizations, it is important to note that they are ‘by and large led by and ultimately serve the 
interests of the ubiquitous middle classes’ (Khan 1998: 10). The best known anti-corruption NGO 
in Vietnam is Towards Transparency, TI’s national contact. Besides, there are various NGOs 
working indirectly on anti-corruption via many issues related to transparency, accountability, and 
integrity. Although the trust in NGOs for anti-corruption remains low according to the Global 
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Corruption Barometer 2010, their continued efforts in the related fields have been important for 
educating the public and influencing policy and practices in anti-corruption governance. They often 
work closely with the media and mass organizations to make their contribution to reduce corrupt 
practices. In the absence of opposition politics, the mass organizations represented by the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front (VFF) are assigned the tasks of being at the people’s forefront of anti-corruption 
battle. Most legal documents on anti-corruption and grassroots democracy highlight this role of the 
VFF and are silent on the role of NGOs. Thus, the NGOs have been seeking partnership and 
cooperation with the mass organizations in improving aspects of the integrity system. They 
carefully choose the issues and themes to work on and deploy strategies to influence the discourse 
and policy-making process accordingly by engaging with key stakeholders in each campaign and 
forming strategic alliance along the issues/themes they want to influence changes. Examples of 
these active NGOs are Live and Learn Centre and the Institute for Study of Economy and 
Environment (iSEE) with the campaign ‘Toi tu te’ [I do the decent things] which aims to generate 
change in corrupt practices throughout the society. The NGOs also use official channels or the 
invited space to promote integrity against corruption. A notable example is the Vietnam Anti-
Corruption Initiative (VACI) program organized by the World Bank in coordination with the 
Government Inspectorate between 2011-2014 with a view to awarding small grants for projects that 
help to reduce the prevalence of corruption at any level. Many NGOs and informal groups have 
received VACI grants for their projects to strengthen public integrity and transparency. One of the 
VACI awarded projects was the website toidihoilo.com [I paid a bribe] initiated by a group of 
innovative citizens to encourage people to disclose information about bribes and corrupt practices 
that they have encountered.   
A new phenomenon in anti-corruption governance is the recent emergence of various loosely 
organized non-state actors. These are informal groups or networks of people who have become so 
frustrated with the rampant corruption that they want to act collectively in response to either a 
particular case or the general problem of corruption. These actors adopt more confrontational 
approach and their processes of claiming the political space have generated contestations and 
challenges to the party-state at both local and national levels in addressing the corrupt practices of 
the latter’s agencies and cadres. The sign of banners and slogan shouting at demonstrations against 
land grab corruption cases have recently become more common throughout the country. They are 
forming the kind of protest politics which is unprecedented in Vietnam. While in most cases these 
groups of people are marginalized and repressed, the processes can finally reach successful 
outcomes in some particular cases. The success of the informal groups of petitioners in Do Son land 
grab corruption case (2004-2007) in Hai Phong city was attributable to their high level of 
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organization, influential alliance-building and and sustained pressures on the government bodies to 
bring the case to light. A group led by Le Hien Duc, the 2007 TI Integrity Award winning citizen, 
has been active in serving as a connecting point for corruption denunciations and coordinating 
efforts to help the victims of corrupt officials [Hiep hoi Dan oan Viet Nam].  
The bloggers and social media are the newest social force that is critically pushing the limits 
of anti-corruption governance in Vietnam. The scope of agency exercised by this social force has 
been enlarged in most part due to its independence from the party-state control. The blogosphere 
has increasingly established itself as the most sought source for different perspectives and in-depth 
analysis of corruption cases and anti-corruption politics in Vietnam. Its more informed analysis has 
increased the influence on public opinion and pressure on the party-state. A number of critical 
political blogs have been identified as threats to the party-state such as Quan lam bao, Dan lam bao, 
and Basam. Several bloggers like Truong Duy Nhat and Pham Viet Dao were arrested and jailed for 
crossing the line in amplifying public frustration about official corruption. 
These types of civil society actors mentioned above usually operate separately in anti-
corruption governance as they have different ranges of distance and relations from the party-state. 
On some particular cases of corruption where they share the sphere of influence and echo each other 
in protecting the victims and denouncing the corrupt officials, the power of the civil society actions 
is multiplied to an extent that the party-state cannot discount. As the party-state has so far failed to 
provide an effective response with strategic and integrative approaches to corruption, contestatory 
claims and processes in civil society have been on the rise recently. The case in point is an illegal 
land eviction that ended in violence in Tien Lang district of Hai Phong province in January 2012 
which ‘released a torrent of popular grievances over corruption in local police departments’ (Cain 
2013: 2). The Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was reported to appreciate the role of the press in 
exposing the wrongdoings and corrupt practices of local authorities in the high-profile land eviction 
in Tien Lang. The joined voice by various quarters of the media, both traditional and social media 
that sided with the farmers who fell victims to the wrongdoings of local officials had riveted the 
whole country. The case exposes both latitude and depth of many problems with the administration, 
legal and judiciary system in the country. Civil society action against corrupt officials and in 
support of the victims who even had committed violent resistance had generated phenomenal 
pressure on the party-state beyond the case in point.  
In the case study below, more detailed analysis of the civil society processes in anti-
corruption governance will be presented. The Do Son land grab corruption case is pertinent to this 
discussion as it suggests how civil society processes were playing out in the ant-corruption 
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governance. In this case, informal and unorganized networks of activism had emerged and were 
operating outside of the party-state. They engaged in contestations and challenges against the 
corrupt norms and practices in the opaque dealings among local officials.  At first, they suffered 
serious persecution and clampdowns from some corrupt elements of the party-state at local levels. 
Later, they had been gradually been tolerated and endorsed by the party-state to fill in the gap in 
anti-corruption governance. The party-state had tried to appease the popular discontent by 
punishing errant officials and maintain its control of the higher ground in the governance area 
critical to its political legitimacy. The battle of values and norms throughout civil society processes 
have contributed to shaping and reshaping power relations in this case.    
 
6.5 Case study: Do Son land grab corruption scandal 
Do Son is a town in Hai Phong city that is famous for beach resorts in the North of Vietnam. 
The corruption scandal regarding the land grab in this resort town shook the whole government of 
the town and Hai Phong city. While this case was typical of land grab in the post-reform Vietnam, it 
was a rare case that civil society processes emerged strongly in protest against the entrenched 
corrupt practices by local officials in land grab and in a successful struggle for justice.    
 
Origin and development of the case 
In 2001, Hai Phong city government authorized the construction and enlargement of the road 
353 Cau Rao - Do Son. With a view to site clearance for the enlarged road, Do Son authorities 
prepared and set up a residential resettlement development project in Van Son and Van Huong 
wards. The resettlement area of 10301m
2
 was designated for 113 households affected by the new 
road construction. Do Son authorities arbitrarily decided that 25% of the land plots from the 
infrastructure development project would be provided to party and government officials of Do Son 
town, 10% to higher level leaders (as gifts), 10% to revolutionary veterans and only 55% to local 
people affected by the project. However, it was revealed later that the actual percentage of land 
plots for local people was only 25%.94 The party committee of Do Son town issued notices to 
provide privileges and priorities to their relatives and other officials to receive the land plots. 33 
households who were granted this special right were identified as related to the party-state officials 
                                                          
94
 Dinh Dinh Phu, the whistleblower in the case, revealed this figure at the land corruption roundtable in Hanoi in 
November 2010. 
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in Do Son and could have not been entitled to such privileges under the official policy of the state 
on land allocation in this type of project.
95
 The decision by Do Son authorities received explicit 
agreement by officials at the higher level in Hai Phong city. Chu Minh Tuan, Director of Hai Phong 
city Department of Resources and Environment and Vu Chi Thanh, Vice Chairman of Hai Phong 
city People’s Committee were involved in the decision.   
The people in Van Son and Van Huong wards of Do Son town expressed grave discontent 
with the decision by Do Son party committee and government. They made a lot of efforts in 
submitting petitions and denunciations of the corruption to the Hai Phong city government and 
central government despite many tactics employed by the local government to hinder their efforts. 
That was a zero-sum game struggle to protect people’s rights and benefits. Between 2002 and 2004, 
a number of Communist Party members and retired officials in Van Huong and Van Son wards had 
criticized the decision and raised the issue against Do Son local government. Leaders of the local 
government not only ignored them but also persecuted the whistleblowers and expelled them from 
the Party. For example Mr. Hoang Dinh Tien, a citizen in Van Son ward, has been a Party member 
for 55 years. He wrote a petition to the Hai Phong city government and the central government to 
denunciate Do Son local government for violations of the law. This person was heavily persecuted 
and insulted by the local government. Consequently, he got a stroke and must be hospitalized. He 
was among many victims of the persecution when trying to expose corruption committed by the 
local government.  
 
Popular anti-corruption movement 
Dinh Dinh Phu, a retired colonel, emerged as a leading whistleblower in the anti-corruption 
movement in Van Huong ward. He visited the office of the local government for three times to ask 
them to correct their mistakes but they refused to talk with him. Vu Duc Van, Party Secretary of Do 
Son town even ridiculed the efforts by the whistleblowers: ‘Let the dogs bark, and we still go our 
own way!’96 
                                                          
95
 Details about this project are compiled from different media sources and local government decisions. See 
http://www.tienphong.vn/Phap-Luat/nhung-dieu-chua-biet-ve-vunbspan-dat-do-son-87244.tpo (accessed 20 September 
2014). 
96
 See the report by Dinh Dinh Phu at the land corruption roundtable in Hanoi in November 2010. 
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Dinh Dinh Phu had been skillfully used the rights language based on the democratic norms in 
the 1992 Constitution of Socialist Republic of Vietnam to fight against corrupt officials and the 
malfeasance. He and a pioneering group of people in the anti-corruption movement against Do Son 
authorities had conducted various activities of education, information and communication to help 
raise people’s awareness and get them involved in the fight against corruption by legal means. 
Particularly, they could mobilize the participation of decent party members in the fight against 
corruption with a view to protecting the prestige and dignity of the Party. That made their informal 
networks more powerful. People across Do Son sent their land related papers and disclosed 
information about the bad practices to him for reference and preparation of denunciations. They 
also managed to involve the participation of the local and central media in the fight to increase 
pressure on the corrupt officials and isolate them. As Dinh Dinh Phu put it:  
This is knowledge-based struggle between the people and those who take advantage of their position 
to make corruption. This is also a fight between land broker, land receiver and their families. The 
powerful authority in collaboration with opportunists puts a huge pressure on decent ordinary people 
who struggle to protect their rights. 
In response the anti-corruption struggle by the people, the local authorities in Do Son town 
employed various tactics to deal with the situation. They even established a task-force group under 
the the party committee of Do Son town responsible for prohibiting photocopy shops from printing 
anti-corruption dissemination leaflets, broadcasting on local radio stations reports that slander 
corruption whistleblowers, preventing the press’s participation. The party committee of Do Son 
town threatened to expel involved Party members and took advantage of mass organizations to 
denounce of corruption fighters. They employed other tactics of psychological warfare to increase 
counter-pressure on the whistleblowers. More dangerously, some gangsters groups were hired to 
threaten and insult the whistleblowers and monitored their daily activity, threaten their children and 
persuade the children to stop their parents from pursuing the anti-corruption acts. 
The anti-corruption movement by the people formed a firm front against the crackdown by 
the local government. They held a meeting to denounce the slandering of local government and the 
meeting was concluded with the signatures of 8 representatives from mass organizations and a 
meeting minute. Many other people in surrounding areas also provided them with support in various 
ways like volunteering to drive the whistleblowers to the places they needed to visit by taxi or by 
motorcycles with minimum costs. The coach drivers between Hanoi and Do Son town also 
volunteered to deliver the newspapers. In face with gangsters’ threat and the failure of the police to 
protect the whistleblowers, the people organized themselves. Whenever the gangsters grouped to 
blackmail the whistleblowers, people around gathered in large crowd to support the latter. For 
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example, on one occasion of gangsters’ blackmailing at Dinh Dinh Phu’s house, 20 motobikes 
carrying 60 people from the nearby Kien An district appeared with gifts and flowers holding high 
the banner “Dinh Dinh Phu – a hero of peace time”, outnumbering the gangsters and forcing them 
to run away as people in the neighbourhood came in to protect his family.  
The anti-corruption movement in Do Son received a lot of support from people not only from 
surrounding areas but also from across the country, both in cash and in kind. Letters of greetings 
and encouragement were received from Ca Mau, Ho Chi Minh city, Dong Nai, Vung Tau, Khanh 
Hoa, Da Nang, Phu Tho, and Quang Ninh. Students and youth across the country also expressed 
their admiration to the whistleblowers for their courage and inspiration to fight for justice. In 2005, 
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai praised Dinh Dinh Phu as a courageous citizen who denounced the 
malfeasance of local party officials and ordered strict disciplinary measures agains the local 
authorities.
97
 Do Trong Ngoan, Deputy of the National Assembly in Bac Giang province visited the 
whistleblowers and praised them ‘you are the one who rings the first toll to awake people in a fight 
for corruption.’98 Mr. Le Quoc Than, a revolutionary veteran, Former Vice Minister of Public 
Security also made a visit to Do Son, commenting ‘you voluntarily serve as a bomb to explode the 
corruption system, deserving as a police of people of Vietnam.’99 Senior Lieutenant General Le The 
Tiem, a member of the Party Central Committee and Vice Minister of Public Security said in an 
interview about Dinh Dinh Phu that ‘he deserves the title of hero with his contribution.’100 As the 
anti-corruption front was consolidated, the corrupt officials and their associates and relatives were 
gradually isolated by the people in their daily life. Some of them were even met with shouting and 
severe criticisms by the people when they did shopping at the market.  
 
Trials and Final Outcome 
The case was brought to court for a first-instance hearing by the People’s Court of Hai Phong 
city on 28 August 2006. The three accused were Vu Duc Van, Party Secretary of Do Son town, 
                                                          
97
 See details in the Document No.55/TB-VPCP dated 24/3/2005 by the Office of the Government. 
98
 See the report at http://www.tienphong.vn/xa-hoi/mien-nhiemnbspchu-tich-pho-chu-tich-thi-xa-do-son-15071.tpo 
(accessed 12 October 2013). 
99
 Speech by Mr. Dinh Dinh Phu at the Roundtable “Increasing transparency in land administration in Vietnam” 
organized by the Embassy of Sweden in Hanoi, 18 November 2010. 
100
 See his comment in a reported by Sai Gon Giai Phong online newspaper dated 17 September 2008, available at 
http://www.sggp.org.vn/chinhtri/2008/9/165424/ (accessed 12 October 2013). 
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Hoang Anh Hung, Chairman of People’s Committee of Do Son town, and Luu Kim Thai, Vice 
Chairman of People’s Committee of Do Son town. Before the hearing, the Hai Phong city People’s 
Court had to report the case to the Party Committee of Hai Phong city for direction as all the 
accused were officials managed by the Party Committee. Nguyen Van Thuan, Party Secretary of 
Hai Phong city specifically directed the Court to issue rulings of light punishments and the 
Procuracy not to prosecute Chu Minh Tuan, Director of Department of Resources and Environment 
of Hai Phong city, and the city government to ask for favour from the prosecuting agencies at the 
central level in considering punishments to the accused. In implementing the instruction by the 
Party Committee, the People’s Committee of Hai Phong city sent requests to the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy and the Investigative Police of the Ministry of Public Security for similar purpose. The 
two official letters (Cong van) were signed by Nguyen Van Thanh, Vice Chairman of the People’s 
Committee of Hai Phong city.101 As a result of such interventions by Hai Phong city government 
and Party Committee in the case, the court did not deliver any sentence of imprisonment for the 
accused but instead issued some warnings and criticisms about their responsibilities only. Chu Minh 
Tuan, was also acquitted of any criminal offence in the case. However, the media and the public 
opinion expressed vehement opposition to the ruling by the court.  
In response to the public opinion on the court’s rulings, the newly elected Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung requested the Chief Justice of the People’s Supreme Court and the President of 
the Supreme People’s Procuracy to review the case and to direct an appeal hearing in order to 
ensure justice. The Prime Minister also requested competent authorities to conduct investigation 
and clarify the responsibilities of related officials and state bodies in the wrongdoings. The outcome 
should be made publicly available to appease the public discontent. Subsequent, on 14 September 
2006, the Supreme People’s Procuracy issued an official protest against the rulings by Hai Phong 
city court in the Do Son case, pointing out many violations and unlawful judgments. Deputy Prime 
Minister Truong Vinh Trong instructed Hai Phong city government to review their responsibility in 
their interventions in the court’s rulings. The appellate court issued a ruling on 10 October 2006 that 
the first-instance court rulings were annulled and the case was returned to the investigating and 
prosecuting agencies for a new litigation process. In June 2007, the second first-instance court 
convened a hearing for Do Son case and delivered new verdicts with more harsh punishment. 
Accordingly, Chu Minh Tuan and Vu Duc Van were sentenced to seven years of imprisonment and 
six other accused received sentences of 3-6 years in prison. In response to the appeal by the accused 
                                                          
101
 Nguyen Van Thanh later became the Chairman of Hai Phong city in December 2009, Party Secretary of Hai Phong 
city in December 2010 and a member of the CPV Central Committee in January 2011. 
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to the (second) first-instance court rulings, another appellate court conducted a hearing in 
September 2007 and decided to keep the rulings by the first instance court.
102
  
In sum, the anti-corruption movement in Do So town of Hai Phong city has formed different 
types of contestations via the battle of arguments, the battle of nerve, and battle of forces between 
the people and local authorities in Hai Phong during the period of 2004-2007. The ruling by the 
appellate court in September 2007 was a symbolic victory for the whistle-blowers and their anti-
corruption movement. The victory over corrupt officials inspired the anti-corruption movements at 
the grassroots levels, notably in Vinh Phuc and Thai Binh province. Counter-hegemonic 
manoeuvres are initiated not only in discourse but also in action that can engage in direct challenge 
against the discretionary power by the party officials. The extent to which counter-hegemonic 
formulations can take root and develop to influence the outcome of particular corruption cases 
depends on the kind of combination of political connections between different sections of civil 
society and the party-state. At a certain level, the case echoes Heng (2004)’s argument that the close 
connections to, rather than the independence from, the party-state is the key to certain effective 
forms of influence on the party-state’s behaviours. At a deeper level, it suggests that when civil 
society actors adopts relevant strategies to cope with structural constraints of which they are 
conscious, they can expose and exploit the dysfunctionality of the party-state structures to achieve 
their contingent goals. In acting strategically, civil society actors can modify the effects of the 
party-state structures.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at the perception of corruption and some of key integrity-based 
reforms to combat corruption in Vietnam. I then examine the interaction between civil society and 
the party-state in this area of governance. The case study of Do Son land grab is illuminative of the 
counter-hegemonic formulations in civil society amid the eroding confidence by the public in the 
party-state’s capacity to rectify itself in order to fight corruption. Anti-corruption governance has 
become truly a test of legitimacy claim for the party-state and civil society has demonstrated more 
overt and contestatory expressions. 
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 See details at http://www.dangcongsan.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=30106&cn_id=15467 
(accessed 23 October 2013). 
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This chapter contends that anti-corruption governance becomes a critical site of contestations 
and challenge and civil society has an important role to play. It suggests that civil society processes 
have a power of transformative potential to influence changes in anti-corruption governance. In 
Vietnam, corruption has long been considered as a serious threat to both the national development 
and the very survival of the regime. Various corrupt practices have been identified and tackled by 
party-state agencies through reforms, notably legal and judiciary reforms. Various efforts by the 
party-state to efforts to build and strengthen the national integrity system have been put in place and 
broad engagement and cooperation with the international community through anti-corruption 
dialogues have been underway. However, corruption is still rampant. In that context, civil society 
has emerged as a key pillar in the integrity system despite the continuing anathema by the party-
state over the development of civil society. In the absence of non-governmental organizations that 
can mount outright challenges to corrupt practices by powerful party-state institutions and officials, 
civil society processes generated by citizen’s activism, NGOs, the media and the blogosphere have 
become significant in broadening the political space in anti-corruption governance. Civil society has 
become a substantial force to establish a moral high ground in anti-corruption governance. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis provides an account of civil society in Vietnam as processes rather than outcomes 
or a collection of actors who are non-state and/or hybrid (NGOs, CBOs, MOs, GONGOs). It 
provides a study of the actors and their activities in civil society but locates them in the context and 
space in which they are formed and in which their interactions with each other and the party state 
take place. Civil society processes take place at all levels of state-society relations, bringing 
together a multiplicity of individuals and organizations around a shared collective identity and 
common interests. In doing so, civil society provides more effective responses to governance 
problems and question of social change. Civil society processes have become viable, engaged and 
contemporary in an authoritarian regim. Furthermore, civil society has embraced a more overt, 
vocal and contentious nature over the past ten years or so.  
Civil society processes take place amid the interplay of various factors ranging from market 
forces, the party-state system and policies, institutional and regulatory frameworks and local 
sociocultural dynamics. In this sense, the thesis contributes to an understanding of civil society as a 
dynamic space embracing agency for change. The current literature places emphasis on the 
structural constraints and the consensual formulations in civil society to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the party-state either by increasing social capital or supporting authoritarian values. The thesis 
highlights the contestatory expressions and counter-hegemonic maneovres in civil society as drivers 
of conflict in Vietnam. 
Recent political, social and economic circumstances in Vietnam have inspired renewed 
interest in the development of civil society. A political vibrancy has developed that is potentially 
capable of navigating the repressive structural constraints and hegemonic power of the party-state. 
The development of civil society is now coming to the fore of Vietnam’s politics. Civil society has 
become a space for counter-hegemonic discourse and manoeuvres pioneered by organic 
intellectuals who attempt to mobilize support. In the key areas of governance, civil society emerges 
with an appealing claim to legitimacy that can be tolerated and endorsed at a certain degree by the 
party-state. Civil society actions have emerged critically around outstanding cases and then tended 
to diminish, raising questions about its capability to sustain the momentum gathered. Although the 
cases might have been presented separately for analytical purposes, there are common themes 
playing out and cross-cutting the debate about civil society since the very first civil society action. 
This thesis makes a contribution to the methodology of studying civil society. It demonstrates 
that the impact of party-state structures across various crucial areas like law, poverty reduction, 
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environment, anti-corruption governance, depends on the extent that civil society actors recognize 
and purposefully choose to be influenced by these structures. This explains different outcomes of 
civil society actions and processes in different areas of governance and particular cases as well as 
different strategies adoped by civil society actors. The DPOs in Chapter Five and NGOs in the 
environmental protection tax law case of Chapter Four illustratehow civil society actors 
purposefully choose to act within the parameters of the structural constraints in order to explore 
opportunities and realize their interests. However, civil society actors in the Vedan case (Chapter 
Four) and Do Son case (Chapter Six) took on more contentious characters and adopted strategies to 
test and push the boundary of the structural constraints. By acting in a strategic and conscious 
manner, civil society actors were able to change the effects of the structural constraints imposed 
upon them and the context in which they operated.   
 
Power in civil society 
Power has been increasingly contested throughout civil society. In the context and space of 
civil society, ideas emerge about the values of governance, democratic freedoms, transparency, 
accountability, and meaningful participation. These critical issues in governance continue to be 
highlighted throughout different areas and times, revealing increasingly complex aspects of 
struggles of ideas and values in state-civil society relations. These struggles serve as fundamental 
platforms for changing dynamics of governance in Vietnam. The social and political change or 
resistance to change is now closely linked with questions about the fragility and/or resilience of the 
CPV rule. Given the ultimate purpose of the CPV remains the monopoly of power in the absence of 
effective and convincing ideological responses to critical governance questions, the party-state has 
to accept changes which implicate both a co-optation strategy and a Gramscian concession to 
counter-hegemonic discourse in civil society, in order to maintain its existing hegemony. Lacking 
effective ideational responses, the CPV has developed a syncretism strategy to cope with 
contestations and challenges over ideas, values and norms raised by civil society based on critical 
knowledge. However, the CPV faces another challenge emerging from shifting patterns at its power 
base. The middle class and the rise of powerful interest groups are forces that potentially bring 
about a radical change to the way the CPV continues its ideological and political hegemony. These 
issues in governance are important for future research to make sense of the trends going forward in 
Vietnamese politics.  
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The case studies findings demonstrate how each public sphere has emerged out of civil 
society processes in a respective area of governance: environment, poverty reduction, and anti-
corruption. Counter-hegemonic maneourvres in the form of communicative actions and discourses 
are present in civil society across the public spheres of regulatory framework, environmental 
governance, poverty reduction, and anti-corruption politics are enlarging the political space for 
plural interests and identity claims to find expression. These themes are inter-related and interactive 
and run through key areas of governance in contemporary Vietnam. Civil society processes across 
these areas of governance demonstrate the party-state could no longer portray a simplistic image of 
broad social consensus over governance issues. At the same time, the party-state maintained wishful 
thinking for a public spectacle of ideological stability and harmonious integration by coercive 
strategies. The party-state leaders found themselves struggling to manage the diverse and strident 
calls for change and to accommodate wider political participation from emerging players.  
Across these areas of governance, civil society processes demonstrate how meanings and 
power relations are not as fixed as assumed in the dominant orthodox narrative, but are changing 
because they are constantly constructed, reconstructed and deconstructed by the representatives of 
different societal interest groups. While civil society can find expressions in cooperative and even 
compliant activities of the non-state or hybrid actors, it can also find the potentials of overt 
contestations and challenges. They come in various forms of defiance to rules and norms both 
codified in the existing governance system and constitutive of the view and practices of the party-
state. The very robustness of the processes suggests that it might be impossible now to annul civil 
society as the party-state once did in the past.       
Another contribution of the thesis to civil society literature in Vietnam is the extrapolation of 
a new character of civil society in Vietnam. I argue that dialogues, debates and clashes in civil 
society embrace a new level of visibility, scope and intensity. It is now the overt and contestatory 
character of civil society that features most prominently. This character distinguishes itself from the 
existing literature’s presentation of civil society in a character of quiet and peacemeal resistance 
besides consensual formulations. What makes the study of civil society in Vietnam so interesting 
are the dynamics of the discourses and practices involved, which show how conflict is openly 
driving significant change in public thinking about foundational political principles. Contestations 
and conflict accumulated since Doi Moi have been raised to such a level and scope that it has 
become extremely difficult for fixed dominant orthodox narratives to maintain hegemonic, without 
recognizing differences and co-opting new elements. This key point gives rise to a key theme 
emerging from the thesis related to the hegemony of the party-state. 
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Implications for the party-state’s hegemony 
The party-state is now struggling to maintain hegemony by ideational coercion or propaganda 
strategies. The establishment has been compelled to employ concessions to produce consent across 
the wide spectrum of discourses and embrace new instrumental rationalities to legitimize their 
identity claims. Inevitably, elite interest groups are making efforts to accommodate the diverse 
interests of other society groups and calls for broader political participation. However, the tacit 
recognition of plural interests and identities by the party-state has not resulted in a long-awaited 
democratic transition or a shift to a pluralist political system; they have only brought about changes 
with ambiguous implications for democratization. What is more certain is that the gradualism and 
syncretism embedded in Vietnamese civil society are giving way to more publicly conflictual 
drivers of change in this country’s political system. This is a significant area for future study.  
The party-state is in some ways harnessing civil society – both indigenious and international – 
to help manage the complex problems of post-Doi Moi governance. In the environmental sphere, it 
engages civil society as a complementary source of governance to tackle both old and new 
environmental problems. In the poverty reduction field, the party-state employs and supports CBOs 
in alleviating poverty to bolster its claim for performance-based legitimacy. Similarly, in the anti-
corruption area, the party-state has to expand the governance space to civil society given its 
incapability of rectifying itself. As corruption is in nature a matter of misused power and power in 
Vietnam is monopolized by the CPV, the entire problem could have been controlled and resolved 
by the CPV itself alone. The dilemma that the party-state faces is that in expanding the “invited 
space” to different actors, it has to deal with more complex tasks of governance and has to 
reconfigure its mode of governance. This marks a phenomenonal change compared to the earlier 
years after Doi Moi. In the years between 1990s and early 2000s, civil society was described as 
being nascent, broadly homogenous, and adopted a markedly consensual approach to the party-
state. While the thesis has analyzed the causes, consequences and implications of these changes for 
the regime’s legitimacy and durability, it has also examined the potential scope for civil society to 
develop and empower itself. This is becase the party-state has to accommodate expanding social 
demands and civil participation while it has to regain and maintain high economic growth coupled 
with macroeconomic stability. This task of governance is a major structural and political challenge 
for Vietnam’s party-state.  
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    In studying civil society and governance in Vietnam, the thesis makes a contribution to the 
debate about responsive/smart authoritarianism and democratization in Southeast Asia and China. 
Through empirical findings, the thesis demonstrates a remarkable evolution in authoritarian 
responses to social demands through state interaction with civil society. The party-state responds to 
popular demands for political participation with a sophisticated strategy combining tolerance and 
repression. However, the level of responsiveness and persuasion is declining due to the structural 
problems with the party-state hierarchy as can be seen in the cases of Constitutional reform, Vedan, 
and the Do Son land grab. That the party-state hierarchy has become less responsive and more 
defensive is a major structural challenge for the party-state to maintain its hegemonic stability. The 
emergence of counter-hegemonic manoeuvres and discourses in civil society has become a critical 
factor determining the extent to which the party-state can retain its authoritarian rule and resist 
democratization. The study of civil society and governance in Vietnam adds to the body of 
knowledge on the change and evolution of authoritarian polities in Southeast Asia and China. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Fieldwork interviews in Vietnam 
 
Code # Organization Date Location of 
Interview 
Language 
V1 NGO/Vietnamese 29/7/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V2 Academic/Vietnamese 29/7/2012 Ha Long Vietnamese 
V3 National Assembly staff 29/7/2012 Ha Long Vietnamese 
V4 Vietnam Fatherland Front 02/8/2012 Vung Tau Vietnamese 
V5 Lawyer/Vietnamese 02/8/2012 Vung Tau Vietnamese 
V6 Academic/Vietnamese 06/8/2012 Ho Chi Minh city Vietnamese 
V7 Local government 07/8/2012 Quang Ngai Vietnamese 
V8 Local government 08/8/2012 Quang Ngai Vietnamese 
V9 Local government 08/8/2012 Quang Ngai Vietnamese 
V10 NGO/ International 08/8/2012 Quang Ngai Vietnamese 
V11 NGO/International 09/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V12 Local government 09/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V13 NGO/ International 10/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V14 GONGO/Vietnamese 10/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V15 NGO/ International 10/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V16 NGO/ International 10/8/2012 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V17 NGO/Vietnamese 13/8/2012 Hue Vietnamese 
V18 NGO/Vietnamese 13/8/2012 Hue Vietnamese 
V19 NGO/Vietnamese 13/8/2012 Hue Vietnamese 
V20 NGO/Vietnamese 13/8/2012 Hue Vietnamese 
V21 Academic/Vietnamese 14/8/2012 Ho Chi Minh city Vietnamese 
V22 NGO/Vietnamese 14/8/2012 Ho Chi Minh city English 
V23 Lawyer/Vietnamese 15/8/2012 Ho Chi Minh city Vietnamese 
V24 Vietnam Fatherland Front 15/8/2012 Ho Chi Minh city Vietnamese 
V25 NGO/ International 16/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V26 GONGO/Vietnamese 17/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V27 NGO/ International 18/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V28 NGO/ International 19/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V29 Central government 20/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V30 International organization 21/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V31 International organization 21/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V32 International organization 21/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V33 International organization 21/8/2012 Hanoi English 
V34 Academic/Vietnamese 22/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V35 NGO/Vietnamese 23/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V36 Diplomatic Corps 24/8/2012 Hanoi English 
V37 NGO/ International 24/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V38 NGO/ Vietnamese 24/8/2012 Hanoi English 
V39 National Assembly member 25/8/2012 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V40 CBO/Vietnamese 13/9/2013 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V41 Local government 13/9/2013 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V42 CBO/Vietnamese 14/9/2013 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
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V43 Local government 14/9/2013 Quang Tri Vietnamese 
V44 Academic/Vietnamese 17/9/2013 Hanoi Vietnamese 
V45 GONGO/Vietnamese 18/9/2013 Hanoi Vietnamese 
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Appendix B: Vietnam’s Key Dates for Elite Politics, 1986-2014 
Jun 1986. Party General Secretary Le Duan dies and Truong Chinh becomes Party General 
Secretary again 
Dec 1986. 6
th
 Party Congress: Doi Moi policy launches. Nguyen Van Linh becomes Party General 
Secretary with Pham Hung as Prime Minister. Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho and Pham Van Dong 
retire from Politburo.  
19 Apr 1987. General election for 496 deputies of the 8
th
 National Assembly (NA). 
Apr 1988. Pham Hung dies and Do Muoi takes over as Prime Minister.  
Oct 1988. Truong Chinh dies. 
Mar 1990. Party Central Committee’s 8th Plenum expels Tran Xuan Bach from Politburo.  
Sep 1990. Vietnam and China normalize relations at the Chengdu summit (official normalization in 
Nov 1991). 
17-27 Jun 1991. 7
th
 Party Congress: Nguyen Van Linh retires  and Do Muoi becomes  Party 
General Secretary, Le Duc Anh becomes standing member of Politburo and Secretariat for foreign 
affairs, defense, and security until Sep 1992. Dao Duy Tung is the standing member of Secretariat 
from Sep 1992 to Dec 1993. 
August 1991. Vo Van Kiet becomes Prime Minister and Nguyen Manh Cam becomes Foreign 
Minister at the 8
th
 National Assembly (the 9
th
 Session). 
Apr 1992. A new Constitution of Vietnam is adopted by the NA on 15 April 1992 and is effective 
as of 18 April 1992. 
19 Jul 1992. General election for 395 deputies of the 9
th
 NA. 
Sep 1992. General Le Duc Anh becomes State President and Nong Duc Manh becomes NA 
Chairman at the first session of the 9
th
 NA. 
Nov 1993. 6
th
 Plenum of 7
th
 CPV CC. Le Kha Phieu (Chairman of General Political Department, 
MoD), Nguyen Manh Cam (Foreign Minister), Nguyen Ha Phan (Chairman of CPV Economic 
Commission and NA Vice Chairman) and Do Quang Thang (Chairman of Control Committee) are 
elected to the Politburo. 
Nguyen Ha Phan becomes the CPV Permanent Secretary from Dec 1993 to April 1996. 
Jul 1995. Vietnam joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), signs the 
Framework Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), and normalizes diplomatic 
relations with the US.  
Jun 1996. 8
th
 Party Congress. Do Muoi continues to be Party General Secretary, Le Kha Phieu is a 
Standing member of the Politburo (The Secretariat is abolished). 
20 Jul 1997. General election for 450 deputies of the 10
th
 NA. 
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Sep 1997. Vo Van Kiet retires and Phan Van Khai becomes Prime Minister, Le Duc Anh retires and 
Tran Duc Luong becomes State President at the first session of the 10
th
 NA. 
Dec 1997. 4
th
 Plenum of the 8
th
 CPV CC: Do Muoi retires, Le Kha Phieu becomes Party General 
Secretary and Pham The Duyet standing member of the Politburo. 
Apr 2001. 9
th
 Party Congress: Le Kha Phieu retires, Nong Duc Manh becomes Party General 
Secretary and Phan Dien is the standing member of the reinstalled Secretariat.  
June 2001. Nguyen Van An becomes NA Chairman. 
19 May 2002. General election for 498 deputies of the 11
th
 NA. 
April 2006. 10
th
 Party Congress: Nong Duc Manh continues Party General Secretary, Truong Tan 
Sang becomes standing member of the Secretariat. 
June 2006. Phan Van Khai retires and Nguyen Tan Dung becomes Prime Minister, Tran Duc Luong 
retires and Nguyen Minh Triet becomes State President, Nguyen Van An retires and Nguyen Phu 
Trong becomes NA Chairman. 
11 Jan 2007. Vietnam is officially acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
20 May 2007. General election for 493 deputies of the 12
th
 NA. 
Jan 2009. 9
th
 Plenum of the 10
th
 CPV CC. To Huy Rua is additionally elected to the Politburo and 
Pham Binh Minh is additionally elected to the CPV Central Committee (from an alternate member).  
Jan 2011. 11
th
 Party Congress. Nong Duc Manh retires and Nguyen Phu Trong becomes Party 
General Secretary and Le Hong Anh becomes the standing member of the Secretariat. 
22 May 2011. General election for 500 deputies of the 13
th
 NA. 
July 2011. Nguyen Minh Triet retires and Truong Tan Sang becomes State President, Nguyen Sinh 
Hung becomes NA Chairman at the first session of the 13
th
 NA. 
May 2013. Nguyen Thien Nhan and Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan are additionally elected to the 
Politburo; Tran Quoc Vuong is additionally elected to the Secretariat. Tran Quoc Vuong is elected 
to the Secretariat. 
Nov 2013. Vu Duc Dam and Pham Binh Minh become Deputy Prime Ministers and Nguyen Thien 
Nhan retires as Deputy Prime Minister.  
28 Nov 2013. The amended Constitution of Vietnam is approved by the NA and is effective as of 1 
Jan 2014. 
 
 
 
 
